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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the Chinese economy by focusing on the specialized human 
capital themes of production processes, regional productivity disparities and 
convergence, cost competitiveness comparisons and private returns to education from 
1978 to 2009.  
Chapter 2 reviews the growth accounting model and measurement methods of its 
components such as capital services, labour inputs, labour composition index and Total 
Factor Productivity index.  
China’s spectacular economic growth is from unequal performance of provinces 
and regions. Thus, chapter 3 examines effects of the physical and human capital on 
disparities and convergence of labour productivity, Total Factor Productivity and 
average wages in China, incorporating the market reform factors. We find that 
composition-adjusted human capital is more important than capital services in the 
production function. We also overcome the endogeneity of schooling in the wage 
function with instrumental variables. 
In chapter 4, we discuss industrial disparities and convergence across countries 
and provinces from labour costs perspective to figure out industries with comparative 
competitiveness advantage.  
Moreover, we correct the Heckman selection bias problems of education returns 
in chapter 5. We find that education returns keep on rising over time, which support 
human capital hypothesis rather than the signalling effect for all age groups except the 
group educated during the “Cultural Revolution”. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
“Knowledge is the only instrument of production 
that is not subject to diminishing returns.” 
(Clark, 1923) 
 
China introduced economic reforms and open-door policies in 1978. After thirty years’ 
growth, China has surpassed Japan to become the second biggest economy in the world 
by 2010. Existing literature shows that the Chinese economic miracle has been mainly 
pushed by investment in both physical and human capital (Ding and Knight, 2011). 
However, investment in physical capital has shown diminishing returns in scale and 
cannot support a sustainable economic growth in China. Instead, as Clark said in his 
Studies in the Economics of Overhead Costs (1923), knowledge is the only instrument 
of production that is not subject to diminishing returns, making human beings the centre 
of the economy.  
China should learn lessons from the experience of developed countries, and shift 
the centre of attention away from focusing solely on physical capital accumulation, 
towards human capital accumulation in areas such as education, skill and 
entrepreneurship. This challenge facing China raises our interest in the specialized 
human capital themes of production processes, regional productivity disparities and 
convergence, cost competitiveness and private returns to education.  
The development of “Human capital theory” in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
followed the revolution of the neoclassical growth model, which focused on the 
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contribution of labour and physical capital, as well as the unaccounted role of 
technology (Solow, 1956). Its empirical growth accounting framework, assessing the 
contribution of the various inputs to aggregate economic growth, was first introduced by 
Solow (1957) and later developed by Kendrick (1961). Dension (1962) and Jorgenson 
and Griliches (1967) extended and refined the analysis by considering changes in the 
composition of capital and labour.  
In the next chapter, we review the growth accounting model and measurement 
methods of its components such as physical capital services, labour inputs, and labour 
composition index (LCI) and Total Factor Productivity (TFP) in China from 1978 to 
2009. We distinguish workers’ characteristics by their education levels to impute labour 
composition indices for regions and provinces. The labour composition indices are 
imputed by both the average (or cell) approach and by the regression approach. 
Compared to the average approach, the regression approach can increase the 
dimensionality of factors in the quality adjustment with few observations, by 
incorporating the interactive variables with regressions.  
Chapter 3 uses the measurement results of physical capital services, labour inputs, 
LCI and TFP from chapter 2 to examine the determining factors of the severe regional 
disparity problem in China’s economic growth (Knight and Song, 2001). If the 
increasing inequality in China is not corrected in time, the uneven growth in 
productivity and wage will not only threaten the ultimate success of China’s economic 
reform, but is also likely to bring about serious social and political unrest  (Chen and 
Feng, 2000). Understanding the drivers of the increasing economic gap between rich 
and poor regions has become an urgent task for Chinese economists.  
Moreover, the neoclassical model of economic growth is based on the hypothesis 
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that each province is converging towards its equilibrium state. We investigate whether 
there are provincial convergence trends of labour productivity, TFP and wages from 
1978 to 2009. Knight and Song (2001) point out that there are two possible explanations 
for the rise of regional inequality in China: economic growth and policies of economic 
reforms. Therefore, we investigate provincial convergence by controlling the market 
reform factors such as ownership, One Child Policy, openness and fiscal expenditures 
on human capital. Furthermore, to analyse the human capital more efficiently, we 
correct the endogeneity problem of education returns using the Generalized 
Instrumental Variables method with three instruments (number of brothers, number of 
sisters and access to tap water). 
In chapter 4, we extend the discussion of the last two chapters to the international 
level. We examine industrial disparities and convergence of labour costs across 
countries and internal provinces. This comparison is only applied to the manufacturing 
subsectors and checks whether China’s position as “the world factory” has been affected 
by relative currency appreciation, rising labour productivity and nominal labour 
compensation after the mid 1990s. The internal provincial comparison aims to assess 
the comparative advantage of nine one-digit sectors for provinces’ development 
strategies, according to their cost competitiveness. We illustrate the drivers and 
decomposition of the changes of relative unit labour costs for the cross-country and 
province comparison. The long time-period of our study, 1978-2009, also allows a 
thorough investigation of industrial cost convergence across countries and among 
provinces. 
However, the neoclassical growth model does not address the sources of wage 
disparity. This gap has been filled by Schultz (1959; 1961b) on the role of knowledge 
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and ability in accounting for productivity growth, and by Mincer (1958) on investment 
on human capital as a determinant of personal earnings (Ehrlich and Murphy, 2007). A 
further development, by Mincer (1974b), shows a profound impact on the measurement 
of private and social rates of returns to schooling and training. It also offers important 
insights concerning wage differentials and the sources of inequality in the distribution of 
labour compensation. Chapter 5 applies these methods on returns to schooling in China 
from 1989 to 2009. We verify the human capital hypothesis for China’s education 
returns, rejecting the signal effect hypothesis that education just reflects signals of 
innate ability rather than the accumulation of human capital. Moreover, traditional 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimates may be biased by selection problems and by 
mix-ups of cohort heterogeneity. Hence, we estimate the marginal effects of returns to 
schooling with the experience of increasing labour markets, using the Heckman 
Selection Model (Gronau, 1974; Lewis, 1974; Heckman, 1976) by four age cohorts. 
In general, the data used in this thesis come from the EU KLEMS dataset, the 
Penn World Table (PWT) 7.0, the International Comparison of output and productivity 
(ICOP), the China Statistical Yearbooks (CSYs) published annually by the State 
Statistical Bureau of China, various issues of Statistical yearbooks published by local 
statistical bureaux, Population Census data published by State Council Population 
Census Office and the NBS Population Division (1985, 1993 and 2001), the 
Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China, and the China 
Household Nutrition Survey (CHNS) dataset. By combining these data with insights 
from economic theory this thesis attempts to shed new insights on Chinese economic 
development.  
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CHAPTER TWO: GROWTH ACCOUNTING ANALYSIS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Economic reforms in China have resulted in unprecedented economic growth since 
1978. In the early years of the new millennium, however, China found itself with one of 
the highest degrees of regional inequality in the world and over its history (Yang, 2002; 
Kanbur and Zhang, 2005; Fleisher et al., 2010).  
Chinese province
1
 show quite different growth paths with wide regional 
disparities in growth rates after the reforms and open-door policies launched at the end 
of the 1970s. In the first year of our study (1978), the industrial Northeast region
2
 was 
the growth engine of China with the highest level of real GDP per worker (5,288 Yuan, 
about 633 US dollar in 1995)
3
 among the four regions. At the same time, the real GDP 
per worker of the Coastal region was 2,964 Yuan which was a little higher than that of 
the Interior (2,022 Yuan) and the West (2,514 Yuan) regions, but only 56 percent of the 
Northeast region.  
However, the Coastal has been growing much faster than other regions so that by 
the last year of our study (2009), its GDP per worker (48,818 Yuan) has increased about 
16.5 fold over the thirty-two years. The Coastal has the highest annual growth rate at 8.6 
                                                             
1
 China has 31 administrative divisions. We exclude Tibet due to lack of data. And, we combine Hainan 
with Guangdong, and Chongqing with Sichuan to ensure consistency over the entire period of 1978-2009, 
because Hainan was separated from Guangdong in 1988 and Chongqing was separated from Sichuan 
province in 1996. Thus, we analyze 28 provinces in this thesis. 
 
2
 We categorize the 30 administrative divisions (excluding Tibet) into four regions in this thesis: the 
northeast region (including Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning), the Coastal (including Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, 
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, and Guangdong-Hainan), the Interior (Shanxi, Anhui, 
Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei and Hunan) and west (Guangxi, Sichuan-Chongqing, Guizhou, Yunnan, Inner 
Mongolia, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang). The division of the four regions is based on 
research regarding the major economic and geographical clusters in economic growth and development in 
China. See geographic graph of regions in Appendix Table A2.1.  
 
3 
All variables are in real terms based on 1995 RMB Yuan in this chapter. We use exchange rate 1US 
dollar=8.35 RMB Yuan to calculate the equivalent value in US dollar in 1995. 
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percent per year among the four regions, while the old growth engine, the Northeast 
gradually loses its power and achieves annual growth rate at 7.0 percent per year before 
1994. In 2009, GDP per worker in the Coastal and Northeast regions are nearly double 
that in the two lagging regions - the Interior and West (see Figure 2.1). Therefore, the 
much higher economic growth rates of the Coastal enlarge the regional disparities of 
productivity in China. This chapter aims to explain the regional disparities of economic 
growth using a growth accounting approach.      
 
Figure 2.1: Real GDP per worker by region (Yuan in 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
Data sources: (Hsueh and Li, 1999); various years China Statistical Yearbook (NBS, 1999); National 
Bureau of Statistics (1999). 
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2.2 Growth accounting model 
2.2.1 Methodology  
We apply the growth accounting framework to assess the contributions of the various 
inputs to aggregate economic growth. This methodology was first introduced by Solow 
(1957) and later developed in Kendrick (1961). Dension (1962) and Jorgenson and 
Griliches (1967) extended and refined the analysis by considering changes in the 
composition of capital and labour. The growth accounting model is based on production 
possibility frontiers where value added is a function of capital, labour, and technology. 
The production function is given by: 
 
),,( ptptptpt ALKfY                                             (2.1) 
 
where Y is value added; K is an index of capital services; L is an index of labour inputs; 
A reflects Hicks-neutral technical change, all of which are indexed by provinces p (= 
1,…, 28) and time t (=1978,…, 2009).  
Under the assumptions of competitive factor markets, full input utilisation and 
constant returns to scale (CRS), the growth of value added can be expressed as the cost-
share weighted growth of inputs and technological change. Using the trans-log 
functional form in such analyses, the growth accounting equation is: 
 
Y
ptpt
L
ptpt
K
ptpt ALVKVY lnlnlnln                   (2.2) 
 
The above equation indicates the proportions of value added growth accounted for 
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growth in capital services K, labour inputs L and technical change measured as Hicks-
neutral technical change A or Total Factor Productivity (TFP), respectively.
4
 Because of 
our approach to measure capital services, Hicks-neutral technical change A only 
includes disembodied technical change. Moreover, V  denotes the two-period average 
share of inputs K or L in nominal output defined as follows: 
pt
Y
pt
pt
K
ptK
pt
YP
KP
V  , 
pt
Y
pt
pt
L
ptL
pt
YP
LP
V   
1
LK
VV                                              
 (2.3) 
 
 
2.2.2 Measuring capital services 
The starting point to measure capital stock is the perpetual inventory method (PIM), 
introduced by Goldsmith (1951). The PIM consist of adding the net investment data of 
the current year to an assumed base year of capital stock. Assuming geometric 
depreciation, the general formula is given by:  
 
ttt IKK  1)1(                                    (2.4) 
 
where 
tK  is capital stock;   is the depreciation rate; tI  
is the investment which refers 
to investment in fixed assets.  
For the aggregation of capital services over the different asset types (k, assuming 
                                                             
4
 The composition of labour inputs is measured as the labour composition index (LCI) which will be 
discussed later.  
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two kinds of asset types, for example, S for structures and E for equipment assets), it is 
assumed that aggregate capital services are a trans-log function of the services of 
individual assets. It is also assumed that the flow of capital services for each asset type k 
(=S or E) is proportional to its stock, independent of time. The Tornqvist quantity index 
of individual capital types as follows: 
 
ptk
k
K
ptkpt KwK ,, lnln  
                                    (2.5) 
 
where ptkK ,ln indicates the growth of capital stock by capital type k, and weights are 
given by the period average shares of each type in the value of capital compensation. As 
we assume that marginal products are equal to real returns, also equal to rental costs, the 
weighting procedure ensures that inputs which have a higher price also have a larger 
influence in the input index. Hence, equation (2.5) can be rewritten as follows: 
 
E
pt
E
pt
S
pt
S
ptpt KwKwK lnlnln                      (2.6) 
 
where 
S
ptw  are the period-average shares of asset S in total capital costs in province p 
and year t, and similarly for asset E. Weights are given by the average shares of each 
component in the value of capital compensation )(
2
1
1,
S
tp
S
pt
S
pt WWW  and 
E
pt
E
pt
S
pt
S
pt
S
pt
S
ptS
pt
KPKP
KP
W
**
*

 , where 
K
sptP is the price of capital service from asset S. 
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Rental prices, or user-cost of capital, can be estimated using the standard approach 
grounded in the arbitrage equation derived from neoclassical theory of investment, 
introduced by Jorgenson (1963) and Jorgenson and Griliches (1967). In equilibrium, an 
investor is indifferent between two alternatives: buying a unit of capital at investment 
price I tspP 1,  , collecting a rental fee and then selling the depreciated structures for 
I
spts P)1(   in the next period, or earning a nominal rate of return spti , on a different 
investment opportunity. The cost-of-capital equation is: 
 
)(** 1,,1,
I
tsp
I
tsp
I
sptSspt
I
tsp
S
pt PPPiPP                     (2.7) 
 
This formula shows that the rental fee is determined by the nominal rate of returns, the 
rate of economic depreciation and the asset specific capital gains. We will use this 
method to measure capital services.  
 
2.2.3 Measuring labour composition index  
The labour composition index (LCI)
 5
 is an important component in the decomposition 
of labour input in the growth accounting literature (O'Mahony and Timmer, 2009), 
which is also called the “labour quality” index in Jorgenson et al. (2005) and Schwerdt 
and Turunen (2007). In emerging knowledge economy, changes in labour composition 
index is mostly driven by greater demand for skilled workers (Timmer et al., 2010). 
                                                             
5
 The labour composition index adjusts the total hours worked for the composition of labour, which 
requires identification of separate, heterogeneous groups of labour input whose work-hours are likely to 
have varying effectiveness. The LCI is particularly important when we consider changes over time in the 
labour input. For example, consider the effect of the total number of hours remaining fixed over time, but 
the composition changing so that the hours are being performed by increasingly intelligent workers. 
These hours being more efficient will result in greater output. 
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To consider labour heterogeneity, we can multiply the number of employed 
persons
6
 by the labour composition index to proxy human capital in the labour inputs. 
Labour composition index accounts for the level of skill provided per worker which 
increases with improvement of knowledge and innovation. Ignoring the growth of 
labour composition will underestimate the contribution of labour inputs to economic 
growth (Jorgenson, 2005). The growth rate of labour composition is as follows: 
 
ptptpt HLLCI lnlnln                             (2.8) 
 
ptHln  is the growth rate of unadjusted labour input  - number of employed persons at 
different education levels, which is defined as follows: 
 
1,
lnln


tp
pt
pt
H
H
H                                         (2.9) 
    
 
4
1m mptpt
hH                                           (2.10) 
 
where hmpt is the number of persons employed for the particular educational level m in 
the province p and year t. ptLln is the growth rate of weighted composition-adjusted 
labour inputs, and the weight is the average labour compensation share for a particular 
group (assuming there are four groups) 
 
                                                             
6
 The information of annual hours worked by education level/province/year is not available in China, so 
we use the number of employed persons instead. 
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)]ln(*)(
2
1
[ln
1,
4
1 1,1,
1,1,
4
1
4
1

 





tmp
mpt
m tmptmp
tmptmp
m mptmpt
mptmpt
mpt
h
h
hW
hW
hW
hW
L             (2.11) 
 
where Wmpt is the average measured wage rate for particular education level m in 
province p and year t. In a competitive market, wage differentials should represent 
individuals’ productivity differentials. The use of wage as a measure of a worker’s 
productivity is based on the underlying assumption that relative wages are equal to the 
relative marginal products of workers. Various characteristics of actual labour markets, 
such as discrimination, union bargaining, signalling and mismatch, may result in 
violations of this assumption (Ho and Jorgenson, 1999). However, due to the lack of 
more direct measures, wage remains the best available proxy of a worker’s productivity. 
There are two methods, the average approach and the regression approach to 
measure wages. The average approach is to use the average compensation share 
attributable to a particular cell (Ho and Jorgenson, 1999) to estimate the wages Wmpt. 
They construct a quality/composition-adjusted measure of labour inputs based on a 
cross-classification of number of employed persons into a number of cells by observed 
worker characteristics. On the other hand, the regression approach is applied by the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (1993) and Schwerdt and Turunen (2007), using a 
Mincerian wage regression approach to estimate cell means. We try both methods in this 
chapter. 
 
2.3 Measuring capital services in China 
2.3.1 Data sources  
To illustrate the effect of physical and human capital on productivity, we need measure 
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variables such as value added, capital services, labour inputs and the labour composition 
index. Our data on capital services are mainly from macro level data in various years of 
the China Statistical Yearbook (CSYs), Population Census (State Council Population 
Census Office and the NBS Population Division, 1985, 1993 and 2001), Hsueh and Li 
(1999) and National Bureau of Statistics (1999). In this sector, we firstly follow the 
methods in Timmer et al. (2007) to construct the capital services in China.  
Our investment data are from the National Bureau of Statistics (1999) and various 
Chinese Statistical Yearbooks, which provide information for three categories of capital 
- buildings and structures, machinery and equipment, and other assets. The “other assets” 
refers to the expenses related to the structures and installation projects and to the 
purchase of equipment. In line with Fu (2008), we reallocate the “other assets” into 
structures and equipments according to their ratios in investment excluding “other 
assets”. 
 
2.3.2 Measurement method 
Hulten and Wykoff (1981) estimated depreciation rates of 3.7 percent for structure and 
13.3 percent for equipment in the US. The Chinese official depreciation rates are 
unusually low, in line with the overestimated service life of fixed assets in the absence 
of markets during the central-planned period (Wu and Xu, 2002). Since the National 
Bureau of Statistics does not provide life length and depreciate rates for the different 
kinds of investments, we derive depreciation rates based on Chinese tax regulations.
7
 
According to equation (2.4), we have the capital stock of structures as follows:  
                                                             
7
 Before 1994, the legal life of structures is 40 years, and equipments’ legal life is 18 years. After 1994, 
the structures’ legal life is 30 years, and equipments’ legal life is 13 years. Thus, the geometric 
depreciation rates for structures are 5 percent and 7 percent, and for equipments are 11 percent and 15 
percent, with the 1994 as break. 
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The nominal rate of returns here is the one-year deposit rate, and the asset price is 
the capital deflator of investment for structure. To decide the starting point of capital 
stock from the value of gross fixed capital formation (1952 value, or the average value 
between 1952 and 1956) adjusted by its depreciation rates, we make a sensitivity test to 
compare their derived capital stock. We find that these two lists of capital stocks 
calculated are similar, because the investment was very low in the newly founded the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). So we choose to rely on the gross fixed capital 
formation in 1952 multiplying life time as the starting point to calculate the capital 
stock. After we get the nominal capital stock for structure and equipment, we add them 
together to get the nominal capital stock for each province p in each year t. Using the 
capital stock deflators, which equal to the GDP deflators from 1878-1991, and the 
investment deflators from 1992-2009, and imputed by the general retail price index for 
1952 to 1977, we derive the real capital stock for our productivity analysis. 
 
2.3.3 Results 
Table 2.1 presents the annual growth rate of real capital stock during three time periods, 
1978 to 1988, 1989 to 1999 and 2000 to 2009 by region. Physical capital grows faster in 
the Coastal than other regions before 2000, but becomes slower in 2000-2009. It 
suggests that the Coastal is shifting its growth driver from physical capital to other 
factors (such as human capital) after 2000.   
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Table 2.1 Annual growth rate of real capital stock  
 
Location 1978-1988 1989-1999 2000-2009 
Northeast 0.1 0.09 0.16 
Coastal 0.16 0.15 0.14 
Interior 0.1 0.11 0.16 
West 0.09 0.12 0.16 
Note: The real capital stock is calculated by the perpetual inventory method. 
 
2.4 Measuring labour composition index in China 
2.4.1 Data sources  
Macro level data in the China Statistics Yearbooks 1989-2009 are used to investigate the 
change of labour composition index over long and continuous time period. 
Notwithstanding, a major limitation of macro level data is that only mean (average) 
income are reported at the provincial level. Directly using macro level data is equivalent 
to assuming that all individuals in a group have the same income. This potentially 
underestimates inequality within each province.  Hence, micro level data of the CHNS 
is also used to improve the data quality of the labour composition index in this sector.  
The CHNS dataset is conducted by China’s National Institute of Nutrition and 
Food Safety, the Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention, and the University 
of North Carolina. It is typically available for isolated years and individual provinces 
for urban and rural areas, containing accurate information on wages, education, and 
other demographic information. The survey employs a multistage random-cluster 
sampling process to draw households from eight provinces during 1989-1997 and nine 
provinces thereafter.
8
 Jorgenson (1990) measures labour quality indices, incorporating 
                                                             
8
 8 provinces (Liaoning, Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi and Guizhou) for years 
1989-1993; 8 provinces in 1997 (replace Liaoning with Heilongjiang, others are the same); 9 provinces 
for years 2000-2009 (with both Liaoning and Heilongjiang, and other provinces as well). In 1989, the 
CHNS surveyed 15,917 individuals from 3,795 households. From 1993 onwards, the survey added new 
households and communities to replace those that were no longer participating. But most households have 
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both individual data on hours worked and labour compensation from the Censuses of 
Population.  Following his work, this chapter derives the wages from the CHNS dataset, 
and then incorporate the macro level data to compare the two methods of labour 
composition index.   
 
2.4.2 Measurement method 
First, we need to identify categories to identify workers with different effectiveness. The 
categories should be workers’ demographic characteristics relevant to marginal products, 
under the assumption of perfect competition. Dension (1962) measures labour quality 
changes due to the age, sex and education. Chinloy (1980) uses gender, class of worker, 
age, educational attainment and occupation. And, Jorgenson et al. (1987) use gender, 
age, educational attainment, class of worker, occupation and industry.   
In this chapter, workers’ education attainment is considered as a proxy for human 
capital. The China Statistical Yearbooks have only categorized provincial persons 
employed by education levels. The information of education levels by age and gender is 
limited in macro level data. In terms of economic theory, formal education is the main 
source of general human capital, with the basic proposition that investment in education 
results in higher human capital and productivity (Becker, 1993). Individuals with the 
same education level are regarded as an isolated island within which all hours worked 
have the same productivity, but facing different productivities when compared with each 
other. Hence, different education groups are imperfect substitutes in production (Lindley 
and Stephen, 2011; Katz and Murphy, 1992).
9
  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
been followed up across the eight waves. 
 
9
 Previous studies also uses only one variable (education) to obtain quality indexes. For example, Barro 
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From macro level dataset, we get variables such as number of persons employed 
over 1989-2009, and education levels of persons employed from 1996 to 2009. 
Following Cheng and Kwan (2000), we construct the education levels of persons 
employed from 1989 to 1995 based on information of the entire population (the 
percentages of the population aged 6 and over with primary school, junior secondary 
school, senior secondary school and college education) by province. Consequently, we 
compute changes in the aggregate labour inputs as a weighted average of the working 
hours of each cell and time period, where the weights are given by the average share of 
compensation attributable to each cell in two adjacent years. We calculate growth in 
labour composition as the difference between growth in this aggregate labour inputs and 
growth in a raw measure of hours worked.  
Second, we apply two methods, the average approach and the regression approach 
to measure average wages using the CHNS dataset. We consider urban and rural areas 
separately and then weight them by the urban-rural ratios of persons employed.
10
 The 
average approach applies the average compensation share attributable to a particular cell 
(Ho and Jorgenson, 1999). We construct a composition-adjusted measure of labour input 
based on a cross-classification of hours worked into a number of cells by observed 
worker characteristics (education levels in this chapter).  
The regression approach is applied by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
(1993) and Schwerdt and Turunen (2007), using a Mincerian wage regression to 
estimate cell means. With the regression approach, we can increase the dimensionality 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
and Lee (1996) used actual years of schooling to compare the human capital stock of different countries.  
 
10
 The effect of education is significantly different between the urban and rural areas, which are verified 
by the sensitivity tests. The huge urban-rural inequality results in significant differences in the 
accumulation of human capital and their returns. 
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of factors in the composition adjustment with few observations by incorporating the 
interactive variables. We estimate wage equations for the persons employed in available 
provinces and years using the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression.
11 
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where wit is the nominal hourly wage rate for a worker i with education level m in 
province p in year t;
12
 edumt are dummies for education categories (m=1 - 4): primary 
school and below, lower middle school, upper school (including upper middle school 
and vocational school), and college and above; propt represents 9 provinces in the 
surveys; and urbanut represent individual’s location (u=0 for rural; 1 for urban). In the 
regression, the interactive variable “primary school and below*Guizhou province*rural” 
is the baseline group. Quadratic age and gender are control variables.
13
 We run this 
regression for each year t. Following the BLS method, average values for the control 
variables for the whole sample are used to calculate measured wages, such that their 
impact is excluded from the calculation of the labour composition index (BLS, 1993).  
Then, we construct measured wages Wmpt for education level m, province p and 
year t based on the coefficients of the interactive variables in the equation as follows: 
                                                             
11
 We will correct the endogeneity problem of education returns in Section 3.6, and the Heckman 
selection bias of education returns in chapter 5. 
 
12
 We divide the nominal annual earning (including wages, subsidy and bonus) by annual hours worked to 
derive a measure of nominal hourly wage rate for each individual. Different from the aggregate provincial 
dataset from CSYs, the CHNS micro data provides the individual’s annual hours worked.  
 
13
 Age is a proxy for the stock of general experience that embodied in a person.
 
We use age rather than 
experience because the CHNS dataset does not provide information for experience. Women earn less than 
males even when controlling for all the other relevant characteristics. 
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For both the average approach and the regression approach, we then impute the 
measured wages between the surveyed years. For example, the measured wages in 1994 
can be imputed by the annual growth rate g between 1993 and 1997: 
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2.4.3 Results 
Table 2.2 shows the ratio of persons employed who work in the urban area to total 
persons employed, i.e. urban share for the nine provinces and the four regions from 
1989 to 2009. These urban-rural ratios will be used as weights for the labour 
composition index calculation. After the foundation of P. R. China in 1949, the 
Northeast (including Liaoning and Heilongjiang provinces) was centrally planned to 
focus on the secondary industries. Hence, this region had the highest urban share among 
regions in 1989 (about 56 percent), but declined to about 44 percent in recent years. The 
Coastal developed quickly over time as its urban share increased from 27 percent in 
1989 to 38 percent in recent years. The urban shares of the other two regions (the 
Interior and the West) are quite stable around 20 percent. 
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Table 2.2: Urban Share (by province and region) 
 
Urban share 1989-2009 1989-1999 2000-2009 
Northeast 0.49 0.55 0.43 
Liaoning 0.51 0.56 0.45 
Heilongjiang 0.52 0.60 0.43 
Coastal 0.30 0.29 0.32 
Jiangsu 0.29 0.26 0.31 
Shandong 0.24 0.23 0.25 
Interior 0.22 0.23 0.20 
Henan 0.18 0.19 0.16 
Hubei 0.30 0.32 0.28 
Hunan 0.19 0.20 0.18 
West 0.21 0.21 0.21 
Guangxi 0.16 0.17 0.16 
Guizhou 0.14 0.15 0.13 
 
Note:  Urban share is the ratio of persons employed who work in the urban area to total persons employed 
 
         h    
                                         
                    
 
 
Table 2.3 presents the nominal hourly wages derived from the average approach 
by region (results by province are listed in Appendix Table A2.1). Generally, hourly 
wage rates of all sub-groups increase over time.  In 1989, most of the wage rates was 
nearly 0.55 - 0.65 Yuan per hour, reflecting the national rigid wage-setting irrelevant 
education level or location. With the deepening wage reforms, for all education levels 
and locations, the wage rates doubled from 1993 to 1997. And, the wage rates in 2009 
doubled the wage level in 1997 again. The difference across education levels and 
locations mainly happened in the 2000s.  
The highest returns to education occurred in both the urban and rural areas of the 
Coastal and Interior. Nearly in all provinces and regions, workers with upper school and 
above degrees earned more in the urban area (urban premium), suggesting 
complementarities between technology in the urban and high skilled workers. Similarly, 
workers with lower middle school and below degrees earn more in the rural area (rural 
premium), suggesting complementarities between technology in the rural and medium 
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skilled workers. 
 
Table 2.3: Average wages by region (the average approach) 
                  
Average 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
Primary school and below (urban area) 
Northeast 0.66 0.85 0.93 2.81 3.49 4.5 8.32 6.24 
Coastal 0.63 0.99 1.43 2.87 5.3 5.71 5.66 8.27 
Interior 0.65 0.95 1.6 2.93 4.09 5.03 5.5 10.85 
West 0.57 0.7 1.66 3.08 4.63 3.23 4.67 5.94 
Lower middle school (urban area) 
Northeast 0.5 0.65 1.07 3.37 4.53 5.1 6.29 8.27 
Coastal 0.65 0.83 1.49 3.36 5.53 6.6 6.81 10.97 
Interior 0.69 0.82 1.29 3.13 4.05 6.29 10.03 9.27 
West 0.58 0.59 1.3 2.7 5.57 4.24 5.11 7.81 
Upper school (urban area) 
Northeast 0.6 0.67 0.86 2.99 5.11 7.92 9.2 10.58 
Coastal 0.6 0.83 1.62 3.62 6.01 8.1 8.39 14.26 
Interior 0.77 0.8 1.15 3.78 6.44 7.11 9.31 12.88 
West 0.53 0.64 1.23 2.64 4.08 8.12 10.03 13.35 
College and above (urban area) 
Northeast 0.63 0.75 1.09 3.04 6.7 10.08 13.87 17.66 
Coastal 0.65 0.78 1.44 4.16 8.66 9.45 13.22 17.33 
Interior 0.71 0.86 2.35 5.27 8.5 11.7 16.08 17.32 
West 0.59 0.69 1.41 2.92 5.06 14.29 10.22 16.06 
Primary school and below (rural area) 
Northeast 0.79 1.14 1.43 2.63 6.42 4.84 5.91 16.09 
Coastal 0.61 0.93 1.28 3.66 4.34 5.08 3.92 8.28 
Interior 0.63 0.88 1.39 3.58 5.04 5.09 6.43 11.76 
West 0.72 0.89 1.12 2.79 4.15 3.77 4.43 5.58 
Lower middle school (rural area) 
Northeast 0.56 0.93 1.39 3.35 4.09 8.03 7.17 8.84 
Coastal 0.68 0.76 1.17 3.07 4.27 5.62 5.76 9.73 
Interior 0.93 0.79 1.84 2.82 4.16 4.55 6.4 15.16 
West 0.55 0.76 1.42 3.18 4.73 5.93 6.43 8.21 
Upper school (rural area) 
Northeast 0.47 1.87 1.17 1.86 3.88 6.32 8.1 10.37 
Coastal 0.63 0.75 1.23 3.58 5.31 7.29 8.36 10.71 
Interior 0.64 0.74 0.89 3.65 5.31 6.29 7.43 12.75 
West 0.49 0.67 0.95 2.94 4.84 6.56 6.48 13.03 
College and above (rural area) 
Northeast 0.59 0.82 1.02 1.88 4.27 6.26 11.01 13.15 
Coastal 0.48 0.65 1.03 2.51 5.01 16.39 11.19 13.44 
Interior 0.65 0.77 1.32 3.21 12.36 6.82 8.27 18.08 
West 0.53 0.69 0.6 3.48 4.62 5.79 9.92 17.76 
 
Note: The average approach is to calculate the average wages for a particular cell, such as “Northeast * 
Primary school and below * 1989”. 
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Table 2.4 represents the coefficients of the OLS regression model in equation 
(2.13) by region, using “primary school and below * the West region * rural area” as the 
baseline group.
14
 These coefficients are regarded as the incremental effects on the 
baseline group.  
In the urban areas, the significantly positive incremental effects are found in 
higher educated groups (for example College and above) since 1993 as we expect. 
However, the incremental effects of higher educated workers in the rural areas are only 
found prominent since 2004. For those medium or low education groups, the wage 
differentials are significant in the urban areas only after 2000, being similar to the rural 
areas. It is consistent with what we find in the average approach and suggests that the 
skill-biased technology, for instance,  the Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT) in O’Mahony et al. (2008) was firstly introduced to the urban areas from the 
advanced western countries with the openness policies, and later the rural areas. 
Therefore, the significant wage differentials among education levels and locations 
mainly appear in the 2000s and more prominent for medium and higher education 
groups such as upper school, and college and above. These results are also consistent 
with the transition processes of Chinese labour markets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
14
 The coefficients of the OLS regression model by province can be seen in Appendix Table A2.2. 
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Table 2.4: Measured coefficients of wages by region (OLS regression)  
                  
OLS 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
 
Primary school and below (Urban Area) 
Northeast 0.076 0.013 -0.124 -0.059 -0.153 0.151 -0.018 0.023 
Coastal 0.047 0.03 0.255 0.031 0.135 0.180* 0.219 0.328**  
Interior 0.085 0.107 0.128 0.051 -0.064 0.077 0.178 0.519*** 
West -0.1 -0.132* 0.143 -0.022 -0.179 -0.214 0.1 0.029 
 
Lower middle school (Urban Area) 
Northeast -0.048 -0.111 -0.064 0.109 0.061 0.168 0.219 0.299**  
Coastal 0.173* 0.058 0.249* 0.065 0.105 0.436*** 0.322** 0.481*** 
Interior 0.155 0.106 0.141 0.117 -0.046 0.201 0.421*** 0.368*** 
West -0.022 -0.191** 0.047 -0.053 0.009 0.075 0.098 0.219*   
 
Upper school (Urban Area) 
Northeast 0.099 -0.034 -0.141 0.075 0.247** 0.653*** 0.589*** 0.565*** 
Coastal 0.095 0.12 0.413*** 0.265*** 0.299** 0.698*** 0.550*** 0.775*** 
Interior 0.191* 0.111 0.069 0.205** 0.308*** 0.560*** 0.670*** 0.741*** 
West -0.062 -0.115 0.171 -0.008 0.085 0.680*** 0.641*** 0.685*** 
 
College and above (Urban Area) 
Northeast 0.131 0.002 0.027 -0.055 0.474*** 0.982*** 1.042*** 1.171*** 
Coastal 0.215* -0.004 0.216 0.444*** 0.620*** 0.888*** 1.003*** 1.124*** 
Interior 0.242** 0.116 0.306** 0.550*** 0.633*** 1.047*** 1.119*** 1.116*** 
West 0.117 -0.014 0.249** 0.141 0.249 0.863*** 0.949*** 1.022*** 
 
Primary school and below (Rural Area) 
Northeast 0.151 0.208 -0.006 -0.041 0.002 0.038 0.181 0.553*** 
Coastal -0.045 -0.027 0.062 0.11 0.013 -0.063 -0.069 0.194 
Interior -0.091 -0.092 -0.18 0.07 -0.114 -0.119 0.135 0.347**  
 
Lower middle school (Rural Area) 
Northeast -0.088 0.069 0.028 -0.166 -0.125 0.205 0.159 0.253**  
Coastal 0.055 -0.018 0.105 -0.034 0.014 0.208* 0.201* 0.326*** 
Interior 0.048 -0.087 -0.077 -0.051 -0.001 0.187 0.24 0.446*** 
West -0.024 -0.036 0.168** 0.099 0.077 0.313*** 0.189** 0.263**  
 
Upper school (Rural Area) 
Northeast -0.08 0.039 -0.19 -0.331*** 0.024 0.456*** 0.504*** 0.582*** 
Coastal 0.099 -0.046 0.08 0.159* 0.224* 0.473*** 0.507*** 0.405*** 
Interior -0.098 -0.087 -0.147 0.135 0.083 0.403*** 0.454*** 0.680*** 
West -0.117 -0.104 -0.091 0.08 0.174 0.458*** 0.380*** 0.568*** 
 
College and above (Rural Area) 
Northeast 0.136 0.08 -0.032 -0.297*** 0.111 0.508*** 0.848*** 0.866*** 
Coastal -0.018 -0.058 0.02 -0.047 0.235 1.242*** 0.848*** 0.924*** 
Interior 0.11 0.072 0.122 0.189 0.673** 0.633*** 0.697*** 0.905*** 
West -0.136 0.026 -0.570*** 0.283*** 0.131 0.517*** 0.819*** 0.891*** 
R-square 0.092 0.093 0.089 0.081 0.086 0.173 0.191 0.181 
N 3325 2981 2498 2562 2555 1841 1988 2277 
Notes:  
1. The coefficients are incremental effects on the baseline group “primary school and below * the 
West region * rural area”. 
2. Notes: Standard errors are in italics. The stars *, ** and *** indicate the significance level at the 
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively for two-tail test.  
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With the nominal hourly wage rates from the average approach and OLS 
regression approach, we get the labour composition index by region (with the West as 
the baseline region starting from 100 in 1989) and province (with Guizhou as the 
baseline province starting from 100 in 1989) in Table 2.5. The detailed labour 
composition indices per year by province are presented in Appendix Table A2.3 and in 
Appendix Table A2.4 by region. In general, the labour composition indices increase 
over time especially after 2000. 
The labour composition indices calculated from the regression approach have less 
variation than from the average approach possibly due to better controlling. In both 
methods, the Interior (101.61 and 102.33 respectively) always has the highest LCI 
among four regions. The outstanding growth rates of the LCI in the Interior suggest the 
catching up processes of this region to the richest Coastal.  
Moreover, from the OLS regression approach, Heilongjiang province in the 
Northeast also has high LCI as in the Interior. For example, in the first survey year 1989, 
the highest LCI from the average approach is in Henan province (109.76) while the 
highest LCI from the OLS regression approach is in Heilongjiang province (104.79).  
Therefore, after two decades, Henan province has become the one with highest LCI 
(121.20 and 114.18 respectively) among all provinces. The lowest labour composition 
index is in Liaoning from the average approach and in Guizhou from the regression 
approach.  
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Table 2.5: Average labour composition index 
 
Average LCI 
Average approach OLS approach 
1989-
2009 
1989- 
1999 
2000- 
2009 
1989-
2009 
1989-
1999 
2000-
2009 
Northeast 95.60 95.40 95.81 98.95 98.33 99.64 
Liaoning 94.53 94.34 94.74 101.44 100.94 101.99 
Heilongjiang 105.42 104.89 106.00 105.96 105.06 106.96 
Coastal 99.15 98.66 99.70 101.85 100.99 102.80 
Jiangsu 100.77 99.72 101.92 104.95 103.27 106.80 
Shandong 101.82 101.74 101.91 104.30 104.03 104.61 
Interior 102.91 101.91 104.01 104.47 102.85 106.26 
Henan 115.70 111.83 119.95 108.48 104.36 113.03 
Hubei 104.36 104.00 104.76 106.17 104.98 107.48 
Hunan 104.65 100.46 109.26 103.64 100.97 106.57 
West 100.49 99.54 101.54 101.20 100.23 102.25 
Guangxi 98.68 97.31 100.19 101.96 100.35 103.74 
Guizhou 99.16 98.75 99.61 100.17 99.91 100.45 
 
 
 
Table 2.6 indicates the annual growth rates of labour composition indices derived 
from both the average and OLS approaches, by region and province over the two 
periods, 1989 to 1999, and 2000 to 2009. Provinces and regions perform much better in 
the 2000s, especially in Henan province with the annual growth rates above 1.1 percent. 
Besides Henan and Hunan, the growth rates of LCI in Jiangsu and Heilongjiang are also 
outstanding. Gansu has no much progress in LCI in the past two decades. Therefore, the 
disparities of growth rates of LCI between provinces and regions in the recent years 
suggest the contribution of human capital formation to decrease the regional disparities 
in China. 
We will use the labour composition index calculated by the OLS regressions in the 
rest of this thesis, since the OLS method can increase the dimensionality of factors in 
the composition adjustment with few observations by incorporating the interactive 
variables. The interactive variables “education level dummies * province dummies * 
urban dummies” can describe the human capital analysis more precisely, especially for a 
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transition country as China. 
 
Table 2.6: Annual growth rates of Labour composition index  
 
 
Average approach OLS approach 
1989-
2009 
1989-
1999 
2000-
2009 
1989-
2009 
1989-
1999 
2000-
2009 
Northeast -0.02% -0.10% 0.07% 0.10% -0.06% 0.27% 
Liaoning 0.01% -0.11% 0.16% 0.14% -0.02% 0.35% 
Heilongjiang 0.04% 0.19% -0.13% 0.09% 0.04% 0.10% 
Coastal 0.06% -0.10% 0.19% 0.13% 0.03% 0.19% 
Jiangsu 0.17% -0.15% 0.52% 0.29% 0.07% 0.55% 
Shandong 0.07% -0.03% 0.17% 0.07% 0.01% 0.10% 
Interior 0.15% 0.02% 0.19% 0.23% 0.09% 0.27% 
Henan 0.50% 0.31% 0.45% 0.53% 0.29% 0.49% 
Hubei -0.01% 0.16% -0.19% 0.17% 0.22% 0.03% 
Hunan 0.62% -0.03% 1.10% 0.39% -0.09% 0.75% 
West 0.10% -0.01% 0.18% 0.10% 0.08% 0.07% 
Guangxi 0.18% 0.11% 0.21% 0.19% 0.11% 0.18% 
Guizhou 0.00% -0.15% 0.14% 0.00% 0.02% -0.03% 
 
 
 
2.5 Total factor productivity (TFP) 
We calculate the TFP growth according to method referred to O’Mahony and Timmer 
(2009) which is based on the index number approach. 
 
pt
L
ptpt
L
ptptpt LVKVYA lnln)1(lnln                (2.17) 
 
where Y, K and L are GDP, capital stock and labour inputs. 
L
ptV  denotes the two-period 
average labour share, which is defined as the ratio of labour compensation to GDP.  
First of all, the labour share 
L
ptV  is regarded as the weight for the production factor 
- labour, reflecting the marginal cost of labour usage in growth accounting 
decompositions. According to the income approach in the China Statistics Yearbooks 
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(CSYs), GDP is the sum of labour remuneration, depreciation, operating surplus and net 
taxes on production
15
. To avoid the potential underestimation of labour shares due to 
non-reported incomes, we use labour remuneration
16
 rather than wage bills to measure 
labour compensation. Returns to capital are represented by depreciation and the 
operating surplus. In addition, in the absence of detailed information about the various 
tax types of net taxes on production, we follow Holz (2006)’s suggestion to split the net 
taxes on production as follows: 
Split ratios for labour = Labour remuneration / (labour remuneration + 
depreciation + operating surplus) 
The imputed labour returns within Net taxes on production = Net taxes on 
production * Split ratios for labour 
Total labour returns = Labour remuneration + the imputed labour returns in net 
taxes on production 
Labour share = Total labour returns / GDP 
 
Then, there are various kinds of price index used here. The implicit GDP deflators 
are applied as in many previous studies (Rawski, 1993; Maddison, 1998; Woo, 1998; 
Wu, 2000a) to deflate nominal values into real ones. To transfer the nominal capital 
stock into real values, we use the “price index of investment in fixed assets” from the 
                                                             
15
 Net taxes on production refer to taxes on production less subsidies on production. The taxes on 
production refers to the various taxes, extra charges and fees levied on the production units on their 
production, sale and business activities as well as on the use of some factors of production, such as fixed 
assets, land and labour in the production activities they are engaged in. Subsidies on production refer to 
the unilateral government transfer to the production units, including subsidies on the loss due to 
implementation of government policies, price subsidies, etc.  
 
16
 Labour remuneration not only refers to the total payment of various forms to workers including wages, 
bonuses and allowances earned in cash or other kinds, but also includes all benefits such as free medical 
services, medicine expenses, transport subsidies, social insurance, and housing fund paid by the 
employers. 
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national CSYs as capital deflator. This capital deflator is collected by the urban survey 
team of National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) since 1991, based on 600 enterprises and 
expanding to 4500 enterprises after 1998. For years before 1991, we splice the price 
index of investment in fixed assets to the GDP implicit deflator. All the monetary values 
are calculated in 1995 price. 
Table 2.7 presents the annual growth rates of the TFP indices by region and 
province during the three time periods, 1978 to 1988, 1989 to 1999 and 1999 to 2009.
17
 
The main difference between using composition-adjusted labour input or unadjusted 
labour input to calculate TFP mainly lies during the time period 2000-2009 in the 
Interior region. In general, the Coastal, Interior and West perform better than the 
Northeast. The highest annual growth rates are 6.6 percent for Xinjiang during 1978-
1988, 6.8 percent for Fujian during 1989-1999 and 5.9 percent in Hubei in the 2000s 
possibly due to their much lower initial levels. It suggests convergence processes among 
provinces and regions which will be further discussed in chapter 3 and 4. Only three 
provinces (Tianjin, Beijing and Shanghai) during 1978-1988 show the negative annual 
growth rates, possibly associated with the slow processes of political and economic 
reforms in before 1989 these three “special municipalities/cities” which are directly 
under control of the Central Government. Moreover, the annual growth rates during 
1989-1999 are the highest among the three periods, which is consistent with the 
dramatic institutional reforms after Deng Xiaoping’s south trip’s speech about 
deepening reforms in 1992.  
 
 
                                                             
17
 The TFP indices (1995=100) by province and region from 1978 to 2009 can be seen in the Appendix 
Table A2.4. 
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Table 2.7: Annual growth rates of Total Factor Productivity 
            
  Considering LCI Not considering LCI 
TFP growth 
1989-
1999 
2000-
2009 
1978-
1988 
1989-
1999 
2000-
2009 
Northeast 0.039 0.029 0.015 0.039 0.030 
Liaoning 0.033 0.028 0.022 0.033 0.029 
Jilin 0.060 0.032 0.034 0.060 0.034 
Heilongjiang 0.036 0.037 0.001 0.036 0.037 
Coastal 0.047 0.033 0.016 0.047 0.034 
Beijing 0.034 0.013 -0.011 0.034 0.014 
Tianjin     0.046 0.045 -0.006 0.046 0.046 
Hebei 0.051 0.024 0.016 0.051 0.025 
shanghai 0.024 0.039 -0.040 0.024 0.040 
Jiangsu 0.046 0.045 0.002 0.046 0.047 
Zhejiang 0.052 0.020 0.049 0.053 0.021 
Fujian 0.068 0.030 0.057 0.069 0.031 
Shandong 0.051 0.034 0.017 0.051 0.035 
Guangdong* 0.054 0.028 0.039 0.054 0.030 
Interior 0.050 0.034 0.042 0.051 0.036 
Shanxi 0.046 0.016 0.023 0.046 0.017 
Anhui 0.053 0.021 0.033 0.053 0.022 
Jiangxi 0.058 0.021 0.027 0.059 0.023 
Henan 0.050 0.031 0.059 0.052 0.035 
Hubei 0.039 0.059 0.051 0.040 0.059 
Hunan 0.054 0.039 0.033 0.054 0.044 
West 0.043 0.035 0.040 0.043 0.036 
Inner Mongolia 0.051 0.047 0.057 0.052 0.048 
Guangxi 0.067 0.042 0.016 0.068 0.044 
Sichuan* 0.035 0.033 0.035 0.036 0.034 
Guizhou 0.039 0.024 0.050 0.040 0.024 
Yunnan 0.026 0.022 0.048 0.027 0.024 
Shaanxi 0.039 0.036 0.053 0.039 0.038 
Gansu 0.039 0.026 0.013 0.039 0.027 
Qinghai 0.030 0.058 0.018 0.031 0.059 
Ningxia 0.021 0.034 0.029 0.021 0.035 
Xinjiang 0.047 0.032 0.066 0.047 0.033 
 
Notes:  
1. The labour composition index has information from 1989 to 2009. 
2. The “Labour input” in the equation 2.17 is calculated by “LCI * Number of employed persons” 
in the columns “Considering LCI”, while only by “Number of employed persons” in the columns 
“Not considering LCI” imply that the Labour input.  
 
 
 
 
2.6 Contributions of production factors to productivity 
According to the growth accounting methodology, we decompose the annual growth 
rate of GDP into its components: employment (L), LCI, physical capital (K) and factor 
productivity (TFP).
 
We list two tables (Table 2.8 and 2.9) to consider the contributions 
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of production factors (excluding or including LCI, respectively) to productivity. 
Table 2.8 shows the sources of growth (annual percentage rate of change) by 
region and province during three time periods: 1978 to 1988, 1989 to 1999 and 2000 to 
2009. As we expect, the physical capital input is the main contributor to labour 
productivity growth before 1989 and after 2000. For example, during the period of 
1978-1988, the physical capital grows at 11.63 percent for Shanghai and 10.41 percent 
for Jiangsu, which account for most of growth of labour productivity. Hence, we can 
find the provinces with more physical investment have higher growth rates, as well as 
higher contribution proportions from physical capital. The Coastal has the highest 
growth rate of physical capital (for instance, 7.44 percent over the period 1978-1988), 
the highest growth rate of GDP (10.5 percent), the highest growth rate of labour 
productivity (9.04 percent) and the highest contribution of physical capital to labour 
productivity growth (82.3 percent). Therefore, the disparities of the formation speed of 
physical capital among regions (provinces) are the dominant factor to understand the 
regional (provincial) disparities in China. The three negative growth of TFP appear in 
the three municipal cities (Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai) which are tightly controlled 
by the central government during the beginning stage of “Open-up Policy” with 
cautious optimism. 
In 1990s, the TFP growth is much higher than the LP growth, leading to the 
falling contribution of capital deepening. The highest contribution of TFP occurs in the 
Interior region, especially the Henan province, consistent with the outstanding 
performance of LCI in Table 2.9. In contrast, the labour productivity and capital 
deepening rise simultaneously after 2000, supported by the huge investment of physical 
capital such as government spending, especially in the Industrial Northeast region may 
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due to the “Revitalize the Northeast” policy implemented in 2003.  
 
Table 2.8: Sources of growth (annual percentage rate of change) 
 
                
 
    
  
  
Contribution to LP 
(%) 
1978-1988 GDP L LP K/L TFP K/L TFP 
Northeast 8.33 2.04 6.29 4.83 1.46 76.79 23.21 
Liaoning 8.98 1.68 7.3 5.15 2.15 70.55 29.45 
Jilin 10.18 3.41 6.77 3.42 3.35 50.52 49.48 
Heilongjiang 6.72 1.68 5.04 5.04 0 100.00 0.00 
Coastal 10.5 1.46 9.04 7.44 1.60 82.30 17.70 
Beijing 9.35 0.93 8.42 9.57 -1.15 113.66 -13.66 
Tianjin     8.23 0.85 7.38 7.95 -0.57 107.72 -7.72 
Hebei 8.6 1.64 6.96 5.39 1.57 77.44 22.56 
shanghai 7.98 0.39 7.59 11.63 -4.04 153.23 -53.23 
Jiangsu 11.83 1.29 10.54 10.41 0.13 98.77 1.23 
Zhejiang 12.95 2.01 10.94 6.03 4.91 55.12 44.88 
Fujian 11.59 2.29 9.3 3.61 5.69 38.82 61.18 
Shandong 10.49 1.59 8.9 7.25 1.65 81.46 18.54 
Guangdong* 11.44 1.8 9.64 5.82 3.82 60.37 39.63 
Interior 9.48 2 7.48 3.34 4.14 44.65 55.35 
Shanxi 8.49 1.52 6.97 4.78 2.19 68.58 31.42 
Anhui 9.88 2.5 7.38 4.13 3.25 55.96 44.04 
Jiangxi 9.31 2.25 7.06 4.43 2.63 62.75 37.25 
Henan 10.58 2.23 8.35 2.51 5.84 30.06 69.94 
Hubei 9.9 1.41 8.49 3.34 5.15 39.34 60.66 
Hunan 8.18 1.96 6.22 2.96 3.26 47.59 52.41 
West 9.2 2.11 7.09 3.09 4.00 43.58 56.42 
Inner Mongolia 10.2 1.93 8.27 2.53 5.74 30.59 69.41 
Guangxi 7.3 2.33 4.97 3.38 1.59 68.01 31.99 
Sichuan* 9.1 1.8 7.3 3.76 3.54 51.51 48.49 
Guizhou 9.72 2.38 7.34 2.28 5.06 31.06 68.94 
Yunnan 9.76 2.21 7.55 2.77 4.78 36.69 63.31 
Shaanxi 10.3 2.14 8.16 2.85 5.31 34.93 65.07 
Gansu 8.09 3.44 4.65 3.24 1.41 69.68 30.32 
Qinghai 7.02 2.14 4.88 3.11 1.77 63.73 36.27 
Ningxia 9.48 2.25 7.23 4.35 2.88 60.17 39.83 
Xinjiang 10.67 1.26 9.41 2.84 6.57 30.18 69.82 
 
Notes:  
1. Annual growth rate of LP = Annual growth rate of GDP – Annual growth rate of L 
2. Annual growth rate of LP = Annual growth rate of capital deepening (K/L) + Annual growth rate 
of TFP 
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Contribution to 
LP (%) 
1989-1999 GDP L LP K/L TFP K/L TFP 
Northeast 8.31 0.43 7.88 3.99 3.89 50.63 49.37 
Liaoning 8.24 0.32 7.92 4.67 3.25 58.96 41.04 
Jilin 9.34 -0.13 9.47 3.54 5.93 37.38 62.62 
Heilongjiang 7.84 0.93 6.91 3.3 3.61 47.76 52.24 
Coastal 12.4 0.99 11.41 6.65 4.76 58.28 41.72 
Beijing 9.86 0.21 9.65 6.45 3.2 66.84 33.16 
Tianjin     10.4 0.4 10 5.49 4.51 54.90 45.10 
Hebei 11.71 0.87 10.84 5.84 5 53.87 46.13 
shanghai 10.81 -0.61 11.42 9.1 2.32 79.68 20.32 
Jiangsu 12.62 1.22 11.4 6.79 4.61 59.56 40.44 
Zhejiang 13.28 0.22 13.06 7.7 5.36 58.96 41.04 
Fujian 14.38 1.38 13 5.95 7.05 45.77 54.23 
Shandong 12.46 1.6 10.86 5.73 5.13 52.76 47.24 
Guangdong* 13.05 1.21 11.84 6.45 5.39 54.48 45.52 
Interior 10.3 1.45 8.85 3.74 5.11 42.26 57.74 
Shanxi 8.7 0.64 8.06 3.48 4.58 43.18 56.82 
Anhui 11 1.23 9.77 4.3 5.47 44.01 55.99 
Jiangxi 10.7 1.18 9.52 3.66 5.86 38.45 61.55 
Henan 10.43 1.88 8.55 3.44 5.11 40.23 59.77 
Hubei 10.8 2.05 8.75 4.62 4.13 52.80 47.20 
Hunan 9.48 1.07 8.41 3.02 5.39 35.91 64.09 
West 9.29 0.86 8.43 4.12 4.31 48.87 51.13 
Inner Mongolia 9.12 0.71 8.41 3.27 5.14 38.88 61.12 
Guangxi 11.84 1.35 10.49 3.79 6.7 36.13 63.87 
Sichuan* 9.17 0.63 8.54 4.99 3.55 58.43 41.57 
Guizhou 7.89 1.2 6.69 2.82 3.87 42.15 57.85 
Yunnan 9.03 1.11 7.92 5.21 2.71 65.78 34.22 
Shaanxi 8.32 1.12 7.2 3.27 3.93 45.42 54.58 
Gansu 8.74 -0.14 8.88 4.9 3.98 55.18 44.82 
Qinghai 7.35 2.19 5.16 2.16 3 41.86 58.14 
Ningxia 7.65 1.75 5.9 3.76 2.14 63.73 36.27 
Xinjiang 9.61 0.69 8.92 4.15 4.77 46.52 53.48 
 
Notes:  
1. Annual growth rate of LP = Annual growth rate of GDP – Annual growth rate of L 
2. Annual growth rate of LP = Annual growth rate of capital deepening (K/L) + Annual growth rate 
of TFP 
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Contribution to 
LP (%) 
2000-2009 GDP L LP K/L TFP K/L TFP 
Northeast 11.3 0.28 11.02 7.76 3.26 70.42 29.58 
Liaoning 11.55 0.37 11.18 8.18 3 73.17 26.83 
Jilin 11.9 0.12 11.78 7.77 4.01 65.96 34.04 
Heilongjiang 10.57 0.27 10.3 6.44 3.86 62.52 37.48 
Coastal 11.7 1.07 10.63 7.1 3.53 66.79 33.21 
Beijing 11.06 4.07 6.99 5.63 1.36 80.54 19.46 
Tianjin     13.72 0.2 13.52 8.6 4.92 63.61 36.39 
Hebei 10.74 0.83 9.91 7.14 2.77 72.05 27.95 
shanghai 10.71 1.54 9.17 5.11 4.06 55.73 44.27 
Jiangsu 12.43 0.15 12.28 7.49 4.79 60.99 39.01 
Zhejiang 11.72 1.87 9.85 7.81 2.04 79.29 20.71 
Fujian 11.53 1.58 9.95 6.81 3.14 68.44 31.56 
Shandong 12.45 0.01 12.44 8.77 3.67 70.50 29.50 
Guangdong* 10.98 2.09 8.89 5.9 2.99 66.37 33.63 
Interior 11.1 0.33 10.77 6.92 3.85 64.25 35.75 
Shanxi 10.56 0.65 9.91 7.92 1.99 79.92 20.08 
Anhui 10.83 0.56 10.27 7.89 2.38 76.83 23.17 
Jiangxi 11.45 0.54 10.91 8.48 2.43 77.73 22.27 
Henan 11.45 0.43 11.02 7.16 3.86 64.97 35.03 
Hubei 11.08 -0.72 11.8 5.58 6.22 47.29 52.71 
Hunan 10.96 0.6 10.36 5.73 4.63 55.31 44.69 
West 11.4 0.79 10.61 6.85 3.76 64.56 35.44 
Inner Mongolia 15.7 0.73 14.97 9.88 5.09 66.00 34.00 
Guangxi 11.44 0.88 10.56 5.83 4.73 55.21 44.79 
Sichuan* 11.18 0.47 10.71 7.25 3.46 67.69 32.31 
Guizhou 10.32 1.45 8.87 6.39 2.48 72.04 27.96 
Yunnan 9.65 1.07 8.58 6.17 2.41 71.91 28.09 
Shaanxi 11.69 0.35 11.34 7.24 4.1 63.84 36.16 
Gansu 10.12 1.07 9.05 6.23 2.82 68.84 31.16 
Qinghai 11.37 0.04 11.33 5.38 5.95 47.48 52.52 
Ningxia 10.93 1.22 9.71 6.16 3.55 63.44 36.56 
Xinjiang 9.65 1.33 8.32 5.01 3.31 60.22 39.78 
 
Notes:  
1. Annual growth rate of LP = Annual growth rate of GDP – Annual growth rate of L 
2. Annual growth rate of LP = Annual growth rate of capital deepening (K/L) + Annual growth rate 
of TFP 
 
 
 
Since the LCI are calculated by using the CHNS dataset (1989-2009), we only can 
impute the LCI contributions during the latter two time periods: 1989-1999 and 2000-
2009 (see Table 2.9). Human capital formation is becoming more and more important 
factor in economic growth. The performance of the Interior region (especially Henan 
province) are outstanding across the two time periods, marked by the lowest 
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contribution of physical capital and highest contribution of LCI. It suggests that human 
capital formation from technological and institutional shifts is taking place of physical 
capital formation in the economic growth (Ding and Knight, 2011). Labour composition 
index has also contributed more than before from about 0.2 percent in the 1990s to 
about 1.4 percent in the 2000s. The changing growth pattern in the Coastal points out 
the development direction for the other regions in the future.   
 
Table 2.9: Sources of growth (annual percentage rate of change) 
                    
 
    Contribution to LP (%) 
1989-1999 GDP L LP K/L LCI TFP K/L LCI TFP 
Northeast 8.31 0.43 7.88 3.99 0 3.89 50.63 0.00 49.37 
Liaoning 8.24 0.32 7.92 4.67 -0.01 3.26 58.96 -0.13 41.16 
Jilin 9.34 -0.13 9.47 3.54 -0.04 5.97 37.38 -0.42 63.04 
Heilongjiang 7.84 0.93 6.91 3.3 0.02 3.59 47.76 0.29 51.95 
Coastal 12.4 0.99 11.41 6.65 0.02 4.74 58.28 0.18 41.54 
Beijing 9.86 0.21 9.65 6.45 0.02 3.18 66.84 0.21 32.95 
Tianjin     10.4 0.4 10 5.49 0.02 4.49 54.90 0.20 44.90 
Hebei 11.71 0.87 10.84 5.84 0.02 4.98 53.87 0.18 45.94 
shanghai 10.81 -0.61 11.42 9.1 0.01 2.31 79.68 0.09 20.23 
Jiangsu 12.62 1.22 11.4 6.79 0.04 4.57 59.56 0.35 40.09 
Zhejiang 13.28 0.22 13.06 7.7 0.02 5.34 58.96 0.15 40.89 
Fujian 14.38 1.38 13 5.95 0.02 7.03 45.77 0.15 54.08 
Shandong 12.46 1.6 10.86 5.73 0.01 5.12 52.76 0.09 47.15 
Guangdong* 13.05 1.21 11.84 6.45 0.02 5.37 54.48 0.17 45.35 
Interior 10.3 1.45 8.85 3.74 0.06 5.05 42.26 0.68 57.06 
Shanxi 8.7 0.64 8.06 3.48 0.05 4.53 43.18 0.62 56.20 
Anhui 11 1.23 9.77 4.3 0.05 5.42 44.01 0.51 55.48 
Jiangxi 10.7 1.18 9.52 3.66 0.06 5.8 38.45 0.63 60.92 
Henan 10.43 1.88 8.55 3.44 0.2 4.91 40.23 2.34 57.43 
Hubei 10.8 2.05 8.75 4.62 0.14 3.99 52.80 1.60 45.60 
Hunan 9.48 1.07 8.41 3.02 -0.06 5.45 35.91 -0.71 64.80 
West 9.29 0.86 8.43 4.12 0.05 4.26 48.87 0.59 50.53 
Inner Mongolia 9.12 0.71 8.41 3.27 0.05 5.09 38.88 0.59 60.52 
Guangxi 11.84 1.35 10.49 3.79 0.08 6.62 36.13 0.76 63.11 
Sichuan* 9.17 0.63 8.54 4.99 0.05 3.5 58.43 0.59 40.98 
Guizhou 7.89 1.2 6.69 2.82 0.01 3.86 42.15 0.15 57.70 
Yunnan 9.03 1.11 7.92 5.21 0.05 2.66 65.78 0.63 33.59 
Shaanxi 8.32 1.12 7.2 3.27 0.06 3.87 45.42 0.83 53.75 
Gansu 8.74 -0.14 8.88 4.9 0.05 3.93 55.18 0.56 44.26 
Qinghai 7.35 2.19 5.16 2.16 0.05 2.95 41.86 0.97 57.17 
Ningxia 7.65 1.75 5.9 3.76 0.05 2.09 63.73 0.85 35.42 
Xinjiang 9.61 0.69 8.92 4.15 0.05 4.72 46.52 0.56 52.91 
Notes:  
1. Annual growth rate of LP = Annual growth rate of GDP – Annual growth rate of L 
2. Annual growth rate of LP = Annual growth rate of capital deepening (K/L) + Annual growth rate 
of LCI + Annual growth rate of TFP  
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    Contribution to LP (%) 
2000-2009 GDP L LP K/L LCI TFP K/L LCI TFP 
Northeast 11.3 0.28 11.02 7.76 0.14 3.12 70.42 1.27 28.31 
Liaoning 11.55 0.37 11.18 8.18 0.18 2.82 73.17 1.61 25.22 
Jilin 11.9 0.12 11.78 7.77 0.16 3.85 65.96 1.36 32.68 
Heilongjiang 10.57 0.27 10.3 6.44 0.05 3.81 62.52 0.49 36.99 
Coastal 11.7 1.07 10.63 7.1 0.1 3.43 66.79 0.94 32.27 
Beijing 11.06 4.07 6.99 5.63 0.1 1.26 80.54 1.43 18.03 
Tianjin     13.72 0.2 13.52 8.6 0.09 4.83 63.61 0.67 35.72 
Hebei 10.74 0.83 9.91 7.14 0.1 2.67 72.05 1.01 26.94 
shanghai 10.71 1.54 9.17 5.11 0.08 3.98 55.73 0.87 43.40 
Jiangsu 12.43 0.15 12.28 7.49 0.28 4.51 60.99 2.28 36.73 
Zhejiang 11.72 1.87 9.85 7.81 0.1 1.94 79.29 1.02 19.70 
Fujian 11.53 1.58 9.95 6.81 0.1 3.04 68.44 1.01 30.55 
Shandong 12.45 0.01 12.44 8.77 0.05 3.62 70.50 0.40 29.10 
Guangdong* 10.98 2.09 8.89 5.9 0.1 2.89 66.37 1.12 32.51 
Interior 11.1 0.33 10.77 6.92 0.15 3.7 64.25 1.39 34.35 
Shanxi 10.56 0.65 9.91 7.92 0.13 1.86 79.92 1.31 18.77 
Anhui 10.83 0.56 10.27 7.89 0.15 2.23 76.83 1.46 21.71 
Jiangxi 11.45 0.54 10.91 8.48 0.15 2.28 77.73 1.37 20.90 
Henan 11.45 0.43 11.02 7.16 0.29 3.57 64.97 2.63 32.40 
Hubei 11.08 -0.72 11.8 5.58 0.02 6.2 47.29 0.17 52.54 
Hunan 10.96 0.6 10.36 5.73 0.46 4.17 55.31 4.44 40.25 
West 11.4 0.79 10.61 6.85 0.04 3.72 64.56 0.38 35.06 
Inner Mongolia 15.7 0.73 14.97 9.88 0.15 4.94 66.00 1.00 33.00 
Guangxi 11.44 0.88 10.56 5.83 0.11 4.62 55.21 1.04 43.75 
Sichuan* 11.18 0.47 10.71 7.25 0.16 3.3 67.69 1.49 30.81 
Guizhou 10.32 1.45 8.87 6.39 -0.02 2.5 72.04 -0.23 28.18 
Yunnan 9.65 1.07 8.58 6.17 0.15 2.26 71.91 1.75 26.34 
Shaanxi 11.69 0.35 11.34 7.24 0.15 3.95 63.84 1.32 34.83 
Gansu 10.12 1.07 9.05 6.23 0.04 2.78 68.84 0.44 30.72 
Qinghai 11.37 0.04 11.33 5.38 0.04 5.91 47.48 0.35 52.16 
Ningxia 10.93 1.22 9.71 6.16 0.04 3.51 63.44 0.41 36.15 
Xinjiang 9.65 1.33 8.32 5.01 0.04 3.27 60.22 0.48 39.30 
Notes:  
1. Annual growth rate of LP = Annual growth rate of GDP – Annual growth rate of L 
2. Annual growth rate of LP = Annual growth rate of capital deepening (K/L) + Annual growth rate 
of LCI + Annual growth rate of TFP  
 
 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
This chapter reviews the growth accounting model and measurement methods of its 
components such as physical capital services, labour inputs, labour composition index 
(LCI) and Total Factor Productivity (TFP). We apply this model to Chinese empirical 
studies for regions and provinces from 1978 to 2009.  
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We use the LCI to adjust labour inputs. Both average approach and Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) regression approach are applied to calculate the measured wage rates for 
employees with different education levels, provinces and years, weighted by urban/rural 
ratios. The LCI keeps on increasing from 1989 to 2009. Among the provinces and 
regions, the Interior region especially Henan province has the highest LCI, maybe 
because it is centre-located between Beijign and Shanghai (two educational and 
economic centers in China).  
After we decompose the annual growth rate of GDP into its components of 
employment, LCI, physical capital and TFP, we find that Chinese economic growth was 
mainly pushed by the growth of physical capital. The annual growth rate of labour 
productivity in the Coastal is the highest among all regions in China, while labour 
inputs and TFP growth contribute more in the Interior and West regions. It can explain 
the regional disparities reasonably. The growth rate of physical capital in the Coastal 
was at about double speed of the other three regions (the Northeast, the Interior and the 
West) before 2000. During the period of 2000-2009, the growth rates of physical capital 
in the left-behind regions have caught up with the Coastal. Since there is no significant 
difference between the Coastal and the other three, with more investment of physical 
capital, we would find more evidence of convergence on economic growth in the future 
research.  
Moreover, the contribution shares of physical capital in labour productivity have 
been declining for the most advanced Coastal, while the TFP contributions have been 
increasing over the same period. It is consistent with findings of Ding and Knight (2011) 
that both physical and human capital formation contribute to the economic growth in 
China. Our results show that the human capital formation from technological and 
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institutional shifts (TFP) is becoming more and more important in the Coastal. Labour 
composition index (education) also contribute to economic growth. Although its 
contribution is not as dominant as physical capital and TFP in current stage, the LCI is 
taking more space in the growth accounting model. The new growth pattern of the 
Coastal suggests that human capital formation including education will be the next 
potential engine of economic growth for other less developed regions, leaving much 
more space for them to compete. 
In the next chapter, we apply more accurate specifications to analyze the regional 
disparities and convergence of labour productivity, TFP and wages, using physical 
capital services, labour inputs, LCI and TFP measured here.  
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CHAPTER THREE: ECONOMIC REFORM AND 
PRODUCTIVITY CONVERGENCE 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter focuses on the regional disparities and convergence of labour productivity 
(GDP per worker), Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and wages in China. Regions are 
defined as in the last chapter. China is one country with the worst regional economic 
disparities in the world (Yang, 2002; Kanbur and Zhang, 2005; Fleisher et al., 2010). If 
the increasing regional disparities in China were not corrected in time, the uneven 
growth in productivity and wages would not only threaten the ultimate success of 
China’s economic reform, but also bring about serious social and political unrest (Chen 
and Feng, 2000). Understanding the drivers of the increasing economic gap between the 
rich and poor regions and whether and how the poor regions are catching up with rich 
regions has become an urgent task for Chinese economists.  
Table 3.1 discusses the changes of labour productivity, TFP and wages among the 
four regions from 1978 to 2009. In 1978, the real GDP per worker of the Northeast was 
double that of the Coastal and the Interior. Then, the Coastal caught up with the 
Northeast with annual growth rate at 8.6 percent during 1978-1995. All regions 
developed very quickly at 9.3 percent to 10 percent per year in 1995-2009. However, in 
2009, the real labour productivity in the richer Northeast and Coastal regions (about 
50,000 RMB) were still more than twice the poorer Interior and West regions (below 
26,000 RMB) due to their low initial levels.  
A body of research has shown that TFP growth has played an important role in 
post-reform growth in China (Chow, 1993; Borensztein and Ostry, 1996; Young, 2003; 
Wang and Yao, 2003; Islam et al., 2006; Fleisher et al., 2010). In 1978, the Northeast 
39 
 
had the higher level of TFP index (73), nearly 17 percent higher than the Coastal, and 
54 percent higher than the Interior and West. The annual growth rate of the TFP index 
was the highest in the Interior at annual rate of 4.4 percent from 1978 to 1995 and 3.9 
percent from 1995 to 2009. Therefore, the TFP index of the Interior (173) exceeds the 
industrial Northeast region in 2009.  
In terms of wages, we find the same “gradualism, stagnation and sharp jumps” 
process of China’s economy as described in Fleisher et al. (2010). The gradualism of 
reform brings the slow pace of China’s transformation which distinguishes it from most 
other transition economies, especially those in Central and Eastern Europe and the 
Former Soviet Union (Fleisher et al., 2005).  In the 1980s, the regional wages were 
similar to each other due to a rigid labour market, until Deng Xiaoping’s “South Trip” in 
1992 which speeds the pace of transition to a market based economy and changes the 
wage structure in China.
18
 From 1978 to 1995, the annual growth rates of wages in the 
Coastal (7.4 percent) were much higher than the other three regions, especially the 
Northeast (4.9 percent) which was suffering the huge laid-off from State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs). During 1995-2009, wages increased rapidly with growing labour 
productivity in all regions at about 10-11 percent per year. With lower initial levels, 
average wages of the Coastal were about 10 percent higher than those of the Northeast 
in 2009, 22.6 percent higher than the Interior and 28.3 percent higher than the West.  
 
 
 
                                                             
18
 In the spring of 1992, Deng Xiaoping visited the east region of China (Guangdong and Shanghai). His 
main idea was “To Get Rich Is Glorious”. Hence, we follow the same line of Fleisher et al. (2010) to 
account for the structural break of Chinese market reforms around 1994 in the specification of our 
empirical models.  
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Table 3.1 Changes of labour productivity, TFP and wages, 1978- 2009 
 
 
Northeast Coastal Interior West 
Real labour productivity 
1978 value 5288 2964 2115 1993 
1995 value 12263 12766 6637 5905 
2009 value 49728 48818 25657 21644 
1978-1995 (growth rate) 0.049 0.086 0.067 0.064 
1995-2009 (growth rate) 0.100 0.096 0.097 0.093 
Total factor productivity index (1995=100) 
1978 value 73 63 47 50 
1995 value 100 100 100 100 
2009 value 170 166 173 165 
1978-1995 (growth rate) 0.018 0.028 0.044 0.040 
1995-2009 (growth rate) 0.038 0.036 0.039 0.036 
Real average annual wages 
1978 value 2162 1773 1812 1999 
1995 value 4541 6266 4555 4801 
2009 value 22431 24662 20116 19222 
1978-1995 (growth rate) 0.044 0.074 0.054 0.052 
1995-2009 (growth rate) 0.114 0.098 0.106 0.099 
 
Data sources: (Hsueh and Li, 1999)); various years China Statistical Yearbook; National Bureau of 
Statistics (1999). 
 
Figure 3.1 is a preliminary statistical examination of regional disparities and 
convergence of labour productivity, TFP and wages. Here regional disparities are 
measured as the coefficients of variation (CV) of labour productivity (left axis), TFP 
and wages (right axis) among the four regions. Regional disparities have been 
decreasing for all three productivity proxies before 1986 which showed a common trend 
of convergence for all regions. After that, the coefficients of variation for labour 
productivity become quite stable, while the wages are dramatically diverging in the 
1990s and then converging in the 2000s. In contrast to the diverging wages in the 1990s, 
TFP index keeps on converging among regions and becomes quite stable in the 2000s. 
Thus, these three productivity proxies show different convergence patterns in the more 
dynamic economy after 1986.   
41 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Coefficients of variation, 1978-2009 
 
 
 
Data sources: (Hsueh and Li, 1999); various years China Statistical Yearbook (NBS, 1999); National 
Bureau of Statistics (1999). 
 
 
The different patterns of regional disparities of labour productivity, TFP and 
wages demand more comprehensive economic growth models which can take account 
of determining factors of economic growth such as demographic, social-economic and 
institutional changes. China need learn lessons from the economic growth path of 
developed economies. In a cross-country setting, numerous theoretical and empirical 
studies find that economic growth is determined by factors such as physical and human 
capital, privatization, international openness and public policy (Barro and Lee, 1993; 
Barro and Lee, 2001; Chen and Feng, 1996; van Ark et al., 2008). However, effects of 
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these determinants on Chinese economic growth, especially their impacts on different 
productivity proxies have not been thoroughly analyzed. Thus, this chapter aims to 
investigate determining factors in production processes, labour productivity, TFP and 
wages in China. We study the beta-convergence processes in China to check whether the 
lagging regions would grow faster than the rich regions and eventually catch up with 
them. We focus on the role of human capital in economic growth and address the 
associations between human capital formation and ownership reform, One-Child Policy, 
openness and fiscal expenditures.
 
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section is the literature 
review; in section 3.3 we lay out our baseline empirical specifications for drivers of 
regional disparities and beta-convergence; Section 3.4 is for data description; Section 
3.5 reports empirical results; Section 3.6 solves the endogeneity problem of education; 
Section 3.7 concludes. 
  
3.2 Literature Review 
Regional convergence 
The hypothesis of economic convergence is a primary and particularly active area of 
research in empirical growth economics. The growth-convergence equation originates 
from the neoclassical growth model (Solow, 1956) and has been developed by long 
series of growth empirics such as Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992). In more recent 
literature, Byrne and Vecchi (2010) examine convergence in a panel of industries 
between the United States, the United Kingdom and France, providing evidence of 
conditional convergence. When the partial correlation between economic growth and its 
initial level is negative, there is beta-convergence (Islam, 2003). 
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Researchers generally deal with convergence in terms of GDP per capita across 
Chinese provinces. Jian et al. (1996) is a pioneering study proceeding from the 
neoclassical convergence and use the beta-convergence to analyze GDP per capita of 28 
Chinese provinces for the period 1978-1992. They use agriculture share and costal 
location as conditional variables and report that convergence before 1985 and 
divergence afterwards, which is consistent with what we find in Figure 3.1. They argue 
that convergence is a result of provinces in the Coastal (rural area) growing faster as a 
result of policy advantage.  
Raiser (1998) relies on light industry and investment rates as controlling variables 
and finds “weakening” convergence since 1985, which could be the result of either 
shifts in the steady state of some provinces in the Coastal or reduction in capital 
mobility. Chen and Fleisher (1996) find conditional convergence of production across 
provinces on physical investment share, employment growth, human capital investment, 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and coastal location from 1978 to 1993. Villaverde et al. 
(2010) find a strong convergence process for the periods 1978-1990 and 2004-2007 but 
divergence for the period 1990-2004. They argue that provincial inequality in China 
mainly lies within rather between regions, particularly for provinces in the Coastal. 
Labour productivity convergence however can be the joint outcome of the twin 
processes of capital deepening and technological catch-up, known as issue of TFP 
convergence. Jorgenson and Nishimizu (1978) initiates the international comparison of 
relative TFP levels in the United States and Japan during the period 1952-1974. Dollar 
and Wolff (1994) examine TFP level convergence using time-series growth accounting 
method, while Dowrick and Nguyen (1989) use a cross-section regression to interpret 
the coefficients of the initial income variables of the equation as indicative of TFP-
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convergence.  
Unfortunately, there is little literature about Chinese regional TFP convergence. 
As one of rare cases, Wu (2000b) find that China’s regional TFP converges to the same 
level from 1982 to 1995 using coefficient of variation, but he does not relate his study to 
convergence theory. In this chapter, we use the following conditional variables to 
analyze the drivers of regional disparities and beta-convergence of labour productivity, 
TFP and wages in China. 
 
Human capital  
It is widely hypothesized that human capital has an important role in production through 
the direct generation of worker skills and also facilitate technology spillovers 
(O'Mahony and Vecchi, 2009; Fleisher et al., 2010). Human capital plays a critical role 
in the endogenous growth models, which hold that knowledge-driven growth can lead to 
a constant or even increasing rate of return. Romer (1986; 1990) argues that human 
capital is the major input to research and development that innovates technologies. 
Levine and Renelt (1992) and Young (1992) also find that countries with larger initial 
human capital stock are more likely to have new products and grow faster than other 
countries. Empirical evidence has revealed a positive relationship between human 
capital and growth. Fleisher et al. (2010) find that human capital positively affects 
labour productivity, TFP growth and wage growth in China.  
This chapter focuses on the effect of human capital on labour productivity, TFP 
and wages in China. Dearden et al. (2006), O’Mahony and Peng (2008) and Carmichael 
et al. (2009) compare the effect of education and training on productivity and wages for 
European countries in an attempt to pick up external benefits of human capital. 
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However, China does not have the labour force survey dataset for the whole country, so 
we apply the labour composition index (calculated by the CHNS dataset in the former 
chapter) into an economic growth model and address the associations between human 
capital formation and ownership reform, One-Child Policy, openness and fiscal 
expenditures.
 
 
 
Physical capital 
Mankiw et al. (1992) show that an augmented Solow model including physical capital 
as well as human capital accumulation can describe the cross-country data. Bai et al. 
(2006) estimate average rates of returns on physical capital for Chinese industrial 
enterprises as 6.1 percent in 1998 and 12.2 percent in 2003. Chapter 2 also verifies a 
observation in Ding and Knight (2011) that China’s exceptional growth performance is 
most fundamentally a reflection of the high investment rates of physical and human 
capital that characterised the economy. 
 
Ownership reform 
Knight and Song (2001) point out that there are two obvious explanations for the rise in 
regional disparities in China: economic growth and policies of economic reforms. The 
Chinese economy has experienced dramatic institutional reforms in last thirty years 
(Chen and Feng, 2000). Although urban economic reforms began in the period of 1983-
85, the Chinese economy was still largely a command and market coordinated economy 
with rigid wage system over the entire period of our study.
 19
 The State-Owned 
                                                             
19
 Using data for advanced European countries such as Germany and Italy, Peng and Siebert (2007; 2008) 
find that the wage rigidity harms the economy of lagging regions by delaying their recovery from 
disadvantageous shocks. Kang and Peng (2012) analyze the CHNS data and also find similar wage 
rigidity for lagging private sector in China. 
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Enterprises (SOEs) account for more than half of gross industrial outputs (Fleisher et al., 
2010).
 
 
After 1992, Chinese reforms aimed to transform the rigid central-planned 
economy into a flexible market-oriented economy. Chen and Feng (2000) suggest that a 
larger share of production by non-state-owned enterprises (including collective and 
private units) results in higher economic growth in the Coastal region of China.
20
 
Consequently, curtailing the widening Coastal-Inner regional gaps can be effectively 
achieved by promoting collective-owned or private enterprises.  
Fleisher et al. (2010) measure the degree of market reform in the local economy 
using the proportion of urban labour employed in private firms. We categorize staff and 
workers into three kinds of enterprises: SOEs, collective-owned units and private units, 
and assess the effect of privatization on labour productivity, TFP and wages. Under the 
rigid wage system until the early 1990s, the superior labour compensation in joint 
ventures and foreign firms attracted many talented workers to transfer from SOEs into 
the private sector which was well known as “jumping into the sea”. It brought about a 
much more efficient allocation of human capital in the production processes. 
However, the wages in the public sector began to increase sharply in the late 
1990s and reached 16,227 Yuan in 2003 which finally surpassed the private sector 
wages and attracted Chinese professionals back to the public sector known as “coming 
back to shore” (Yang et al., 2010). These new changes could be from the capital 
deepening processes through the global value chain which make the economic scale 
more important than before and also improve human capital formation. Therefore, the 
                                                             
20
 “Private units” include cooperative enterprises, Joint enterprises, Limited liability enterprises, share-
holding enterprises, private enterprises, self-employed individual, Funds from Hong Kong, Macro and 
Taiwan, Foreign funded enterprises. 
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ownership structure is a very important institutional factor in our study.  
 
Openness 
Levine and Renelt (1992) systematically study numerous economic factors that may 
account for long-run aggregate economic growth. They argue that government policies 
reducing protectionism and liberalising trade are major inputs for growth. Chen and 
Feng (2000) also argue that international trade is encouraged by geographical and 
political factors such as proximity to major ports, decisions to create special economic 
zones and free trade areas, local institutional characteristics such as laws and regulations, 
contract enforcement, local expenditures on infrastructure, and by labour market 
conditions. Trade also has facilitated the transformation of the state-owned and the 
collective sectors, and potentially bring in new production and managerial technologies 
with their attendant spillovers (Liu, 2008; O'Mahony et al., 2008). Thus, we also 
account for the regional disparities with trade by measuring an openness variable as the 
share of international trade (export and import) to GDP, and assess its effect on regional 
productivity and wages. 
 
One-Child Policy 
Birth rate is regarded as an important variable representing human capital formation in 
the productivity model, but no conclusion that birth rate has positive or negative effect 
on productivity in the theoretical or empirical literatures. On the one hand, there is 
“population pessimism” which claims population growth will bring negative effect on 
economic growth. Malthus (1798 [1986]) claimed that large population will decrease 
the productivity because of diminishing marginal productivity. For a natural resource 
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(land, water, etc.) augmented economy, such as rural economy, as population grows the 
per capita share of natural resource decreases. Hence, the marginal product of labour 
goes down.  
On the other hand, there is “population optimism” which claims population 
growth will bring positive effect on economic growth. The neo-Boserupian school of 
thought (Boserup, 1981) mentions that population may have a scale effect that is 
beneficial to economic growth. Becker, Glaeser and Murphy (1999) argue that in 
modern urban economies with small agricultural and natural-resource sectors, the 
increased density that comes with higher population and greater urbanization promotes 
specialization and investment in human capital and more rapid accumulation of new 
knowledge, which would raise per capita incomes.  
Therefore, Becker, Glaeser and Murphy (1999) combine both negative effect 
(diminishing marginal productivity) and the positive effect (human capital accumulation, 
spillover effect, etc.) and conclude that “the net relation between greater population and 
labour productivity depends on whether the inducements to human capital and 
expansion of knowledge are stronger than diminishing returns to natural resources.  
China started the “One-Child Policy” in 1979 which only be applied to the Han 
Chinese
21
 and by way of affirmative policies, all ethnic minorities in China are allowed 
to have two or more children until the end of the 1980s (Qian, 1997). In this chapter, I 
will study the net effect of birth rate on labour productivity, Total factor productivity 
and average wages in the transition of rural economy to urban economy by urbanization 
reform.  
 
                                                             
21 
Han Chinese is an ethnic group native to China and constitutes about 92 percent of the population of the 
People’s Republic of China. 
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Regional growth policies 
The cross-country growth literature addresses the political roles that the central 
government can play in improving the lagging regions’ economic growth. Since the 
widening productivity and wage gap between the Coastal and the other regions can lead 
to political unrest and polarization, the Chinese central government has emphasized the 
importance of the inner areas’ growth and development.  
Ma (1995), Ma and Norregaard (1998) and Chen and Feng (2000) argue that the 
central government policies should not be biased in favour of the Coastal. The central 
government led by Premier Zhu Rongji launched the “Western Development Strategy” 
in 1999 to boost the lagging Interior and West regions. The main components of the 
strategies include the development of infrastructure, enticement of foreign investment, 
increased efforts on ecological protection (such as reforestation), as well as human 
capital formation such as promotion of education and retention of talent flowing to 
richer provinces. As of 2006, a total of 1 trillion Yuan has been spent on building 
infrastructure in western China (Goodman, 2004).  
Moreover, the Northeast was one of the earlier regions to industrialize in China, 
focusing mainly on equipment manufacturing including the steel, automobile, 
shipbuilding, aircraft manufacturing, and petroleum refining industries. Recent years, 
however, have seen the stagnation of the Northeast’s heavy-industry-based economy, as 
economy continues to liberalize and privatize. Hence, the central government led by 
Premier Wen JiaBao has initialized the “Revitalize the Northeast” campaign in 2003.  
These policy factors should be considered in an economic growth model for China by 
the sensitivity test of different development patterns of the four regions. 
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Fiscal expenditures on human capital 
Not only individuals but also government benefit from increasing wages. Heckman 
(2005) notes that China’s government investment in human capital beyond the junior 
high school level (the compulsory 9-year education) has been very small and dispersed, 
in contrast to nations at similar levels of socio-economic development. Chinese 
government has increased education expenditures sharply aiming for 4 percent of GDP 
before 2010. In 2007, however, the government expenditures on education are still only 
2.43 percent of GDP and have been below 3 percent in most years since 1992, which are 
much lower than the average of 5.1 percent in developed countries (Fleisher et al., 
2010). Hence, we investigate the effect of provincial “fiscal expenditures on human 
capital (culture, education, scientific and health)” on labour productivity, TFP and 
wages in this chapter.  
 
Structural breaks in 1994 
The year 1994 marks the fiscal decentralization processes beginning from withdrawal of 
government subsidies for loss-incurring SOEs, and the hardening of SOEs’ budget 
constraints become much more earnest in 1997 (Appleton et al., 2002).
22
 The shift 
toward fiscal federalism is also through separating central and local government 
taxation and relaxing ties between provincial and sub-provincial treasuries and the 
centre, reinforced imposition of hard budget constraints on SOEs (Su and Zhao, 2004). 
Therefore, We will follow the suggestion of Fleisher et al. (2010) to use the year 1994 
                                                             
22
 The decentralization of fiscal revenue raising and spending decisions can improve the efficiency of the 
public sector, cut the budget deficit and promote economic growth because local governments are better 
positioned than the central government to locate and monitor the fiscal expenditure more efficiently, 
which reinforced imposition of hard budget constraints on SOEs (Qian and Weingast, 1997; Ma and 
Norregaard, 1998; Oates, 1972). It is also confirmed by numerous studies on intergovernmental fiscal 
relations in China (Agarwala, 1992).  
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as a structural break for the economic transition process in China.  
 
3.3 Empirical specifications 
3.3.1 Baseline empirical Specifications 
Firstly, we estimate a regional aggregate production function, in which inputs include 
physical and human capital. We measure human capital as the composition-adjusted 
labour inputs (= Number of employed persons * LCI
23
 ). The standard regional fixed 
effects (FE) specification is as follows: 
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where Ypt is the real GDP for province p (=1 ,…, 28) in year t ( =1978, …, 2009); Kpt is 
real capital inputs; Lpt is the number of employed persons; LCIpt is the labour 
composition index calculated with the micro CHNS dataset; Rr and Tt are region 
(=1,…,4) and time dummies; and it is a random error term.  
As discussed in above section, we apply two sensitivity tests to test the 1994 
structural break, and the disparities in different development patterns in the four regions:  
(1) Adding variables interacted with the structural break year dummy Spt (0 = 
before 1994, 1 = 1994 and thereafter);  
(2) Adding variables interacted with the regional dummies rd  to capture the 
                                                             
23
 The Labour composition index used in this chapter is calculated from the Chapter 2 for 1989 - 2009. 
We assume that the LCI indices during 1978-1988 are the same as 1989 for every region and province. 
This assumption is reasonable because the contributions of LCI to labour productivity increase mainly in 
2000s (see Table 2.9) and are very likely to be quite constant in the early stage of reforms (1980s). 
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different growth paths of regions. The rd1 – rd3 dummies are for the Northeast, Coastal 
and Interior regions, leaving the West as the baseline region. Hence, the coefficients of 
interactions are the incremental effect of specific period/region on the baseline 
period/region. 
 
 
Secondly, the fixed effect (FE) models are applied to examine the impact of LCI 
and institutional variables on labour productivity, TFP and wages. We present the basic 
FE specification as follows: 
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where LPpt  is the GDP per worker for province p in year t; KLpt is real capital stock per 
worker; TFPpt is the total factor productivity index; AWpt is the real annual earnings per 
worker; O1pt and O3pt represent the ratios of staff and workers worked in the public 
sector and private enterprises respectively; BRpt is the birth rate of population to 
measure the human capital formation from One-Child Policy on productivity; OPpt is 
the share of trade (export and import) of GDP to capture the effect of openness and 
potential skilled-biased technology spillovers; Fispt 
is the share of fiscal expenditures on 
human capital; Rr and Tt are region and time dummies; and pt
  is a random error term.  
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Following the same vein of the sensitivity tests in the production function in 
equation (3.2), we also apply sensitivity tests for structural break (year 1994) in labour 
productivity, TFP and wage functions (use LP as example) as follows: 
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And the sensitivity tests for regional disparities in GDP per worker are just replacing the 
structural break dummy with the regional dummies 1rd - 3rd for the Northeast, Coastal 
and Interior regions.  
 
3.3.2 Empirical specifications for beta-convergence 
Following Sala-i-Martin (1996), we postulate that beta-convergence holds for provinces 
p in a region. Log form labour productivity in the province p can be approximated by   
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where 0<  <1 and ),0(~ 2 pt , and is independent over province p and year t. 
Manipulating the equation (3.4) yields, 
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Thus,  >0 implies a negative correlation between growth and initial level of labour 
productivity. 
 
                                          )1(
Te                                      (3.6) 
        
λ is the measure of speed at which a region proceeds towards its own steady state level, 
Hence, λ from cross-section data is often interpreted as the speed at which poorer 
regions are closing their productivity gap with richer countries.  
The beta-convergence regression of provincial labour productivity for region r 
(=1, … ,4) are as follows: 
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where LPp,t-1 is the lagged labour productivity for province p. The beta-convergence 
regression of provincial TFP and wages for region r are similar. 
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3.4 Data Description 
Table 3.2 describes the variables used in this chapter. In 1978, the real GDP in the 
Northeast (51.2 billion RMB) is higher than that of the Coastal (48 billion RMB) and 
Interior (39.1 billion RMB), and above twice that of the West (22.5 billion RMB). 
Hence, the industrial Northeast was the growth engine and the richest region.  
From 1978 to 1994, the GDP in the Coastal increases about 6 fold, compared with 
about 4 fold in the other three regions so that the Coastal took the No.1 position of the 
Northeast gradually. From 1994 to 2009, all regions increase 5 fold, suggesting a 
convergence trend among regions. Hence, over the last 32 years, the Coastal has the 
highest annual growth rate of GDP at 11.9 percent, while the Northeast grows slower 
than the Coastal at 8.7 percent per year.  
The capital inputs have the similar pattern to GDP.  The Northeast had the highest 
capital inputs (65 billion RMB) in 1978. Then, the capital inputs in the Coastal 
increased rapidly so that they were 50 percent higher than the Northeast in 2009. The 
annual growth rate is the highest in the Coastal (14.2 percent) and lowest in the 
Northeast (10.9 percent).  
TFP index has been increasing in all four regions, but the growth is most 
prominent in the Interior. TFP index in the Interior (50) was the lowest among the four 
regions in 1978 which increased to 94 in 1994, and finally achieved the second highest 
level (173) among four regions in 2009. As average wage rates are concerned, the 
Coastal has the lowest wages (1,766 Yuan, about 211 US$ in 1995) among the four 
regions in 1978. However, its growth rate was the fastest at 8.6 percent per year and 
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increased 16 fold from 1978 to 2009. Hence, the average wages of the Coastal (27,697 
Yuan, about 4,054 US$) became the highest among the four regions in 2009. The labour 
composition index is normally higher in the Interior than in the other three regions, 
which may be because the Interior is closer to the municipal cities with rich education 
resources, such as Beijing and Shanghai (see more details in Appendix Table A3.1).  
We also compare several relevant factors that may affect growth, such as 
ownership (the share of persons employed in SOEs or private enterprises), birth rate, 
openness and fiscal expenditures on human capital. First of all, the share of private 
enterprise has been increasing over time, and now is higher than SOEs in the Coastal 
(88 percent). In 1978, all four regions had a share of SOEs more than 70 percent (86 
percent in the West). Thereafter, the SOEs share of staff employed persons has declined 
to the range of 16-24 percent in the three inner regions and even lower in the Coastal 
(only 11 percent) in 2009.  
The birth rate keeps on decreasing for all regions resulting from the One-Child 
Policy, and in 2009, the Northeast had the lowest birth rate (7.07‰) while the West had 
the highest rate (12.75‰). The provinces in the Coastal tend to be more engaged in 
international trade because of their geographic, historical and institutional advantages, 
while inner provinces tend to be less open to international trade. The openness ratio (5 
percent) in the Coastal was much higher than the second most open region - the 
Northeast (2 percent) in 1978. From 1994, the openness ratios were quite stable in the 
four regions: the Coastal (9 percent), the Northeast (3 percent) and the other two lagging 
regions (1 percent). As noted above, the openness of these provinces in the Coastal is 
likely to be an important factor conducive to higher growth. 
Finally, the proportion of fiscal expenditures on human capital in the Interior was 
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the highest among the four regions in 1978 (18 percent), as the other regions are nearly 
the same (16 percent). Human capital expenditures have been increasing very fast in 
both absolute and relative sense over the period 1978-1994. The West region even 
achieved a peak proportion as 59 percent in 1994 because the central government 
transfer huge investment on human capital to the Xinjiang province of the West region. 
After 1994, this expenditures share slowly has been decreasing in all regions, possibly 
due to the dramatic process of fiscal decentralization in 1994, possible due to the 
substitution effect of infrastructural investment of local government  (Fleisher et al., 
2010; Zhang and Zou, 1998).   
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Table 3.2: Data description of economic growth in China 
Region GDP 
Capital 
input 
Labour 
input 
TFP 
index 
Average 
wage 
Labour 
composition 
index 
Public 
sector  
Private 
Firms 
Birth 
rate 
( ‰) Openness 
Fiscal 
expenditures 
on human 
capital 
  1978 
Northeast 512 650 969 70 2148 101.64 0.78 0 16.93 0.02 0.16 
Coastal 480 377 1620 71 1766 101.37 0.74 0 17.63 0.05 0.16 
Interior 391 509 1848 50 1786 102.50 0.81 0 20.19 0.01 0.18 
West 225 308 1127 54 2147 100.92 0.86 0 22.75 0.01 0.15 
  1994 
Northeast 1825 3030 1592 96 4128 101.39 0.47 0.37 11.46 0.03 0.27 
Coastal 2866 4353 2445 96 5646 101.66 0.35 0.54 12.66 0.08 0.3 
Interior 1751 2324 2929 94 4059 103.23 0.36 0.55 16.83 0.01 0.31 
West 953 1329 1793 94 4521 101.24 0.53 0.37 20.04 0.02 0.59 
  2009 
Northeast 8391 21113 1687 178 21919 103.90 0.24 0.75 7.07 0.03 0.24 
Coastal 15538 35817 3183 167 27697 104.36 0.11 0.88 10.38 0.09 0.29 
Interior 8729 21366 3402 173 19799 108.82 0.16 0.82 11.97 0.01 0.27 
West 4474 12707 2067 170 18632 104.10 0.22 0.77 12.75 0.01 0.25 
 
Data sources: (Hsueh and Li, 1999); various years China Statistical Yearbook; National Bureau of Statistics (1999). 
 
Notes: 
1. “GDP”: 100 million Yuan. “Capital input”: 100 million Yuan. “Labour input”: Number of employed persons, 10,000 persons. “TFP index”, “Labour composition 
index”: 1995=100. Average wage: annual wage rate (Yuan per worker).  
2. The value of the labour composition index in 1978 is assumed to equal those in 1989, since the LCI is calculated by the Chinese Household Nutrition Survey 
(CHNS) (1989-2009). 
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3.5 Empirical results  
3.5.1 Results of baseline regressions 
This section reports statistical results estimating cross-region productivity and wages 
from 1978 to 2009 in China. Table 3.3 presents the estimation results from the simple 
production function using equation (3.1). The estimated output elasticises of capital 
services, adjusted labour inputs are positive and significant, which is consistent with the 
literature. For the overall regression (1), the contribution of adjusted labour inputs is 
slightly higher than capital services.  
For the sensitivity test on structural break in 1994, regression (2) shows that 
significantly positive incremental effect in physical capital (14.7 percent) and 
significantly negative incremental effect in adjusted labour inputs (-12.9 percent), 
confirming the structural break in China’s economy in 1994. Regression (3) shows the 
sensitivity tests on regional heterogeneity that the adjusted labour inputs mainly benefits 
output in the West (1.14) and the Interior (0.785), while the capital inputs are more 
important in the Northeast (0.81) and the Coastal (0.69) than others.  
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Table 3.3:  Production function and sensitivity tests, fixed effect model using equation (3.1) 
  Reg (1) Reg (2) Reg (3)  
Dep. Variable:  
Ln (GDP) 
Overall 
effect 
Before 
1994 
After 1994 
(Incremental) 
Northeast 
(Incremental) 
Coastal 
(Incremental) 
Interior 
(Incremental) 
West 
Ln (Capital) 0.681*** 0.510*** 0.147*** 0.213*** 0.091*** 0.080*** 0.599*** 
0.007 0.011 0.01 0.029 0.02 0.026 0.018 
Ln (adjusted 
labour input) 
0.696*** 0.998*** -0.129*** -0.905*** -0.563*** -0.355**  1.140*** 
0.044 0.043 0.01 0.175 0.126 0.148 0.111 
R-squared 0.986 0.991 0.987 
N 832 832 832 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in italics. The stars *, ** and *** indicate the significance level at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively for two-tail test.  
 
Significant coefficients table: 
 Reg (1) Reg (2) Reg (3) 
Dep. Variable: Ln (GDP) Overall effect Before 1994 After 1994 Northeast  Coastal Interior  West  
Ln (Capital) 0.681 0.51 0.657 0.812 0.69 0.679 0.599 
Ln (Adjusted labour input) 0.696 0.998 0.869 0.235 0.577 0.785 1.14 
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Table 3.4 displays estimation results of the baseline specification for effect of 
human capital on labour productivity, TFP and wages. We find that capital deepening 
improves labour productivity and wages. The labour composition index improves all 
three productivity proxies and benefits workers’ earnings (3.6 percent) more than TFP 
(3 percent) and labour productivity (1.1 percent).  
Other variables include the market reform factors such as ownership, birth rate, 
openness and fiscal expenditures on human capital. Compared to collective-owned 
enterprises, the private firms have much higher productivity and wages; while the public 
sector has lower productivity but similar wages. The birth rate is negatively associated 
with the three productivity proxies, which is consistent with Li and Zhang (2007). 
Openness can increase TFP (45 percent) and the labour productivity (29 percent), but 
not for wages. Fiscal expenditures on human capital have no significant effect on the 
labour productivity and TFP, but decrease wage (-12.4 percent).  
We conclude that capital deepening as well as human capital formation, 
privatization and openness significantly improve economic growth, while higher birth 
rate and the relatively inefficient public sectors harm productivity growth. Fiscal 
expenditures on human capital have no significant positive effect on economic growth, 
and are even harmful for wages, verifying Zhang and Zou (1998)’s argument that 
central government spending (such as in highways, railways, power stations, 
telecommunications and energy)  benefits economic growth, while a high degree of 
provincial government spending is associated with lower provincial economic growth. 
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Table 3.4: Baseline model, fixed effect models using equation (3.2), 1978-2009   
Dependent variable 
Ln (Labour 
productivity) 
Ln (TFP 
index) 
Ln (Average 
wage) 
Ln (Capital per worker) 0.564***   0.568*** 
 
0.01   0.01 
Labour composition index 0.011*** 0.030*** 0.036*** 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Public sector (%) -0.343*** -0.498*** 0.19 
 
0.12 0.15 0.17 
Private sector (%) 0.296*** 0.515*** 0.547*** 
 
0.10 0.11 0.14 
Birth rate -3.505*** -5.585*** -0.87 
 
1.04 1.28 1.49 
Openness 0.290** 0.446*** -0.17 
 
0.14 0.16 0.19 
Fiscal expenditures on  
human capital 
-0.05 -0.03 -0.124*** 
  0.03 0.04 0.05 
R-squared 0.99 0.89 0.97 
N 832 832 832 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in italics. The stars *, ** and *** indicate the significance level at the 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively for two-tail test.  
 
Significant coefficients table 
        
Dependent variable 
Ln (Labour 
productivity) 
Ln (TFP 
index) 
Ln (Average 
wage) 
Ln (Capital per worker) 0.56   0.57 
Labour composition index 0.01 0.03 0.04 
Public sector (%) -0.34 -0.50 - 
Private sector (%) 0.30 0.52 0.55 
birth rate -3.51 -5.59 - 
Openness 0.29 0.45 - 
Fiscal expenditures on human 
capital 
- - -0.12 
 
 
As the dramatic fiscal reform happens during in 1994, we argue that the structural 
break may produce biases in our estimation. Hence, we next have the sensitivity tests on 
disparities in the two time periods (1978-1993 and 1994-2009) and four regions using 
the equation (3.3). The results are reported in Table 3.5 and 3.6. In Table 3.5, economic 
growth mainly benefits from the capital services (48 percent) and openness (33 percent) 
before 1994, but mainly from the birth rate (1.642), the capital inputs (60.5 percent) and 
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the fiscal expenditures on human capital (12.8 percent) after 1994. The public sector 
harms labour productivity overall for the whole time period, but it improves TFP and 
wages after 1994. These results confirm our postulation on structural break in 1994. 
Especially for fiscal expenditures on human capital, the positive effect on productivity 
is found after 1994, as well as positive effect on wages before 1994. 
Openness has significantly positive effect on labour productivity and TFP.  The 
LCI accelerate both TFP and wage growth from 1978 to 2009. Among other variables, 
the privatization is the most important institutional change for the three productivity 
proxies after 1994.  
Since the One-Child Policy was implemented after late 1970s, people who born 
under this policy have not join the labour market before 1994, supporting the negative 
effect of birth rate on labour productivity due to the dominant diminishing marginal 
productivity. However, after 1994, the birth rate has positive effect on labour 
productivity due to the human capital accumulation in the One-Child family, the 
development of urban area and the gradual process of urbanization. For the whole time 
period 1978-2009, the birth rate has negative effect on TFP mainly due to the still low 
technology level across the population. The effects of birth rate on labour productivity 
and average wages are inconsistent, maybe because Chinese labour market is still rigid 
in the transition process. 
Overall, this table shows that the post-1994 period is different from the pre-1994, 
supporting that year 1994 is a structural break year for Chinese productivity analysis.  
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Table 3.5: Sensitivity tests for structural break (Y1994), fixed effect models using 
equation (3.3), 1978-2009  
              
Dependent 
variable 
Log (Labour 
productivity) 
Log (TFP index) Log (Average wage) 
 Before 
1994 
After 1994 
(Incre.) 
Before 
1994 
After 1994 
(Incre.) 
Before 
1994 
After 1994 
(Incre.) 
Ln (Capital per 
worker) 
0.483*** 0.122*** 
  
 
0.383*** 0.223*** 
 
0.01 0.01   
 
0.01 0.01 
Labour 
composition 
index 
0.01 0.00 0.034*** -0.012*** 0.033*** -0.016*** 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Public sector (%) -0.595*** -0.06 -0.554*** 1.145*** -0.20 1.911*** 
 
0.12 0.28 0.15 0.33 0.14 0.32 
Private sector (%) 0.13 0.17 0.309** 1.375*** 0.404*** 1.847*** 
 
0.10 0.22 0.12 0.25 0.12 0.26 
birth rate -4.763*** 6.405*** -6.906*** 6.067*** 2.275* -4.666** 
 
1.11 1.90 1.42 2.20 1.31 2.23 
Openness 0.327** -0.298** 0.549*** -0.421*** -0.11 -0.524*** 
 
0.14 0.14 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.16 
Fiscal 
expenditures on 
human capital 
-0.07 0.128** -0.135** 0.196*** 0.155*** -0.182*** 
  0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 
R-squared 0.99 0.90 0.98 
N 832 832 832 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in italics. The stars *, ** and *** indicate the significance level at the 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively for two-tail test.  
 
 
Significant coefficients table 
            
Dependent variable 
Log (GDP per 
worker) Log (TFP index) 
Log (Average 
wage) 
  
Before 
1994 
After  
1994 
Before 
1994 
After  
1994 
Before 
1994 
After  
1994 
Ln (Capital per worker) 0.48 0.61   
 
0.38 0.61 
Labour composition index 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 
Public sector (%) -0.60 -0.60 -0.55 0.59 - 1.91 
Private sector (%) - - 0.31 1.68 0.40 2.25 
birth rate  -4.76 1.64 -6.91 -0.84 2.28 -2.39 
Openness 0.33 0.03 0.55 0.13 - -0.52 
Fiscal expenditures  
on human capital 
- 0.13 -0.14 0.06 0.16 -0.03 
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Table 3.6 shows the different growth patterns for the four regions. Capital 
accumulation benefits the labour productivity and TFP growth in all four regions, 
especially in the Northeast and Interior. The labour composition index is more important 
in the Coastal, mainly possibly due to 56 percent of top universities in China are located 
in this region (see Appendix Table A3.1). The public sector only improves labour 
productivity and TFP in the Northeast and Coastal, and wages in the Interior. The 
Northeast and Coastal also benefit from more private firms. The birth rate has no effect 
on labour productivity, but harms the TFP in all the four regions which is consistent 
with quality and quantity argument of human capital formation. Openness has huge 
positive effect on all three productivity proxies, except in the Northeast for the labour 
productivity, and in the Coastal for wages. The fiscal expenditures on human capital are 
also significantly positive in the Coastal for wages, suggesting a new growth pattern in 
this advanced region.  
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Table 3.6: Sensitivity tests for 4 regions, fixed effect models, 1978-2009 
          
Dependent variable Ln (Labour productivity) 
  
Northeast 
(Incre.) 
Coastal 
(Incre.) 
Interior 
(Incre.) West  
Ln (Capital per worker) 0.028 -0.053* 0.029 0.568*** 
 
0.048 0.028 0.032 0.025 
Labour composition 
index 
0.017 0.035*** 0.003 0.008 
 
0.017 0.011 0.01 0.009 
Public sector (%) 2.336*** 1.954*** 0.319 -2.350*** 
 
0.647 0.346 0.452 0.314 
Private sector (%) 1.985*** 1.748*** 0.365 -1.395*** 
 
0.419 0.278 0.353 0.253 
birth rate -0.55 -3.891 2.779 -2.924 
 
3.525 2.537 3.237 2.199 
Openness -4.895*** -4.430*** -2.856 4.583*** 
 
1.314 1.219 1.956 1.211 
Fiscal expenditures on 
human capital 
-0.275 -0.173 0.069 0.017 
  0.309 0.121 0.196 0.031 
R-squared 0.989 
N 832 
Dependent variable Ln (TFP index) 
  
Northeast 
(Incre.) 
Coastal 
(Incre.) 
Interior 
(Incre.) West  
Labour composition 
index 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.014 0.037*** 
 
0.02 0.012 0.011 0.01 
Public sector (%) 1.618** 2.581*** -0.26 -2.459*** 
 
0.811 0.456 0.597 0.415 
Private sector (%) 1.544*** 1.943*** 0.04 -1.071*** 
 
0.551 0.357 0.462 0.33 
birth rate 5.23 -2.324 6.579 -6.969** 
 
4.488 3.317 4.25 2.871 
Openness -3.654** -4.485*** -0.502 4.912*** 
 
1.699 1.57 2.469 1.56 
Fiscal expenditures on 
human capital 
-0.773* -0.553*** -0.42 0.044 
  0.407 0.153 0.257 0.04 
R-squared 0.904 
N 832 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in italics. The stars *, ** and *** indicate the significance level at the 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively for two-tail test.  
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Continue... 
 
Dependent variable Ln (Average wage) 
  
Northeast 
(Incre.) 
Coastal 
(Incre.) 
Interior 
(Incre.) West  
Ln (Capital per worker) -0.022 -0.039 0.118** 0.538*** 
 
0.072 0.043 0.049 0.038 
Labour composition index 0.034 0.037** -0.02 0.047*** 
 
0.026 0.016 0.015 0.014 
Public sector (%) 0.946 0.772 2.162*** -1.395*** 
 
0.969 0.519 0.678 0.471 
Private sector (%) 1.415** 0.924** 1.559*** -0.812** 
 
0.628 0.417 0.529 0.379 
birth rate 7.386 4.967 4.267 -5.336 
 
5.281 3.801 4.849 3.295 
Openness -3.238 -3.515* -0.399 3.356* 
 
1.969 1.826 2.931 1.815 
Fiscal expenditures on human capital -0.781* 0.404** -0.193 -0.077* 
  0.463 0.181 0.293 0.046 
R-squared 0.974 
N 832 
Notes: Standard errors are in italics. The stars *, ** and *** indicate the significance level at the 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively for two-tail test.  
 
 
Significant coefficients table: 
  Northeast Coastal Interior  West  
Dependent variable Ln (Labour productivity) 
Ln (Capital per worker) 0.568 0.515 0.568 0.57 
Labour composition index - 0.035 - - 
Public sector (%) -0.014 -0.396 -2.35 -2.35 
Private sector (%) 0.59 0.353 -1.395 -1.40 
birth rate - - - - 
Openness -0.312 0.153 4.583 4.58 
Fiscal expenditures on human capital - - - - 
Dependent variable Ln (TFP index) 
Labour composition index 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.04 
Public sector (%) -0.841 0.122 -2.459 -2.46 
Private sector (%) 0.473 0.872 -1.071 -1.07 
birth rate -6.969 -6.969 -6.969 -6.97 
Openness 1.258 0.427 4.912 4.91 
Fiscal expenditures on human capital -0.773 -0.553 - - 
Dependent variable                     Ln (Average wage)   
Ln (Capital per worker) 0.538 0.499 0.656 0.54 
Labour composition index 0.047 0.084 0.047 0.05 
Public sector (%) -1.395 -1.395 0.767 -1.40 
Private sector (%) 0.603 0.112 0.747 -0.81 
birth rate 7.386 - - - 
Openness 3.356 -0.159 3.356 3.36 
Fiscal expenditures on human capital -0.858 0.327 -0.077 -0.077 
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3.5.2 Results of beta-convergence regressions 
Table 3.7 presents estimation results for conditional beta-divergence. The dependent 
variables are growth rates of labour productivity, TFP or average wages. We control 
relevant condition variables such as capital deepening, LCI, ownership, birth rate, 
openness, fiscal expenditures on human capital and structural break in year 1994 as 
above. The conditional beta-convergence is present if the coefficient on lagged 
dependent variable is significantly less than 0.  
The main difference between the OLS and GLS specifications appears on the 
coefficients of the controlled variables. For example, regarding to the labour 
productivity regressions, GLS method finds upwards bias of OLS estimators on capital 
deepening and ownership variables, and GLS method verify the significant positive 
effect of LCI on labour productivity in the Interior region which is consistent with our 
discuss about LCI indices in the Chapter 2.  
The convergence speeds are similar in the two specifications, and both methods 
confirm that only provincial within the Northeast region do not show evidence of 
convergence for average wages. The provinces within the richest Northeast and Costal 
regions have the highest speed (above 2) converging to their steady states of labour 
productivity and TFP growth, while the provinces within the poorest West region have 
the lowest convergence speed (1.89). For the convergence trends of average wages, the 
provinces within the Coastal regions still have highest speed (2.03) while the provinces 
within the West region has the lowest speed (1.99).  From the convergence analyse, we 
can see that the poorest West region not only suffer from the severe regional inequality, 
but also suffer from the relative slower convergence speed across provinces within this 
region.  
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Table 3.7: Regressions to test for beta-convergence in China using equations (3.7 and 3.8), 1978-2009 
 
                  
 Dependent: LP growth OLS regression GLS regression 
  Northeast Coastal Interior West Northeast Coastal Interior West 
Lagged labour productivity  -0.269*** -0.151*** -0.152*** -0.033*   -0.233*** -0.134*** -0.122*** -0.034**  
 
0.068 0.024 0.036 0.017 0.057 0.023 0.03 0.015 
Capital deepening 0.168*** 0.105*** 0.081*** 0.027**  0.154*** 0.091*** 0.058*** 0.030*** 
 
0.042 0.017 0.022 0.011 0.037 0.017 0.017 0.01 
Labour composition index 0.007** 0 0.002 0 0.006** -0.002 0.002** 0 
 
0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 
Public sector -0.092 -0.218*** -0.109 -0.300*** 0.024 -0.236*** -0.088 -0.244*** 
 
0.214 0.074 0.148 0.096 0.203 0.067 0.116 0.092 
Private enterprises 0.187 -0.130** 0.102 -0.181**  0.237 -0.140** 0.118 -0.162**  
 
0.16 0.066 0.12 0.078 0.15 0.058 0.094 0.077 
Birth rate -2.497** -3.980*** 1.021 -1.068 -2.450** -3.760*** 1.426* -1.548**  
 
1.123 0.859 1.096 0.7 1.01 0.845 0.851 0.658 
Openness -0.386*** 0.120** 2.090*** 0.556 -0.355*** 0.143** 1.255** 0.725**  
 
0.121 0.055 0.688 0.398 0.122 0.057 0.555 0.331 
Fiscal expenditures on human 
capital 
0.230** 0.001 0.178* 0.014 0.295*** 0.004 0.122 0.011*   
 
0.109 0.081 0.102 0.009 0.1 0.079 0.081 0.006 
Year1994 dummy -0.026 -0.005 -0.009 -0.01 -0.033* -0.001 -0.012 -0.008 
  0.02 0.015 0.022 0.014 0.018 0.014 0.016 0.012 
R-squared 0.53 0.178 0.278 0.236         
N 93 279 186 248 93 279 186 310 
Wald chi2 (Prob>chi2)         132.4 68.9 104.9 72.3 
Beta -0.27 -0.15 -0.15 -0.03 -0.23 -0.13 -0.12 -0.03 
Lambda 2.07 2.04 2.04 1.89 2.06 2.04 2.03 1.91 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in italics. The stars *, ** and *** indicate the significance level at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively for two-tail test.  
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Dependent: TFP growth OLS regression GLS regression 
  Northeast Coastal Interior West Northeast Coastal Interior West 
Lagged TFP -0.116*** -0.119*** -0.121*** -0.055*** -0.124*** -0.112*** -0.114*** -0.048*** 
 
0.038 0.014 0.023 0.015 0.037 0.011 0.021 0.013 
Labour composition index -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0 0 -0.001 
 
0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 
Public sector 0.159 0.047 0.045 -0.092 0.176 0.021 -0.025 -0.091 
 
0.188 0.049 0.114 0.07 0.176 0.051 0.106 0.068 
Private enterprises 0.22 0.160*** 0.200** -0.012 0.254* 0.133*** 0.152* -0.042 
 
0.152 0.043 0.09 0.056 0.143 0.043 0.084 0.056 
Birth rate -2.028** -2.538*** 0.867 -1.02 -1.449* -2.204*** 1.237 -1.392**  
 
0.956 0.603 0.903 0.619 0.841 0.571 0.788 0.575 
Openness -0.154 0.081** 0.76 0.357 -0.124 0.078** 0.103 0.587**  
 
0.108 0.037 0.558 0.319 0.108 0.036 0.477 0.242 
Fiscal expenditures on human 
capital 
0.188** -0.026 0.098 0.013*   0.185** -0.009 0.056 0.009**  
 
0.092 0.058 0.087 0.008 0.088 0.056 0.074 0.004 
Year1994 dummy 0.011 -0.016 -0.009 -0.009 0.006 -0.01 -0.01 0.001 
  0.018 0.011 0.018 0.012 0.017 0.01 0.014 0.01 
R-squared 0.25 0.303 0.177 0.037         
N 93 279 186 248 93 279 186 310 
Wald chi2 (Prob>chi2)         42.5 175.4 54.4 25.9 
Beta -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.06 -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 -0.05 
Lambda 2.03 2.03 2.03 1.99 2.03 2.03 2.03 1.98 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in italics. The stars *, ** and *** indicate the significance level at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively for two-tail test.  
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Dependent: Average wages 
growth OLS regression GLS regression 
  Northeast Coastal Interior West Northeast Coastal Interior West 
Lagged average wages -0.039 -0.121*** -0.057** -0.058*** -0.05 -0.118*** -0.055** -0.056*** 
 
0.04 0.02 0.025 0.02 0.036 0.02 0.024 0.019 
Capital deepening -0.033 0.053*** 0.019 0.004 -0.014 0.053*** 0.016 0.002 
 
0.033 0.011 0.017 0.01 0.028 0.011 0.015 0.009 
Labour composition index 0.006** 0 0.002 -0.001 0.004* 0 0.002 -0.002 
 
0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Public sector -0.43 -0.115 -0.243 -0.097 -0.356 -0.135* -0.244 -0.079 
 
0.328 0.086 0.175 0.134 0.293 0.081 0.165 0.126 
Private enterprises 0.014 0.025 -0.023 0.019 0.009 0.011 -0.033 0.048 
 
0.245 0.076 0.15 0.116 0.217 0.071 0.139 0.113 
Birth rate -1.501 -3.071*** 0.521 -2.480**  -2.453* -2.964*** 0.9 -1.626 
 
1.478 0.984 1.44 1.158 1.336 0.931 1.221 1.133 
Openness -0.257 0.118* 1.421* 1.029 -0.302* 0.107 1.263* 0.8 
 
0.169 0.066 0.855 0.624 0.164 0.072 0.761 0.572 
Fiscal expenditures on 
human capital 
0.095 0.079 -0.142 0.007 0.062 0.121 -0.16 0.007 
 
0.137 0.094 0.128 0.016 0.115 0.089 0.117 0.015 
Year1994 dummy 0.006 0.021 -0.007 0.048**  0.012 0.02 -0.005 0.047**  
  0.03 0.018 0.029 0.023 0.028 0.017 0.026 0.021 
R-squared 0.464 0.216 0.226 0.208   
   N 93 279 186 248 93 279 186 310 
Wald chi2 (Prob>chi2)         98.4 94.8 69.1 70.3 
Beta no convergence -0.12 -0.06 -0.06 no convergence -0.12 -0.06 -0.06 
Lambda   2.03 1.99 1.99   2.03 1.99 1.99 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in italics. The stars *, ** and *** indicate the significance level at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively for two-tail test.  
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3.6 Endogeneity of education  
 
This section focuses on finding and testing valid instrumental variables to overcome the 
well-known endogeneity problem of schooling in education returns over the early and 
later transition periods and speculate on the likely institutional and structural factors 
underpinning these results. It assesses whether the OLS estimates (assuming schooling 
an exogenous variable) significantly differ from the Generalized Instrumental Variables 
(GIV) estimates that consider this bias.  
 
3.6.1 Empirical specifications and choice of instruments 
The Ordinary Least Square estimation is given by: 
)9.3(ln 210 iiii XEW  
 
where Wi is the hourly wage rate of individual i, Ei represent years of schooling, Xi is a 
vector of control variables including experience and its square, dummies of urban(=1), 
year dummies and provincial dummies; εi is an error term with ε ~N (0, σ
2
).  
Recent work provides evidence that OLS estimates of returns to schooling in 
China are biased if years of schooling are endogenous. However, the literature has 
emphasized the biases that may be caused principally by the endogenous nature of 
schooling (Dearden, 1999; Card, 1999; Blundell et al., 2005). In our CHNS sample, 
endogeneity can arise because of omitted ability. That is, the coefficient of returns to 
schooling 1 is upwardly biased because the chosen schooling levels are positively 
correlated with omitted ability, while ability is positively correlated with the wage rate 
(Chen and Hamori, 2009). However, Card (1999) argues that OLS estimates of 1 are 
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biased downwards because individuals with high discount rates choose low levels of 
schooling, that is, schooling with higher marginal rates of return. In addition, Li and 
Luo (2004) argue that OLS estimators will be biased downwards caused by 
measurement error in schooling. Our study will check out which one of the upwards and 
downwards bias dominates in the gender samples.  
 
Heckman and Li (2004) recommend using the Instrumental Variable (IV) 
methodology to cope with the endogeneity problem in China. They use parental 
education and year of birth as instrumental variables to identify the returns to higher 
education for young people in the urban areas of the six provinces in 2000. The IV 
estimator of average return to four-year college attendance is 43 percent (on average, 11 
percent annually). Harmon and Walker (2000) use the family background as instrument 
and find the IV result (9.9 percent) is higher than the OLS estimation (5 percent) for 
males in UK. Uusitalo (1999) apply the instruments (parental income and education and 
location of resident) for the Finnish sample with IV result (12.9 percent) which is higher 
than OLS (8.9 percent). Chen and Hamori (2009) examines economic returns to 
education in urban China using OLS and IV methodologies for women and men with 
the CHNS 2004 and 2006 pooled data with spouse education as instrument. Moreover, 
Fleisher and Wang (2005) use an IV approach in which schooling is endogenous and the 
instruments are birth year, location dummies of elementary school, namely, a dummy 
variable for whether any normal high-school years occurred during the cultural 
revolution, and interaction terms between the location and Culture Revolution year 
variables. Their IV estimators are exceeding 10 percent in every year in 1984, 1987 and 
1990. 
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Even with the above trials, valid instruments for education still seem a big 
problem in studies of education returns. To be a valid instrumental variable for the 
endogenous years of schooling, the potential exogenous instruments should be only 
correlated with years of schooling, and not correlated with the unobserved errors in the 
wage equation, εi, (such as the unobservable ability variable). The instrumental above 
(family background, parental income and parental education, birth year and spouse’s 
education) are questioned in the literatures. 
Belley and Lochner (2007) argue that family background (such as parental income) 
is correlated with children’s cognitive skill and hence is not a valid instrumental 
variable for education. Heckman and Li (2004) use parental income as the proxy for 
ability which should be put into the wage equation directly rather than used as an 
instrument. Furthermore, parental income is correlated with parental education, so 
parental education would not be a valid instrument too. Following the same line of 
reasoning, although year of birth of individuals may reflect the cohort effect on 
education, it is possible that the cohort effect is correlated with wage through different 
channels such as experience. Spouse’s education would be highly correlated with 
his/her family background which is generally similar and correlated with the 
individual’s education, hence not exogenous. 
Therefore, we try three potential instrumental variables: number of brothers, 
number of sisters and whether the household has access to tap water. The justification is 
as follows. Firstly, there is an extensive theoretical literature that postulates a trade-off 
between child quantity and quality within a family, introduced by Becker (1960) and 
expanded in Becker and Lewis (1973) and Becker and Tomes (1976). A key element of 
the quantity-quality model is an interaction between quantity and quality in the budget 
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constraint that leads to rising marginal costs of quality with respect to family size. It 
may be a consequence of low substitution elasticity in a family’s utility function 
between parents’ consumption or level of living and that of their children (Duesenberry 
1960, Willis 1969). Becker and Lewis (1979) argue that the shadow price of children is 
greater the higher their quality is, and the shadow price of children with respect to their 
quality is greater, the greater the number of children. 
Recent evidence suggests that children from larger families have lower average 
education levels, and yet family size does not affect an individual’s wage – a 
requirement for a valid IV. Black et al. (2005) use a rich dataset on the entire population 
of Norway and find a negative correlation between family size and children’s education. 
Silles (2010) finds that sibling size has an adverse causal effect on test scores and 
behavioural development. Li and Luo (2004) use the CHIP 1995 data and apply OLS 
and various IV estimations with number of siblings as the IV to estimate returns to 
education for young workers in urban China. They find the IV results are around 15-17 
percent while the OLS estimators are 7-8 percent per year of schooling. Li (2007) find 
that student who is the single child or has only one sibling in the family is more likely to 
be enrolled in elite universities in China.  
The effect of number of siblings on returns to education is likely to be different 
for males and females, since a child’s education may be affected by the size and 
composition of brothers or sisters if the family faces borrowing constraints, especially in 
the developing countries such as China. Girls and boys have different earnings 
potentials during the period in which they contribute to household income. Women 
historically spent less time in the labour force than men and for this reason the return to 
investment in education may have been lower for daughters than for sons. If boys 
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receive a higher return to each level of schooling, we should expect to see not only boys 
receive more education, but also that the presence of sons reduces the educational 
attainment of daughters. A girl with only sisters would receive more education than a 
girl with brothers, under the assumption of borrowing constraints and not upon the exact 
shape of the parents’ utility function (Butcher and Case, 1994). Empirical literatures 
also find patterns of discrimination in favour of boys in the allocation of household 
resources, including nutrients, health care, and education (Behrman, 1988; Deaton, 
1989). Parish and Wills (1992) verify that a brother reduces siblings’ education in 
Taiwan. Butcher and Case (1994) examine the effect of the number and sex composition 
of a boy or girl’s siblings on that child’s educational attainment. They find that in the 
United States between 1920 and 1965, women’s educational choices have been 
systematically affected by the sex composition of her siblings, and that men’s choices 
have not. So we expect the number of brothers will have higher negative effect on 
individual’s education than the number of sisters. Hence we will distinguish between 
girl and boy siblings when constructing the instruments. 
Second, as regards household access to tap water as an IV, the argument is simply 
that such access improves a child’s schooling, but does not affect later earnings. In other 
words, we follow Fleisher et al. (2010), Pal (2010) and Maimaiti and Siebert (2009) in 
arguing  that education  is improved by local investment in public facilities such as 
water supply. Even though good education facilities are located in large urban areas and 
provincial capitals, their locations are determined by historical factors, geographic 
characteristics, fiscal policy, political considerations, defence goals, and the like. Thus it 
is reasonable to assume that public facilities tend to generate exogenous impacts on 
people’ earnings through education rather than that their locations have been the result 
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of earnings of people who live there.  
Pal (2010) verifies that access to public infrastructure plays a crucial role on the 
presence of private schools in a community in India. He highlights the role of village-
level public infrastructure (as reflected in the access to concrete road, electricity, piped 
water, phone and post office). Maimaiti and Siebert (2009) argue that access to water is 
especially important for girls, since a girl's education suffers when her larger water need 
for female hygiene purposes after menarche is not met because her household has poor 
access to water. Using the same data source as our chapter, they find that menarche is 
associated with an increase in the school dropout rate, and indeed the effect is weaker 
for girls who have good access to water. Hence, they conclude that water engineering 
can thus contribute significantly to increasing girls’ education in rural areas. On the 
other hand, Oster and Thornton (2011) address sanitary product provision and argue that 
access to tap water affects education of both males and females, and that menarche is 
possibly irrelevant. Thus, we use access to tap water as a potential instrumental variable 
for education of both males and females. 
 
Overall, we adopt an IV approach and using the “numbers of brothers”, “numbers 
of sisters” and “piped / tap water in house or courtyard” variables as instruments. The 
following two-equation model describes the natural logarithm of hourly wage and years 
of schooling are normally applied to cope with the endogeneity of schooling: 
                      
)10.3('   ii ZYS  
           
)11.3(ln ' iiii YSXW    
where Zi denotes the vector of observed instrumental variables with the properties 
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suggested above and the other exogenous variables, same as the variables in the OLS 
regression. Our dataset contain two potential instruments for years of schooling
iYS : 
number of brothers, number of sisters and tap water. 
 
3.6.2 Composition bias of age 
The aggregated estimates of repeated cross-section regressions may be mix-ups of many 
heterogeneous cohorts and hence may suffer serious composition biases (Solon et al., 
1994). Li (2003) uses the 1988 CHIP data to classify workers into three cohorts 
depending on when they started working: prior to economic reform, up to 1979; in the 
early stage of urban reforms (1980 to 1987); or during the advanced stage of urban 
reform (1988 to 1995). The average annual rates of returns to college education were 
7.7 percent for the pre-1979 cohort, 14.1 percent for the 1980–1987 cohort, and 14.8 
percent for the 1988–1995 cohort. Maurer-Fazio (1999) finds higher annual rates of 
education returns for the young (under age 30, 6.6 percent) than for their elders (above 
age 50, 3.4 percent) in 1989. Fleisher and Wang (2005) estimate education returns in the 
first and subsequent jobs, with workers grouped by the year of the first job, in order to 
observe the impact of the “Cultural Revolution”. Their OLS estimators find that annual 
rates of education returns to the younger cohorts (whose first jobs were in 1984, 1987 
and 1990) have received smaller returns to education than did the older cohorts (whose 
first jobs occurred prior to 1970 and 1975, and were affected by the Cultural 
Revolution). These cohort analyses reveal different views of education returns, 
compared to traditional aggregated analysis. Hence, we estimate wage equations for 
four age groups which can provide insights into the nature of labour markets changes 
and the fluctuations in returns to schooling over time.  
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We estimate the regressions with separated age group samples. The three age 
groups are people born before 1961, during 1962-1980 and in 1981 or after. The cut-off 
time choice of groups is based on the widely accepted structural break points in Chinese 
modern history to allow heterogeneity of groups in our study. The age group (born 
before 1961) marks the history periods of the foundation of People’s Republic of China 
(1949) and the “Great Leap Forward” (1958-1961), and the second age group (1962-
1980) is the second baby boom period. Finally, the full enforcement of the “One Child 
Policy” in 1981 defines the last group.  
These structural break points can be clearly observed in a birth rate graph over the 
period of 1949-2009 (see Figure A3.1). The birth rate was above 30 per thousand in the 
1950s. The economic crisis from the “Great Leap Forward” and famine during the 
period 1958-1961 resulted in 30 million extra deaths (Lin, 1990), and the lowest birth 
rate at 18.02 per thousand in 1961. Afterwards, with the economic recovery, China 
experienced the largest baby boom, with the birth rate peaking at 43.37 per thousand in 
1963. From 1961 to 1980, the newborns were about 310 million and comprised 23.5 
percent of the total population in 2009. 24  The large number of children born caused 
China’s leaders to be very concerned about the growth potential of this extraordinarily 
large age group. The “One Child Campaign” was launched in December 1979. In Feb 
1980, Guangdong province was the first province to make regulations for 
implementation, followed by other provinces. The full enforcement of “One-Child 
policy” across country started from 1981. There were two small peaks of the birth rate; 
between 1980 and 1982, due to the implementation of China’s new Marriage Law in 
1981; and the consequent baby boom during 1984 and 1987. After that, the birth rate 
                                                             
24 Data are from the Chinese Statistics Yearbook 2010. 
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continued to decline to be as low as 12.13 per thousand in 2009.  
 
3.6.3 Data description 
We use all eight waves of the CHNS dataset (1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006 
and 2009) to compare returns to education over time. Our sample is selected based on 
employees (age 16-60 for males and 16-52 for females
25
) who work in sectors besides 
“Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, fishery and water conservancy”. It only 
includes employees with positive annual gross income. Self-employed and owners of 
private or individual enterprises have been excluded, because it is difficult to separate 
their wages from the profit income. Observations with missing values on years of 
schooling, experience, etc. have been dropped. Nominal annual earnings include regular 
wages, bonuses, all kinds of subsidies and in-kind wages from the work unit. Nominal 
annual earnings are converted into real annual earnings by deflating by provincial 
urban/rural Consumer Price Index with year 1995 as 100. In the CHNS dataset, the 
numbers of brother and numbers of sister variables are only surveyed on once married 
women under age 53 and their husbands in 2000, 2004, 2006 and 2009. To impute 
sibling numbers for every individual i in our sample, we run regression as follows:  
 
),,Pr,( iiiii MaleUrbanBfSib               (3.12) 
 
where
iSib is the number of brothers or number of sisters, iB is the birth year, iUrban is 
the urban dummy,
iMale is the gender dummy. 
                                                             
25
 In China, the retirement age is 60 for male and 55 for female. The CHNS dataset provide the sibling 
information for once married female under age 53, so we use the cut-off age of 53 for our female sample. 
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Table A3.2 describes the variables by gender and three age groups in the pooled 
dataset of all eight waves. The youngest age group has the highest real hourly wage 
rates at 6.8 Yuan for males and 5.92 Yuan for females. They also have the highest years 
of schooling at 10.59 years for males and 11.18 years for females. But they have the 
shortest potential labour markets experience. The older age group, the more brothers 
and sisters are for both genders. Nearly 79 - 89 percent of households have piped/tap 
water in house or courtyard across the surveyed period. The average experience of 
employees are more than 25 years for the oldest group while only 4-5 years for the One-
child group. Less than half of the employees are from urban area except the female 
group born before 1961, since urban females may have the chance to postpone their 
retirement age.  
 
3.6.4 Empirical Results 
Table A3.3 shows the OLS estimators for the years of schooling by interacting 
schooling and wave dummies for the pooled data, with the logarithm of real hourly 
wage rate as the dependent variable by gender and age group. Experience, experience 
squared, urban dummy, time dummies and provincial dummies are the controlled 
variables. In general, females’ returns to schooling are higher than males’ returns to 
schooling. The returns to schooling for females are higher than males in most cases. 
And, returns are highest around 2004-2006 then decline in 2009 for both gender.  
For the oldest age group (born before 1961), the returns to schooling are nearly 
constant in 1989, 1991 and 1997 at around 2 percent for males and 3.6 for females. For 
both gender, the returns are tripled from 1997 to 2000, increase to the peak at 9.8 
percent for males in 2006 and at 10.7 percent for females in 2004, then decline in 2009 
 82 
especially for females. For the baby boom group (born 1962-1980), males’ returns to 
schooling only appear from 2000 at 3.2 percent, which may be affected by political 
unrest in 1989, then rise at 8.7 percent in 2006. Females have positive returns from 
1991 to 2009 and the highest returns are 12.9 percent in 2004. Employees born in 1981 
or after have highest returns to schooling than other age groups, especially at 19.8 
percent in 2006 for females.  
To overcome the endogeneity problem of years of schooling, we apply the 
Generalized Instrumental Variables (GIV) method by gender and age group which also 
avoid the possible over-identification and heteroscedasticity problems. This is a 2 Stage 
Least Square (2SLS) procedure. In the first step (using equation 3.10, results in Table 
A3.4), we regress years of schooling on instruments and get the 1SLS estimator by age 
group. Then we calculate the predicted values of years of schooling for each group. 
Hence, the variable of years of schooling can be decomposed into two components: a 
linear combination of instruments (predicted years of schooling) and a random 
component. In step 2, we estimate equation 3.11 using the predicted years of schooling. 
This is the GIV estimator and the results are in Table A3.5. 
In Table A3.4, we test the endogeneity of years of schooling and the validity of the 
instruments (number of brothers, number of sisters, and tap water) with the instrumental 
variables estimation, and present the estimators for the years of schooling. When the 
excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors and valid, we check 
whether the equation is weakly identified (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Estimators can 
perform poorly when instruments are weak. When errors are assumed to be i.i.d., the 
test for weak identification reports an F version of the Cragg-Donald Wald statistic 
(Cragg and Donald, 1993). Stock and Yogo (2002) have compiled critical values for the 
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Cragg-Donald F statistic for several different estimators, several different definitions of 
"perform poorly" (based on bias and test size), and a range of configurations (up to 100 
excluded instruments and up to 2 or 3 endogenous regressors, depending on the 
estimator). The instruments are valid except the males born in 1981 and after (F-
value=5.19 here). With the GIV method, the chi-2 statistics are 308.14 between males 
and females, 274.4 among the male groups and 240.39 among the female groups.  
First, children born before 1961 appear mainly to compete with their same sex 
siblings, i.e. losing 0.199 years of schooling for males and 0.123 years of schooling for 
females. Second, children born in the largest baby boom period 1962-1980 compete 
with both brothers and sisters, and present the consistent findings as literatures, i.e., 
girls suffer more from siblings (losing more than 0.20 years of schooling) than boys 
(losing less than 0.175 schooling), and girl with brothers would suffer more education 
(losing 0.214 years) than with sister (losing 0.202 years). Under the One-Child Policy, 
girls appear to compete strongly with their sisters, losing 0.379 years of schooling. 
Having tap water always favours the years of schooling for the three age groups and 
both genders (more for girls, as expected). 
Table A3.5 shows the second-step GIV regressions by gender and age groups. By 
eliminating the endogeneity problem, males’ returns to schooling are higher than 
females’ for the two older age groups, in contrast with the higher returns for females in 
the OLS estimation. The returns from the GIV estimators are higher than the OLS 
estimators, supporting the domination of downwards bias due to the endogeneity 
problem. 
The returns for females born before 1961 are constant from 1989 to 2006 at 6.8 
percent, and then increase to 12.1 percent, while the males in the same group get the 
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returns more than 10 percent in 2000s. For both genders, the education returns appear 
after 2004 at more than 10 percent. The One-Child Policy group has the highest returns 
(about 25 percent for males and 33 percent for females) from 2006. We will discuss the 
characteristics of returns for the age groups in details in the chapter 5.  
 
3.7 Conclusions 
China’s spectacular economic growth is from unequal economic performance of 
provinces and regions. This chapter examines effects of the physical and human capital 
on labour productivity, Total factor productivity (TFP) and wages incorporating the 
market reform factors such as ownership types, birth rate, openness and fiscal 
expenditures on human capital. 
We find that, in a simple production function, the human capital (measured as 
composition-adjusted labour inputs) is more important than physical capital for GDP. 
And, the returns to adjusted labour inputs in the West which has the poorest education 
resources are the highest among the four regions, while the returns to capital inputs are 
the highest in the traditional industrial Northeast region.  
In more accurate specifications for labour productivity, TFP and wages, Chinese 
economic miracle mainly pushed by the (physical) capital service per capita rather than 
labour composition index, possibly due to that the effect of human capital has been 
reflected into market reform variables such as privatization, One-Child Policy, openness, 
and fiscal expenditures on human capital. The share of persons employed in the private 
sector and openness (competing with the foreign companies to the globalization 
processes) are very important for labour productivity and TFP growth, which allow a 
more efficient allocation of human capital based on market demand rather than central 
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planning. The higher birth rate is harmful for human capital formation within the 
families and negative for productivity. The average wage rate is harmed by the fiscal 
expenditures on human capital, possible due to the substitution effect of infrastructural 
investment of local government (Zhang and Zou, 1998). 
The structural break between the pre-1994 and post-1994 periods illustrates 
significant difference on economic growth patterns, indicating that the more radical 
market reforms after 1994 improve productivity and wages. The capital inputs 
contribute more after 1994, while the returns to Labour composition index (LCI) 
decrease with the education expansion and increasing tuition fees since the late 1990s 
(Wang et al. 2010). 
The four regions also show different patterns in economic growth paths. The 
capital inputs mostly help the labour productivity growth in the West as well as the 
wages growth in the Interior. LCI contributes to the TFP in all four regions. The 
privatization processes improve labour productivity and TFP in the Northeast and 
Coastal, as well as wage growth in all four regions except the West. The collective 
ownership seems a better choice than the pure private or public organisation for the 
West because its economy is still based on agriculture. Openness is good for three 
productivity proxies in all four regions, except labour productivity in the Northeast and 
wages in the Coastal. It is consistent with two phenomenal economic issues in China: 
the declining production power of the Northeast under the international and internal 
competition and the great migration of unskilled workers from the rural areas around the 
country to the coastal region after 1994.  
Moreover, provinces within each region present strong evidence of beta-
convergence for all three productivity proxies. The highest convergence speed is found 
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in the provinces in the Northeast and Coastal regions for labour productivity and TFP 
growth, suggesting fast technology spillover within these regions. The provinces in the 
Coastal, as the most advanced region in China have the highest convergence speed for 
average wages, while the provinces in the Northeast region do not show convergence in 
both Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Generalized Least Square (GLS) regressions. 
Finally, we overcome the endogeneity problem of education by the Generalized 
Instrumental Variables (GIV) method using the CHNS dataset (1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 
2000, 2004, 2006 and 2009), considering the composition bias of gender and age groups.  
We argue the validity of instruments applied in the past literatures, and try three 
instruments (number of brothers, number of sisters and tap water). These IVs pass the 
required tests (F tests and Chi-square tests). Results of the first step of GIV regressions 
show that, children born before 1961 appear mainly to compete with their same sex 
siblings, while children born in the largest baby boom period 1962-1980 compete with 
both brothers and sisters, and girls suffer from siblings than boys. For the youngest 
group born in 1981 and after, girls appear to compete strongly with their sisters. Having 
tap water always favours the years of schooling for the three age groups and both 
genders (more for girls, as expected). 
By eliminating the endogeneity problem, males’ returns to schooling are higher 
than females’ for the two older age groups, in contrast with the higher returns for 
females in the OLS estimation. The returns from the GIV estimators are higher than the 
OLS estimators, supporting the domination of downwards bias due to the endogeneity 
problem. We will discuss the returns for age groups in details when we deal with 
another well-known problem of education, Heckman selection bias in the chapter 5.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: COST COMPETITIVENESS 
COMPARISONS AND CONVERGENCE 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 and 3 discuss Chinese provincial disparities and convergence of labour 
productivity, TFP and wages using the growth accounting method and regression 
method. In this chapter, we examine international and internal provincial disparities and 
convergence of sectors (industries) from a labour cost perspective. And then, we 
investigate which sectors have comparative competitiveness advantage in international 
and internal senses.  
Unit labour costs are widely used as a straightforward yard-stick for international 
comparisons (van Ark et al., 2005). An analysis on the factors driving the disparities of 
unit labour costs between regions and industries would continuously induce great 
interest of both academy and practitioners, especially as the information is to be useful 
in a policy context (Peneder, 2009). Thus, we focus on the drivers of unit labour costs 
and decomposition of cost competitiveness in this chapter. 
It is well known that China has a competitive edge in manufacturing subsectors 
because Chinese labour costs were so cheap that China easily became “the world 
factory” in the 1990s (Chen et al., 2009). However, over recent years, Chinese 
competitive advantage has been weakened by raised nominal wages, the relative slower 
productivity growth and appreciated Chinese currency. Thus, this chapter, on the one 
hand examines the change in the competitive position of Chinese 12 manufacturing 
subsectors related to 19 countries (including the USA, many EU countries and China 
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neighbouring countries) during the long-run time periods 1978-2007.26  On the other 
hand, we investigate the Chinese internal provincial unit labour costs and its two 
components, i.e. labour productivity and labour compensation across nine one-digit 
sectors from 1978 to 2009, to figure out provincial development strategies according to 
their comparative advantage. 
Unfortunately, previous studies related to China’s international and internal 
provincial competitive positions are very rare. Even in these scarce cases, on one has 
tried to study so many countries, provinces and sectors, leaving alone so long time 
period as in this chapter. Notable studies include UNCTAD (2002) computing unit 
labour costs in manufacturing for China relative to the US, Sweden and some non-EU 
countries, but only for one year (1998). Cox and Koo (2003) calculate comparative 
labour productivity for China relative to the US and Mexico, also only for one year 
(2001), and without comparisons of unit labour costs. Banister (2005) report on labour 
costs in Chinese manufacturing but does not include productivity or unit labour costs 
analysis and only for 2002. Szirmai et al. (2005) provide long-run series of China’s 
labour productivity relative to the US for 21 manufacturing subsectors from 1980 to 
2002. However, they do not consider unit labour costs either.  
In more recent literature, Ceglowski and Golub (2007) analyze China’s labour 
productivity and unit labour costs in aggregate manufacturing over the period 1980- 
2002. They find that China’s unit labour costs are very low relative to the US, the EU 
countries, Japan and most newly industrialized countries. However, their investigation is 
only for aggregated manufacturing and cannot provide any information at more detailed 
levels such as subsectors and provinces. Chen et al. (2009) concentrate on comparisons 
                                                             
26
 The time periods for Portugal and Japan are 1978-2006 due to data limitation. 
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of relative levels of productivity, labour compensation, unit labour costs and 
convergence trends for 28 manufacturing subsectors and 30 provinces for only two 
years (1995 and 2004). They argue that unit labour costs decline at the aggregated level, 
because labour productivity growth is faster than the labour compensation growth. 
Labour-intensive industries are more likely to converge, whereas capital-skill intensive 
industries tended to diverge in China. However, they do not consider the fast developing 
service sectors in China, which is our contribution in this chapter.  
This chapter is structured as follows: in section 4.2 we consider the method of 
relative unit labour costs, relative labour productivity and relative nominal labour costs 
for comparisons across countries or provinces; Section 4.3 discusses the construction of 
the dataset; in section 4.4 we outline findings in relation to measures of relative unit 
labour costs averaged over periods, and examine what’s driving competitive differences 
among different countries (provinces) across sectors; Section 4.5 provides a 
decomposition of unit labour costs growth into relative changes of productivity, nominal 
labour costs and exchange rates; Section 4.6 shows the convergence taken place across 
countries (provinces) by sector. Finally, we outline the key findings of this chapter.  
      
4.2  Measurement method of unit labour cost 
In order to calculate unit labour costs, we need information of value added, price 
deflators of value added, labour compensation, working hours, numbers of employees 
(or staff and workers in China), exchange rate and purchasing power parity.
27
 For cross-
country comparisons, unit labour costs in domestic prices in sector j and country b 
                                                             
27
 The staff and workers refer to persons working in, and receive payment from units of state ownership, 
collective ownership, joint ownership, and share holding ownership, foreign ownership, and ownership by 
entrepreneurs from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, and other types of ownership and their affiliated 
units. This definition is similar to the employee in the EU KLEMS dataset. 
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(baseline country is China in this study), i.e. 
)(bb
jULC can be calculated by:  
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where 
)(bb
jLC  is labour compensation of sector j in country b in domestic prices;  
similarly, 
)(bb
jY  is value added in domestic prices in sector j and country b . Using 
estimates of price ratios, the unit labour costs of country a can be expressed in prices of 
country b as follows: 
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where ER
ab
 is the exchange rate between country a and b; and PPP
ab
 is the purchasing 
power parity between country a and b. Relative unit labour costs between country a and 
b (RULC
ab
) for a particular benchmark year are then defined as: 
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Next, labour productivity in domestic prices in sector j and country b, i.e. 
)(bb
jLP
can be calculated by:  
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where bjH  is hours worked of employees in sector j and country b. Using PPP, the 
labour productivity of country a can be expressed in prices of country b ( )(bajLP ) as 
follows: 
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Relative labour productivity in sector j between countries a and b ( abjRLP ) for a 
particular benchmark year are then defined as: 
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Finally, nominal labour costs in domestic prices in sector j and country b ( )(bb
jNLC ) 
can be calculated by:  
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Nominal labour costs in prices of country b in sector j and country a ( )(ba
jNLC ) can be 
calculated by:  
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Relative nominal labour costs between countries a and b (
abRNLC ) for a particular 
benchmark year are then defined as: 
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Similarly, for cross-provincial comparisons within China, the formulas for unit labour 
costs, labour productivity and nominal labour costs in province p, relative to baseline 
Chinese national level b are as follows: 
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4.3 Construction of the dataset 
For cross-country comparisons, data are now readily available in harmonised form and 
at a detailed industry breakdown from the EU KLEMS productivity accounts database 
(O'Mahony and Timmer, 2009).
28
 We also extract annual market exchange rates and 
purchasing power parity (PPP) for each country over the time period of consideration 
from the Penn World Table (PWT) 7.0 dataset.
29
 Since unit labour costs are all relative 
to the China’s average national level, figures greater than one indicate relative labour 
costs advantage for China overall, while figures lower than one indicate relative labour 
costs advantage  for other countries over the China’s average national level.   
For cross-provincial comparisons within China, it is more difficult to construct 
national and provincial dataset from 1978 to 2009. Our Chinese dataset is constructed 
from two sources, Hsueh and Li (1999) and Chinese Statistics Yearbooks (CSYs). 
Hsueh and Li (1999) provide information for fourteen sectors for 1978-1995.
30
 And, 
CSYs have information for five sectors in 1996 and 1997, fifteen sectors from 1997 to 
                                                             
28
 The efforts of the EU KLEMS consortium in producing these data and making them publicly available 
are gratefully acknowledged. The November 2009 release is used. 
 
29
 The construction methods can be found in Penn World Table (2011). The Penn World Table 7.0 
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php is released in May 2011. We also try other two kinds 
of PPP exchange rate: adjusted PPP also from the Penn World Table 7.0; and the unit value ratios from 
the International Comparison of Output and Productivity (ICOP) project. Our basic conclusions do not 
change much, so the sensitivity tests of PPP are only available if requested. 
 
30
The fourteen sectors are total economy; primary sector; total manufacturing; construction;  
transportation, post and telecommunications; wholesale and retail trade; banking and insurance; real 
estate; social service; health, sports and welfare; education, culture, arts and television broadcasting; 
science research and general technical services; government agencies, party agencies and social 
organization. 
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2003, and nine sectors information during 2004-2009.
31
 On the one hand, we construct 
China’s national dataset of 12 manufacturing subsectors, consistent with the industry 
code of EU KLEMS dataset (see Appendix Table A4.1) for international comparisons. 
The missing values are imputed by the manufacturing sector ratios calculated from 
subsectors’ gross value added in the seven input-output (IO) tables. The industrial 
classifications in the seven IO tables were adjusted with the China’s system of industrial 
classification (GB), changing from 33 subsectors in 1987, 1990, 1992 and 1995, then to 
40 subsectors in 1997, and finally to 42 subsectors in 2002 and 2007.
 32
  
First, we recode these three kinds of industrial classifications into EU KLEMS 
codes according to their descriptions (see Table A4.1 in Appendix). Second, we 
calculate the ratios of manufacturing subsector to the total manufacturing in the seven 
years. To get the whole time series of the ratios from 1978 to 2009, we assume the 
subsector ratios before 1987 are the same as the 1987 ratios. And the 1988-1989 ratios, 
1991 ratios, 1993-1994 ratios, 1996 ratios, 1998-2001 ratios and 2003-2006 ratios are 
filled by assuming they follow the same exponential growth rate of two adjacent years. 
For example, the 1998-2001 subsector ratios are filled by assuming they follow the 
same growth rate, that is
 
ln(R2002 /R1997)/5. Finally, we separate the total manufacturing’s 
gross value added, labour compensation and hours worked of staff and workers into 
                                                             
31
 The five sectors in 1996 and 1997 are total economy; primary sector; total manufacturing; construction; 
transportation, post and telecommunications; wholesale and retail trade. The fifteen sectors in 1997-2003 
are total economy; primary sector; total manufacturing; construction; service for farming, forestry, animal 
husbandry and fishery; geological prospecting and water management (conservancy); transportation, post 
and telecommunications; wholesale and retail trade; banking and insurance; real estate; social services; 
health care, sports and social welfare; education, culture and arts, radio, film and television; scientific 
research and polytechnic services; government agencies, party agencies, and social organization. The nine 
sectors in 2004-2009 are total economy; primary sector; total manufacturing; construction; transportation, 
post and telecommunications; wholesale and retail trade; accommodation; banking and insurance and real 
estate. 
 
32
 The system of industrial classification is firstly issued in 1984 (“GB1984”), changed in 1994 
(“GB1994”) and revised in 2002 (“GB2002”).  
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their subsector components by applying subsector ratios over 1978-2009 (see Appendix 
Table A4.2), and combine them into 12 manufacturing subsectors which are consistent 
with industry code of the EU KLEMS dataset (see Table 4.1).  
 
Table 4.1 EU KLEMS code of industries 
code Description 
AtB  AGRICULTURE, HUNTING, FORESTRY AND FISHING 
D  TOTAL MANUFACTURING 
15t16   FOOD , BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO 
17t19   TEXTILES, TEXTILE , LEATHER AND FOOTWEAR 
20   WOOD AND OF WOOD AND CORK 
21t22   PULP, PAPER, PAPER , PRINTING AND PUBLISHING 
23    Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel 
24    Chemicals and chemical products 
26    Other non-metallic mineral products 
27t28   BASIC METALS AND FABRICATED METAL 
29   MACHINERY, NEC 
30t33   ELECTRICAL AND OPTICAL EQUIPMENT 
34t35   TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 
36t37   MANUFACTURING NEC; RECYCLING 
F  CONSTRUCTION 
G  WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE 
I  TRANSPORT AND STORAGE AND COMMUNICATION 
J   FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 
K   REAL ESTATE, RENTING AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES 
M   EDUCATION 
N   HEALTH AND SOCIAL WORK 
 
Data source: EU KLEMS http://www.euklems.net/ 
 
There are many missing values in the nine one-digit tertiary sectors after 1995. We 
have to fill up these missing values using data of tertiary sector in the 1995 such as 
gross value added, number of staff and workers and labour compensation from Hsueh 
and Li (1999). We derive the implicit prices of gross value added from the ratios of 
value added at current prices and constant prices. The price deflators of gross value 
added for missing manufacturing subsectors and tertiary sectors are assumed to be the 
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same as the respective price deflators of the total manufacturing or total tertiary. 
Annual working hours are not available in Chinese official statistics. So we follow 
the calculation of Jefferson et al. (2000). They derive working hours from labour 
regulation which changes three times over 1978-2009. Until 1994, a 6-day and 48-hour 
a week is the norm for workers throughout Chinese industry. Then, staff and workers 
work 8 hours a day and 44 hours a week from March 1st, 1994 and work 8 hours a day 
and 40 hours a week from May 1st, 1995.  Hence, during the period of 1978-1993, the 
standard annual working time is 2400 hours a year (= 48 hours/week*50 weeks). The 
standard annual working time in 1994 is 2233 hours, and 2067 hours in 1995.
33
 And 
then, the standard annual working time declines to 2000 hours (= 40 hours/week*50 
weeks) since 1996. By assuming the individual annual working hours do not vary across 
industries, the total working hours are imputed using the number of staff and workers. 
 
4.4 Results 
We firstly present the findings of average relative unit labour costs, and then the drivers 
of cost competition – relative nominal labour costs (RNLC) and relative labour 
productivity (RLP). Because of the structural break in 1994 discussed in the last chapter 
and the baseline year choice of 1995 in the EU KLEMS, we divide the entire time 
period into two parts: before 1995 and afterwards, and also compare results for these 
two periods. Finally, results of cross-country comparisons and cross-provincial 
comparisons have been presented separately, even though both comparisons are based 
on China’s average national level. 
                                                             
33
 The standard annual working time in 1994: 2233 hours =2400*(2/12)+2200*(10/12); The standard 
annual working time in 1995: 2067 hours =2200*(4/12)+2000*(8/12), Jefferson et al. (2000). 
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4.4.1 International comparisons of relative unit labour costs and drivers 
Here we present the results by six main economies groups: the USA, Large EU 
countries (the UK, France and Germany), Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland 
and Sweden), Mediterranean countries (Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal), other EU 
countries (Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg and Netherlands), and neighbouring 
countries (Australia, Korea and Japan). And we divide the 12 manufacturing subsectors 
into low-tech and high-tech manufacturing subsectors. The low-tech manufacturing 
subsectors include Food and Tobacco (15t16), Textiles (17t19), Wood (20), Paper (21t22) 
and other non-metallic products (26). And, the high-tech manufacturing subsectors 
include Petroleum (23), Chemicals (24), Metals (27t28), Machinery (29), Electrical 
equipment (30t33), Transport equipment (34t35) and Manufacturing nec (36t37). 
Table 4.2 displays the average RULC in 12 manufacturing subsectors over two 
periods. The average RULCs declines by about 80 percent after 1995 for all subsectors 
in all countries. It suggests that the labour cost advantages of China are declining over 
time. Hence, we will concentrate on the more recent period of 1995-2007. The bold 
values in Table 4.2 represent China’s largest cost advantage on unit labour costs for each 
manufacturing sub-sector after 1995, compared with other countries.  It is not surprising 
to find that China’s labour cost advantages are most prominent in many manufacturing 
subsectors against Denmark and Germany. For example, unit labour costs in Petroleum 
(23) of Denmark are about 5.8 times those in China. For other manufacturing subsectors, 
unit labour costs in Denmark are about 2-3 times those in China. The only exception is 
Chemicals (24), but still 58 percent higher than in China. Germany, Sweden, Spain and 
Japan also show cost disadvantages in many manufacturing subsectors.  
In contrast to widely believed statement that China has labour cost advantages for 
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all manufacturing subsectors, China actually has many disadvantaged industries in unit 
labour cost term. China have no competitiveness which have lower unit labour costs (<1, 
italic bold values in Table 4.2). For example, unit labour costs in Food and Tobacco 
(15t16), Metals (27t28) and Electrical equipment (30t33) in China are too high 
compared with Korea. These labour cost disadvantages are also prominent in Textiles 
(17t19) against Spain and Luxembourg, in Woods (20) against Greece and Italy, in 
Paper and Publishing (21t22) against Spain and Ireland, in Petroleum (23) against Japan, 
Korea, Greece, France, Italy and the USA, in Chemicals (24) against Ireland, Spain, 
Korea, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Sweden and Portugal, in other non-metallic products 
(26) against Portugal and in Manufacturing nec (36t37) with Greece.  
Therefore, in a broad brush way, China has general cost advantages over the USA 
and the three large EU countries, and can competes in high-tech subsectors with 
Mediterranean countries and low-tech subsectors with neighbouring countries. For other 
countries and manufacturing sub-sectors, China’s labour cost advantages are much 
weaker. 
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Table 4.2 Unit labour costs relative to China across 19 countries, manufacturing 
subsectors 
Country Period 15t16 17t19 20 21t22 23 24 26 27t28 29 30t33 34t35 36t37 
USA 78-95 8.63 12.78 8.61 7.27 9.72 6.93 10.59 11.31 11.17 23.52 11.93 11.16 
95-07 1.53 1.78 1.79 1.62 0.98 1.12 1.48 1.68 1.9 1.13 1.89 1.87 
UK 78-95 6.9 8.24 6.64 6.64 6.42 7.82 6.53 7.39 7.77 8.86 10.59 4.65 
95-07 1.59 1.89 1.91 1.66 1.69 1.35 1.59 1.82 1.77 1.39 1.86 1.79 
France 78-95 7.27 9.55 11.63 8.58  9.05 9.05 7.05 15.58 11.67 10.3 7.98 
95-07 1.48 1.68 1.46 1.79  1.47 1.63 1.86 1.98 1.64 1.75 1.46 
Germany 78-95 7.73 12.38 10.75 9.1 2.13 12.24 10.1 12.27 11.09 13.12 10.76 9.8 
95-07 1.72 2.02 1.71 1.77 3.01 1.66 1.64 2.02 2.23 2.17 2.23 2.29 
Denmark 78-95 10.23 12.53 10.03 10.54 10.4 10.17 9.42 11.6 11.56 17.28 15.38 10.24 
95-07 2.44 2.34 2.57 2.49 5.78 1.58 2.23 2.67 2.74 2.18 3.3 2.54 
Finland 78-95 10.7 12.1 11.09 8.17 10.41 7.9 10.18 9.86 10.28 13.09 12.78 10.6 
95-07 1.49 1.97 1.53 1.17 1.32 1.28 1.83 1.54 2.25 1.11 2.33 1.97 
Sweden 78-95 9.82 14.53 11.69 7.33 12.38 5.89 9.54 10.14 11.82 15.56 11.63 26.78 
95-07 1.83 2.33 1.94 1.4 1.16 0.92 2.13 1.64 2.01 1.2 1.62 3.51 
Spain 78-95 4.3 1.25 12.76 0.8 13.66 1.89 5.21 4.21 6.06 6.41 6.65 5.55 
95-07 1.23 0.45 4.34 0.12 5.52 0.59 1.17 1.21 1.39 1.27 1.35 1.44 
Greece 78-95 1.99 2.04 1.54 2.33 1.38 2.63 2.96 2.74 3.6 2.77 4.18 1.84 
95-07 1.07 1.04 0.91 1.5 0.51 1.41 1.27 1.18 1.61 1.09 1.7 0.87 
Italy 78-95 4.74 6.03 4.34 5.66 2.56 6.35 5.75 6.06 6.3 7.19 7.71 5.4 
95-07 1.14 1.37 0.96 1.26 0.97 1.22 1.25 1.25 1.64 1.48 1.93 1.26 
Portugal 78-95 2.65 3.57 3.89 2.17 15.42 2.08 2.73 3.84 4.16 3.99 5.24 4.09 
95-06 1.26 1.57 1.45 1.05 4.69 0.93 0.98 1.44 1.71 1.16 1.18 1.73 
Australia 78-95 8.07 9.23 7.35 8.21 14.11 7.47 7.33 8.06 11.81 11.46 10.16 9.33 
95-07 1.28 1.54 1.28 1.5 1.77 1.29 1.1 1.18 1.89 1.46 1.36 1.56 
Austria 78-95 9.37 9.55 7.4 10.29 14.35 10.23 7.34 10.72 9.72 11.84 7.88 11.01 
95-07 1.39 1.57 1.43 1.42 1.02 1.34 1.51 1.63 1.78 1.74 1.54 1.63 
Belgium 78-95 7.9 10.72 13.64 9.21 6.36 9.94 9.03 9.97 9.6 8.74 9.73 8.99 
95-07 1.51 1.59 1.66 1.6 2.06 1.32 1.66 1.71 1.78 1.62 1.71 1.79 
Ireland 78-95 5.13 9.01 6.44 4.72 6.74 2.69 6.47 7.43 7.78 7.07 10.4 9.47 
95-07 1.03 2.01 1.5 0.75 1.2 0.31 1.29 1.62 1.67 0.9 2.25 2.17 
Luxembourg 78-95 6.16 14.14 11.61 6.87   5.6 7.65 14.45 8.99 8.48 10.48 8.55 
95-07 1.93 0.93 1.32 1.8   0.88 1.37 2 2.06 1.71 1.85 1.58 
Netherlands 78-95 8.74 10.77 11.05 9.59 6.57 7.26 7.62 9.86 12.07 16.29 12.85 11.98 
95-07 1.27 1.46 1.84 1.56 1.43 0.88 1.48 1.64 1.86 2.01 1.62 2.21 
Korea 78-95 3.06 3.46 2.94 3.78 2.25 3.04 3.97 2.92 5.05 4.9 4.96 3.71 
95-07 0.98 1.22 1.07 1.27 0.48 0.65 1 0.87 1.31 0.69 1.11 1.35 
Japan 78-95 7.7 11.19 11.3 11.39 1.02 10.6 11.27 10.28 15.19 24.52 13.4 10.19 
95-06 1.46 2.56 2.19 2.06 0.23 1.12 1.84 1.81 2.09 1.7 2 1.86 
 
Notes:  
1. The subsectors represent Food and Tobacco (15t16), Textiles (17t19), Wood (20), Paper and 
publishing (21t22), Petroleum (23), Chemicals (24), other non-metallic products (26), Metals 
(27t28), Machinery (29), Electrical equipment (30t33), Transport equipment (34t35) and 
Manufacturing nec (36t37). 
2. The bold values represent China’s large advantage on unit labour costs relative to other countries 
(RULC>2) during 1995-2007. 
3. The italic bold values represent China’s disadvantage on unit labour costs relative to other 
countries. 
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We investigate the extent to which competitiveness, defined by relative unit 
labour costs, is determined by nominal labour cost advantage or a relative productivity 
advantage. Similarly, a relative unit labour costs larger than one with respect to China 
indicates a relatively competitive situation for China. It implies that labour costs are 
considerably lower in China, or that China’s labour productivity is considerably higher. 
Each of these outcomes is likely to have different policy implications and from this 
perspective, it is useful to have a better understanding of which component of relative 
unit labour costs measurement is driving the level. From the perspective of 
understanding the disparities, the most interesting subsectors are those where there is 
the greatest gap between nominal labour costs and labour productivity. 
Table 4.3 and 4.4 illustrate cross-country comparisons of average relative labour 
productivity and relative nominal labour costs over the two periods. In Table 4.3, the 
RLPs are quiet stable except one high-tech manufacturing subsector – Petroleum (23). 
China narrows the relative labour productivity gap in Petroleum with the USA, the three 
large EU countries and Mediterranean countries, but still has largest gap with Japan. 
During 1995-2009, China’s advantages on labour productivity relative to other countries 
only appear in Textiles (17t19) with Portugal and Korea, and in Woods (20) with 
Portugal (see the bold values in Table 4.3), both are low-tech manufacturing subsectors.  
We find China compete against all countries in all subsectors in terms of relative 
nominal labour costs over time in Table 4.4. The relative nominal labour costs gap 
decreases about 80 percent from 1978-1995 to 1995-2007, which explains the sharp 
decrease of relative unit labour costs over time. Therefore, the unit labour costs 
advantages of China are mainly from nominal labour costs rather than increasing labour 
productivity. 
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Table 4.3 Relative labour productivity 1978-1995 and 1995-2007, by 19 countries, 
relative to China, 12 manufacturing subsectors 
Country Period 15t16 17t19 20 21t22 23 24 26 27t28 29 30t33 34t35 36t37 
USA 78-95 4.01 1.98 3.27 4.91 7.79 7.14 3.73 3.62 3.86 2.37 4.4 2.74 
95-07 3.07 2.11 2.09 3.23 9.52 7.01 3.32 3.07 3.02 9.03 3.75 2.34 
UK 78-95 4.88 2.64 3.17 5 13.47 5.37 3.84 3.46 3.68 3.17 3.61 3.72 
95-07 3.34 2.16 1.76 3.47 8.22 5.83 3.28 2.73 2.83 4.07 3.37 2.04 
France 78-95 4.73 2.71 2.43 4.78  7.78 4.01 6.29 2.62 3.81 3.69 3.46 
95-07 3.42 2.84 3.26 3.8  7.92 3.93 3.17 3.49 4.59 4.34 3.24 
Germany 78-95 3.43 2.21 3.15 3.59 28.2 4.54 3.68 3.73 3.91 3.42 4.78 3.33 
95-07 2.63 2.73 3.22 3.48 5.54 6.39 4.07 3.7 3.69 4.08 4.54 2.66 
Denmark 78-95 3.79 2.55 3.37 3.92 8.51 4.44 4.11 2.97 3.29 2.52 2.55 3.31 
95-07 2.51 2.32 2.18 2.7 2.2 5.31 2.88 2.19 2.29 3.13 1.87 2.15 
Finland 78-95 3.16 2.2 2.87 5.28 4.52 5.04 3.34 3.79 3.55 3.02 2.98 2.74 
95-07 3.82 2.22 3.37 6.15 6.83 5.23 3 3.71 2.7 8.36 2.56 2.37 
Sweden 78-95 3.7 2.8 3.28 6.09 3.78 8.83 4.55 3.89 3.46 3.1 3.64 1.34 
95-07 2.78 2.06 2.69 4.49 7.87 8.61 2.58 3.16 2.84 11.22 3.9 1.45 
Spain 78-95 4.93 3.35 2.32 3.43 3.32 15.14 4.72 6.12 4.67 4.56 4.57 2.96 
95-07 2.7 1.72 0.96 2.45 1.01 6.88 3.47 3.03 3.02 3.25 3.13 1.72 
Greece 78-95 6.08 10.16 10.62 6.4 14.75 7.57 7.22 7.05 10.5 16.23 13.9 18.89 
95-07 1.72 1.51 1.46 1.52 6.02 2.13 1.87 1.74 1.18 2.09 1.67 2.03 
Italy 78-95 6.52 4.1 5 6.12 21.33 6.64 5.57 4.86 5.36 4.6 4.48 5.36 
95-07 3.86 2.5 3.44 3.95 7.91 5.32 3.55 3.34 2.95 3.27 2.66 2.79 
Portugal 78-95 3.48 1.83 1.67 5.08 0.87 7.29 3.08 3.26 3.19 2.96 1.69 1.5 
95-06 1.29 0.78 0.95 2.25 8.72 3.52 1.89 1.29 1.28 2.27 2.39 0.76 
Australia 78-95 4.21 2.77 3.55 4.11 4.07 5.28 4.05 3.94 2.38 2.75 3.27 3.04 
95-07 3.2 1.84 2.52 2.87 3.5 3.62 4.12 3.22 1.97 2.74 2.86 1.64 
Austria 78-95 2.86 2.61 3.38 3.57 5.78 3.86 4.71 3.27 3.3 3.12 4.32 2.21 
95-07 3.33 2.97 3.19 4.84 20.79 5.77 3.99 3.54 3.38 3.9 4.39 2.73 
Belgium 78-95 5.13 2.77 3.35 4.93 13.98 6.29 4.39 4.32 4.93 4.87 5.09 3.45 
95-07 4.37 3.61 3.56 4.79 7.37 7.94 4.37 4.4 4.26 5.32 4.83 3.06 
Ireland 78-95 4.21 2.24 2.52 5.25 2.79 9.75 4.19 2.92 2.66 2.83 3.13 2.07 
95-07 3.7 1.54 2.02 6.87 2.73 17.12 3.01 2.1 2.13 4.66 2.12 1.55 
Luxembourg 78-95 4.51 10 2.92 5.25   8.22 4.82 3.34 6.76 3.83 3.97 2.78 
95-07 2.24 9.37 4.37 3.65   7.84 4.24 3.79 4.45 3.09 2.83 3.17 
Netherlands 78-95 4.77 3.67 1.31 4.02 13.26 7.69 4.23 3.82 3.42 2.84 2.78 3.57 
95-07 4.83 3.7 1.14 4.02 7.35 9.98 3.01 3.56 3.42 3.35 3.89 2.85 
Korea 78-95 2.77 0.96 1.62 1.99 5.04 3.61 1.96 2.23 0.7 1.32 1.69 1.41 
95-07 1.71 0.74 1.35 1.41 5.77 4.6 1.78 2.15 0.8 4.05 1.97 1.06 
Japan 78-95 3.11 1.6 1.93 2.93 46.56 6.27 2.47 3.28 2.49 1.82 3.27 2.29 
95-06 2.86 1.39 1.97 2.78 48.75 9.36 3.03 3.49 3.36 5.07 3.61 2.61 
 
Notes:  
1. The subsectors represent Food and Tobacco (15t16), Textiles (17t19), Wood (20), Paper and 
publishing (21t22), Petroleum (23), Chemicals (24), other non-metallic products (26), Metals 
(27t28), Machinery (29), Electrical equipment (30t33), Transport equipment (34t35) and 
Manufacturing nec (36t37). 
2. The bold values represent China’s advantage on labour productivity relative to other countries. 
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Table 4.4 Relative Nominal labour costs 1978-1995 and 1995-2007, by 19 countries, 
relative to China, 12 manufacturing subsectors 
Country Period 15t16 17t19 20 21t22 23 24 26 27t28 29 30t33 34t35 36t37 
USA 78-95 33.97 23.91 27.46 35.58 62.22 47.75 37.66 39.39 41.85 41.41 51.21 29.77 
95-07 5.22 4.01 4.14 5.78 9.45 8.3 5.41 5.74 6.17 7.83 7.6 4.74 
UK 78-95 33.88 21.83 21.04 33.12 85.23 40.51 24.93 25.52 28.33 27 36.74 17.08 
95-07 5.91 4.27 3.7 6.33 15.12 8.52 5.63 5.34 5.35 5.86 6.89 4.01 
France 78-95 34.31 25.92 27.01 40.95  64.45 36.18 38.7 38.37 43.71 37.99 27.76 
95-07 5.82 5.03 4.91 7.57  13.01 6.96 6.7 7.31 7.76 8.29 5.22 
Germany 78-95 26.53 26.14 33.33 32.35 42.19 53.13 36.11 44.84 43.23 42.96 51.26 32.87 
95-07 5.13 5.96 6.03 7.03 11.95 11.11 7.32 8.46 9.22 9.17 10.88 6.93 
Denmark 78-95 38.9 31.83 33.48 41.17 55.96 45 38.92 34.09 38 40.61 38.35 34.03 
95-07 6.95 6 6.23 7.62 10.72 8.81 7.14 6.69 7.16 7.4 7.02 6.16 
Finland 78-95 32.96 25.93 30.45 42.11 45.4 39.01 33.84 36.02 36.77 34.89 37.73 29.02 
95-07 6.07 4.86 5.63 7.81 8.44 7.37 6.2 6.48 6.93 6.89 6.8 5.31 
Sweden 78-95 36.14 40.5 38.6 44.67 45.45 51.49 43.19 38.85 40.76 47.35 42.03 35.35 
95-07 5.67 5.43 5.67 6.96 7.33 8.21 6.09 5.88 6.31 7.51 6.53 5.4 
Spain 78-95 21.4 4.16 28.38 2.69 34.65 27.94 24.9 25.71 28.55 29.26 30.14 16.5 
95-07 3.87 0.84 4.85 0.33 6.3 4.79 4.68 4.28 4.82 4.78 4.9 2.85 
Greece 78-95 9.05 14.37 10.18 11.04 15.39 15.11 15.04 14.18 24.72 29.43 38.01 22.79 
95-07 2.08 1.77 1.51 2.57 3.2 3.35 2.58 2.28 2.11 2.46 3.19 1.94 
Italy 78-95 30.69 24.28 21.77 34.64 47.29 42.1 31.11 29.57 33.01 33.37 34.82 27.64 
95-07 5.05 3.92 3.74 5.69 7.82 7.38 5.01 4.77 5.54 5.51 5.85 4.02 
Portugal 78-95 7.36 5.77 5.59 9.65 36.7 13.54 7.92 10.42 9.75 10 7.89 5.71 
95-06 1.8 1.37 1.46 2.61 10.37 3.61 2.02 2.13 2.4 2.66 2.6 1.5 
Australia 78-95 33.59 25.53 26.01 33.24 45.14 39.69 29.34 30.9 27.45 30.08 32.48 28.31 
95-07 4.53 3.18 3.7 4.84 6.83 5.19 4.61 4.14 3.94 4.56 4.37 3.16 
Austria 78-95 26.03 24.91 25.22 35.13 70.84 36.56 34.68 33.02 31.48 35.3 34.1 23.55 
95-07 4.97 4.71 4.92 7.02 16.32 7.65 6.6 6.34 6.54 7.25 7.11 4.62 
Belgium 78-95 39.56 27.97 40.94 43.54 86.95 54.53 37.55 41.64 46.69 41.77 48.26 31.14 
95-07 7.59 6.2 6.5 8.6 16.52 11.55 8.39 8.39 8.33 9.18 9.11 6.09 
Ireland 78-95 21.92 19.96 16.3 24.95 18.77 24.39 26.47 21.69 20.93 19.83 32.22 19.12 
95-07 4.19 3.36 3.29 5.02 3.07 5.39 4.48 3.79 4.02 4.29 5.39 3.63 
Luxembourg 78-95 28.03 59.51 33.02 36.22   43.04 35.48 45.9 61.45 31.3 39.27 22.95 
95-07 5.02 10.69 5.26 7.63   7.44 6.67 8.16 10.86 5.66 5.8 5.49 
Netherlands 78-95 39.3 36.63 13.72 36.42 81.56 51.21 31.44 35.75 38.58 41.02 33.18 41.44 
95-07 6.88 5.85 2.41 7.03 12.09 9.38 5.13 6.57 7.1 7.45 6.71 7.07 
Korea 78-95 8.5 3.36 5 7.68 10.64 10.9 7.94 6.62 3.52 5.92 8.29 5.42 
95-07 1.91 0.98 1.58 2.06 3.06 2.93 1.91 2.08 1.14 2.31 2.34 1.61 
Japan 78-95 23.95 17.77 21.81 32.97 51.43 51.41 27.09 33.38 34.66 30.46 41.4 23.09 
95-06 4.77 3.99 4.88 6.54 12.43 11.36 6 7.06 7.47 7.68 8.01 5.31 
 
Note: The subsectors represent Food and Tobacco (15t16), Textiles (17t19), Wood (20), Paper and 
publishing (21t22), Petroleum (23), Chemicals (24), other non-metallic products (26), Metals (27t28), 
Machinery (29), Electrical equipment (30t33), Transport equipment (34t35) and Manufacturing nec 
(36t37). 
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4.4.2 Relative provincial unit labour costs within China 
Table 4.5 shows the average relative unit labour costs in nine one-digit sectors for the 
cross-provincial comparisons within China. The average RULCs decrease from 1978-
1995 to 1995-2009 in most cases as we expect. The structural changes of RULCs 
highlight the industrialization process of each province in China. Across sectors, the 
highest relative unit labour costs occur in Finance (J) for most provinces, especially in 
the provinces in the West region (such as Shanxi and Gansu), while the rich provinces 
such as Shanghai and Jiangsu have relatively lower labour costs in Finance. The 
Finance sector is easy to be prosperous in the provinces in the Coastal region associated 
with their special features in the Chinese financial history. Shanghai and Beijing are the 
finance centres attracting funds worldwide. In addition to huge foreign investments and 
advanced banking system, Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Fujian also have traditional informal 
finance from citizens and foreign remittances. 
On the contrary, the relative unit labour costs in Education (M) and Health (N) 
sectors are quite high in the rich provinces in the Coastal region (Shanghai, Jiangsu and 
Guangdong), while relatively lower in the Anhui, Guangxi, Guizhou and Hunan 
provinces, which locate in the Interior and West regions. It suggests a labour cost 
advantage for these provinces in the Interior and West regions to accumulate human 
capital for further economic growth and catching-up with the provinces in the Coastal 
region. Thus, provinces should develop the specific industries according to their 
comparative advantage (see the bold values in Table 4.5). The Primary sector (AtoB), 
Construction (F) and Real estate (K) sectors are the most advantageous sectors for the 
provinces in the Interior and West regions (such as, Guangxi, Guizhou, Henan and 
Qinghai). The provinces in the Northeast and Coastal regions (such as Heilongjiang, 
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Shandong and Hubei) should encourage the Manufacturing (D) sector. The Trade (G) 
sector has lower unit labour costs in Shanxi, Heilongjiang, Fujian and Shandong than 
those in other provinces. The three richest provinces (Beijing, Shanghai and 
Guangdong*) and some provinces in the Interior region (such as Shanxi, Anhui, Jiangxi 
and Sichuan* provinces) have cost advantages in transportation (I) sector possibly due 
to rich capital endowment and geographical advantages of central location. 
  
Table 4.5 Unit labour costs 1978-1995 and 1995-2009, by 28 provinces, relative to 
China national level, nine one-digit sectors 
Province Period AtoB D F G I J K M N 
Beijing 78-95 1.13 2.54 2.36 1.24 1.42 6.22 3.54 2.94 2.37 
95-09 0.97 1.63 1.89 1.6 0.87 0.44 2.04 1.02 1.52 
Tianjin 78-95 1.35 2.49 2.96 1.67 2.01 13.64 5.43 3.22 3.09 
95-09 1.49 1.37 2.06 1.48 1.62 0.93 2.38 1.09 1.17 
Hebei 78-95 1.49 3.5 2.6 2.1 2.41 2.64 5.97 2.95 3.42 
95-09 0.96 1.03 1.16 1.85 1.15 1.37 1.26 1.1 1.13 
Shanxi 78-95 1.46 3.99 3.35 2.47 2.86 3.95 5.64 3.17 3.27 
95-09 0.87 1.34 1.37 0.88 0.98 1.04 1.44 0.99 0.82 
Inner Mongolia 78-95 1.27 3.86 2.85 2.81 2.78 7.06 4.96 3.15 3.26 
95-09 1 1.31 1.57 1.25 0.93 3.69 1.51 1.27 1.1 
Liaoning 78-95 1.53 2.72 2.8 1.79 2.22 2.07 5.68 2.7 2.58 
95-09 1 1.08 1.46 1 0.86 1.8 1.45 1.14 1.53 
Jilin 78-95 1.43 4 3.37 5.07 2.98 9.75 4.27 2.99 3.1 
95-09 0.96 1.15 0.9 1.08 1.08 2.37 1.21 1.09 1.09 
Heilongjiang 78-95 1.47 3.21 3.03 4 2.71 9.7 6.29 3.21 3.26 
95-09 1.19 0.85 1.05 0.98 1.41 2.66 1.52 1.01 1.46 
shanghai 78-95 1.32 2.43 2.63 1.32 2.08 1.13 2.26 3.23 3.22 
95-09 1.3 1.52 1.85 1.42 0.86 0.38 1.8 1.37 1.44 
Jiangsu 78-95 1.56 3.05 2.44 2.39 2.81 1.45 2.74 2.67 2.94 
95-09 1.25 1.25 1.21 1.17 1.52 0.79 1.28 1.23 1.28 
Zhejiang 78-95 1.4 3.87 2.97 1.58 3.52 2.41 5.54 3.16 2.68 
95-09 1.3 1.14 1.82 1.44 1.57 0.62 1.1 1.02 0.81 
Anhui 78-95 1.56 3.62 3.17 2.5 2.91 8.08 2.8 3.5 3.57 
95-09 1.05 1.05 1.08 1.05 0.46 1.25 0.87 0.74 0.63 
Fujian 78-95 1.61 4.76 3.08 3.62 3.19 3.8 4.89 2.92 2.89 
95-09 1.16 1.21 1.76 0.98 1 0.8 1.06 1.15 1.11 
Jiangxi 78-95 1.55 3.8 3.27 2.84 3.86 11.72 3.39 1.83 1.74 
95-09 0.98 1.14 0.89 1.16 0.86 1.5 0.83 1.23 1.36 
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Continue... 
Province Period AtoB D F G I J K M N 
Shandong 78-95 1.45 3.53 2.53 2.79 2.11 3.89 2.33 2.57 2.37 
95-09 1.25 0.98 1.28 0.99 1.21 2.58 0.99 1.21 0.93 
Henan 78-95 1.55 3.7 2.78 2.33 2.06 4.96 3.03 2.85 3.07 
95-09 0.92 1.31 0.92 1.18 1.05 1.21 1.06 0.93 1.16 
Hubei 78-95 1.49 3.32 2.95 2.6 3.4 5.59 4.31 3.26 3.16 
95-09 0.99 0.82 1.35 1.43 1.45 0.91 1.57 1.02 1.07 
Hunan 78-95 1.67 3.43 3.44 2.35 3.09 6.64 2.82 3.29 3.25 
95-09 0.84 1.22 1.2 1.14 1.37 1.25 0.79 0.81 0.74 
Guangdong* 78-95 1.33 4.8 2.25 3.77 2.28 4.07 4.84 2.19 2.47 
95-09 1.24 1.17 2.46 1.08 0.95 1.34 1.28 1.71 1.29 
Guangxi 78-95 1.54 3.17 3.27 3.11 2.47 5.59 4.26 2.68 2.93 
95-09 0.77 1.27 0.86 0.75 1.14 8.27 1.26 0.79 0.86 
Sichuan* 78-95 1.57 3.72 2.94 1.68 2.19 6.84 4.03 3.02 3.21 
95-09 0.91 1.1 1.33 0.8 0.8 1.29 0.96 0.97 0.86 
Guizhou 78-95 1.57 3.82 2.99 2.4 2.14 6.47 6.25 3.65 3.49 
95-09 0.79 1.07 0.88 0.84 1.19 1.3 0.94 0.81 0.67 
Yunnan 78-95 1.66 2.25 2.75 3.43 2.15 3.62 5.76 2.44 2.33 
95-09 1.95 6.12 1.96 1.77 2.78 4.86 2.88 2.26 1.5 
Shaanxi 78-95 1.56 4.18 3.14 2.71 2.53 19.11 6.29 3.4 3.6 
95-09 0.93 1.06 0.7 1.46 1.16 1.78 2.06 1 1.23 
Gansu 78-95 1.5 4.54 4.07 1.82 3.53 10.59 7.69 3.03 3.56 
95-09 0.86 1.52 0.94 1.49 1.24 1.88 2.34 1.16 1.56 
Qinghai 78-95 1.61 4.83 3.3 1.65 4.46 8.2 7.27 2.77 3.31 
95-09 0.84 1.13 1.26 0.84 1.27 1.59 2.22 1.09 1.13 
Ningxia 78-95 1.78 3.77 3.16 1.74 2.31 3.58 4.32 3.02 2.9 
95-09 1.05 1.12 1.01 0.81 0.86 1.41 1.41 0.82 0.82 
Xinjiang 78-95 1.58 3.57 3.09 1.5 2.67 6.4 9.62 3.62 3.74 
95-09 0.86 0.66 1.34 1.44 1.93 2.02 3.61 1.64 1.84 
 
Notes: 
1. The sectors are Primary sector (AtoB), Manufacturing (D), Construction (F), Trade (G), 
Transportation (I), Finance (J), Real estate (K), Education (M) and Health (N) 
2. The bold values represent these provinces’ advantage on unit labour costs relative to national 
level. 
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Similar to the cross-country comparisons, Table 4.6 and 4.7 try to dig out the 
drivers of cost competitiveness: the average relative labour productivity and relative 
nominal labour costs by province, compared with Chinese national level over two time 
periods. We find that the decrease of relative unit labour costs in Table 4.6 occurs 
mainly because the growth rate of relative labour productivity is higher than the growth 
rate of relative nominal labour costs in most cases.  
In Table 4.7, the bold values show the provinces’ labour productivity advantage on 
national levels. Normally, the provinces in the Coastal region (such as Shanghai, 
Jiangsu, Fujian, Shandong and Guangdong) have higher relative labour productivity 
than other provinces. The provinces in the West region (Guangxi, Guizhou and Shaanxi) 
only have higher relative labour productivity in the Primary sector (AtoB) than other 
provinces. As expected, the provinces in the Northeast region (Liaoning, Jilin and 
Heilongjiang) and the West region (Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Sichuan*, Guizhou, 
Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang) have lower relative nominal 
labour costs than national level (see the bold values in Table 4.7). 
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Table 4.6 Relative labour productivity 1978-1995 and 1995-2009, by provinces, 
relative to China national level, 9 sectors 
 
Province Period AtoB D F G I J K M N 
Beijing 78-95 0.7 0.47 0.33 0.68 0.66 1.02 0.29 0.47 0.82 
95-09 0.87 0.62 0.49 0.55 0.63 2.35 0.38 1.91 1.1 
Tianjin 78-95 1.16 0.38 0.42 0.52 0.58 0.83 0.26 0.51 0.38 
95-09 1.95 0.72 0.79 0.91 1.04 1.52 0.76 1.42 1.05 
Hebei 78-95 1.66 0.43 0.4 0.56 0.61 0.42 0.51 0.42 0.45 
95-09 2.57 1.13 0.88 0.78 1.3 0.64 0.84 0.75 0.8 
Shanxi 78-95 1.52 0.37 0.39 0.37 0.44 0.41 0.28 0.45 0.46 
95-09 1.58 0.77 0.58 0.44 0.76 0.62 0.53 0.84 0.73 
Inner Mongolia 78-95 0.28 0.25 0.33 0.42 0.36 0.25 0.27 0.43 0.38 
95-09 0.34 0.68 0.73 0.88 0.79 0.27 0.52 0.8 0.87 
Liaoning 78-95 0.37 0.33 0.27 0.54 0.62 0.44 0.22 0.51 0.55 
95-09 0.48 0.83 0.77 1.51 0.83 0.59 0.83 1.09 1.15 
Jilin 78-95 0.51 0.25 0.29 0.27 0.3 0.26 0.23 0.44 0.37 
95-09 0.61 0.64 0.8 0.76 0.47 0.29 0.47 0.75 0.67 
Heilongjiang 78-95 0.16 0.4 0.33 0.3 0.36 0.41 0.24 0.49 0.51 
95-09 0.22 1 0.52 0.61 0.49 0.37 0.47 0.83 0.85 
shanghai 78-95 0.57 0.77 0.78 0.89 0.68 1.12 0.55 0.55 0.42 
95-09 1.72 1.38 1.69 1.33 0.92 2.46 1.03 2.17 1.42 
Jiangsu 78-95 1.22 0.47 0.85 0.56 0.47 0.62 0.59 0.5 0.46 
95-09 1.58 1.12 1.77 1.26 1.04 1.29 1.37 1.13 1.02 
Zhejiang 78-95 3.05 0.56 0.54 1.12 0.72 0.42 0.65 0.49 0.51 
95-09 5.54 1.44 0.71 1.96 1.53 0.96 1.18 1.3 1.23 
Anhui 78-95 1.6 0.35 0.45 0.53 0.44 0.38 0.4 0.39 0.37 
95-09 1.82 0.92 0.8 0.67 0.81 0.54 0.89 0.75 0.88 
Fujian 78-95 1.12 0.36 0.65 0.95 0.94 0.52 0.55 0.53 0.47 
95-09 2.04 0.7 0.93 1.6 2.07 1.06 1.33 1.02 1.11 
Jiangxi 78-95 0.57 0.25 0.57 0.33 0.39 0.32 0.61 0.51 0.48 
95-09 0.77 0.59 1.02 0.69 0.87 0.54 0.85 0.68 0.55 
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Continue... 
 
Province Period AtoB D F G I J K M N 
Shandong 78-95 3.68 0.5 1.06 0.76 0.88 0.57 0.69 0.56 0.63 
95-09 4.65 0.93 1.22 1.04 1.48 1.08 1.37 1.15 1.2 
Henan 78-95 3.15 0.38 0.45 0.39 0.6 0.32 0.55 0.49 0.48 
95-09 3.11 0.93 0.56 0.41 0.93 0.4 0.74 0.62 0.79 
Hubei 78-95 0.51 0.32 0.45 0.45 0.32 0.31 0.34 0.36 0.37 
95-09 0.66 0.71 0.64 0.71 0.6 0.72 0.72 0.83 0.86 
Hunan 78-95 0.7 0.33 0.55 0.54 0.43 0.37 0.46 0.5 0.44 
95-09 1.68 0.85 0.73 0.93 0.83 0.55 0.78 1.03 1.06 
Guangdong* 78-95 0.59 0.52 0.61 0.72 0.68 0.39 0.61 0.59 0.66 
95-09 0.96 1.11 1 1.37 1.46 0.89 1.38 0.98 0.96 
Guangxi 78-95 0.86 0.37 0.35 0.82 0.48 0.3 0.41 0.4 0.42 
95-09 1.11 0.88 0.87 1.09 0.86 0.41 0.69 0.71 0.84 
Sichuan* 78-95 3.5 0.43 0.56 0.77 0.47 0.45 0.61 0.58 0.57 
95-09 2.93 0.7 0.52 0.9 0.79 0.8 0.82 0.86 0.87 
Guizhou 78-95 1.65 0.29 0.37 0.42 0.36 0.25 0.31 0.33 0.38 
95-09 2.26 0.61 0.37 0.5 0.63 0.59 0.6 0.74 0.98 
Yunnan 78-95 0.54 0.48 0.4 0.69 0.37 0.35 0.29 0.51 0.66 
95-09 0.65 1.01 0.83 0.71 0.56 0.58 0.6 0.61 0.88 
Shaanxi 78-95 1.43 0.26 0.38 0.34 0.44 0.35 0.28 0.45 0.45 
95-09 1.32 0.51 0.82 0.46 0.67 0.41 0.4 0.87 0.77 
Gansu 78-95 0.61 0.31 0.38 0.69 0.36 0.29 0.28 0.42 0.34 
95-09 0.69 0.52 0.7 0.56 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.48 0.64 
Qinghai 78-95 0.4 0.27 0.44 0.65 0.27 0.32 0.43 0.64 0.53 
95-09 0.58 0.77 0.87 0.71 0.49 0.65 0.36 0.97 0.66 
Ningxia 78-95 0.26 0.3 0.63 0.5 0.41 0.4 0.31 0.45 0.38 
95-09 0.4 0.73 1.06 0.78 0.84 0.81 0.57 1.14 0.97 
Xinjiang 78-95 0.08 0.35 0.42 0.61 0.39 0.35 0.3 0.43 0.36 
95-09 0.12 1.2 0.93 0.73 0.72 0.61 0.47 0.82 0.62 
 
Notes: 
1. The sectors are Primary sector (AtoB), Manufacturing (D), Construction (F), Trade (G), 
Transportation (I), Finance (J), Real estate (K), Education (M) and Health (N) 
2. The bold values represent these provinces’ advantage on labour productivity relative to national 
level. 
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Table 4.7 Relative Nominal Labour costs 1978 to 1995 and 1995 to 2009, 28 
provinces, relative to China national level, 9 sectors 
 
Province Period AtoB D F G I J K M N 
Beijing 78-95 0.64 1.01 0.63 0.72 0.86 2.31 0.66 0.84 1.59 
95-09 0.80 0.98 0.92 0.78 0.52 1.03 0.76 1.94 1.65 
Tianjin 78-95 1.42 0.76 0.88 0.75 0.94 0.66 0.95 1.41 0.85 
95-09 2.89 0.97 1.62 1.32 1.64 1.25 1.77 1.52 1.20 
Hebei 78-95 2.30 1.07 0.81 0.95 1.21 0.55 2.07 0.90 1.12 
95-09 2.47 1.17 1.01 1.40 1.49 0.83 1.04 0.82 0.89 
Shanxi 78-95 2.14 1.17 0.94 0.70 0.92 0.62 1.06 1.17 1.32 
95-09 1.36 1.03 0.79 0.38 0.73 0.59 0.73 0.79 0.56 
Inner Mongolia 78-95 0.33 0.70 0.76 0.89 0.77 0.90 0.82 1.02 0.85 
95-09 0.33 0.90 1.13 1.09 0.74 0.91 0.78 1.01 0.93 
Liaoning 78-95 0.51 0.72 0.57 0.70 0.85 0.51 0.56 0.96 1.06 
95-09 0.48 0.89 1.12 1.50 0.72 0.99 1.20 1.24 1.75 
Jilin 78-95 0.69 0.74 0.64 0.76 0.77 1.04 0.64 1.03 0.87 
95-09 0.58 0.74 0.73 0.80 0.50 0.51 0.57 0.81 0.73 
Heilongjiang 78-95 0.22 0.97 0.72 0.72 0.86 1.76 0.88 1.22 1.17 
95-09 0.26 0.84 0.55 0.60 0.68 0.64 0.70 0.83 1.23 
shanghai 78-95 0.69 1.53 1.35 1.04 1.06 0.65 0.70 1.11 0.84 
95-09 2.28 2.07 3.09 1.84 0.75 0.88 1.82 2.95 2.02 
Jiangsu 78-95 1.76 0.99 1.59 0.88 0.98 0.63 1.00 0.99 0.91 
95-09 1.97 1.37 2.14 1.46 1.55 1.00 1.74 1.38 1.29 
Zhejiang 78-95 3.92 1.34 1.12 1.31 1.63 0.48 1.71 1.08 0.95 
95-09 7.44 1.58 1.23 2.73 2.24 0.57 1.30 1.28 0.96 
Anhui 78-95 2.39 0.88 1.11 1.04 0.89 1.51 0.73 0.94 0.94 
95-09 1.91 0.96 0.86 0.70 0.36 0.64 0.77 0.54 0.52 
Fujian 78-95 1.60 1.02 1.25 2.10 1.84 0.99 1.23 1.03 0.86 
95-09 2.37 0.81 1.51 1.56 1.99 0.83 1.36 1.14 1.21 
Jiangxi 78-95 0.83 0.69 1.66 0.86 1.14 0.91 1.38 0.74 0.66 
95-09 0.75 0.67 0.91 0.79 0.75 0.70 0.69 0.81 0.74 
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Continue... 
Province Period AtoB D F G I J K M N 
Shandong 78-95 4.96 1.28 2.04 0.93 1.41 1.12 1.07 1.02 1.08 
95-09 5.85 0.89 1.46 1.02 1.77 2.64 1.34 1.37 1.11 
Henan 78-95 4.65 1.03 1.06 0.77 1.07 0.75 1.03 1.13 1.09 
95-09 2.87 1.23 0.51 0.49 0.96 0.46 0.76 0.57 0.91 
Hubei 78-95 0.71 0.72 1.09 0.94 0.77 1.19 0.84 0.8 0.74 
95-09 0.65 0.58 0.87 1.01 0.86 0.62 1.12 0.85 0.91 
Hunan 78-95 1.09 0.87 1.44 0.92 1.04 1.16 0.83 1.27 1.07 
95-09 1.36 1.03 0.87 1.06 1.14 0.66 0.61 0.83 0.78 
Guangdong* 78-95 0.72 1.49 0.98 2.01 1.08 0.69 1.19 0.9 1.07 
95-09 1.19 1.26 2.04 1.46 1.28 1.11 1.71 1.52 1.18 
Guangxi 78-95 1.24 0.84 0.83 1.42 0.88 1.77 1.12 0.82 0.89 
95-09 0.86 1.11 0.75 0.81 0.98 2.7 0.87 0.55 0.71 
Sichuan* 78-95 5.17 1.15 1.25 1.07 0.84 1.32 1.55 1.22 1.25 
95-09 2.66 0.75 0.65 0.72 0.62 1.01 0.78 0.83 0.75 
Guizhou 78-95 2.36 0.72 0.68 0.84 0.72 0.77 0.93 0.79 0.86 
95-09 1.78 0.61 0.31 0.37 0.65 0.63 0.46 0.51 0.56 
Yunnan 78-95 0.82 0.65 0.92 1.31 0.63 0.99 0.9 0.83 0.71 
95-09 0.69 0.7 0.96 0.65 0.71 1.51 0.79 0.72 0.63 
Shaanxi 78-95 2.1 0.81 0.92 0.78 0.88 2.31 1.02 1.06 1.15 
95-09 1.23 0.54 0.56 0.65 0.72 0.58 0.74 0.81 0.88 
Gansu 78-95 0.85 1.15 0.89 1.03 1.16 1.36 1.23 0.99 0.8 
95-09 0.5 0.67 0.6 0.7 0.42 0.66 0.85 0.48 0.84 
Qinghai 78-95 0.59 0.88 1.11 0.88 0.84 1.44 2.39 1.41 1.61 
95-09 0.49 0.88 1.09 0.59 0.61 0.97 0.76 1.03 0.74 
Ningxia 78-95 0.42 0.82 1.53 0.72 0.81 0.73 0.93 0.98 0.86 
95-09 0.32 0.74 0.8 0.49 0.57 0.83 0.63 0.75 0.63 
Xinjiang 78-95 0.12 0.86 0.95 0.69 0.72 1.1 1.35 1.03 0.9 
95-09 0.11 0.77 1.23 0.73 0.93 0.8 1.07 0.91 0.71 
 
Notes:  
1. The sectors are Primary sector (AtoB), Manufacturing (D), Construction (F), Trade (G), 
Transportation (I), Finance (J), Real estate (K), Education (M) and Health (N) 
2. The bold numbers presents these provinces’ advantage on nominal labour costs relative to 
national level.  
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4.5 Decompositions of relative unit labour costs 
Changes in relative unit labour costs can be decomposed into three component parts: the 
changes of relative nominal labour costs per hour (rnlc), relative productivity (rlp) and 
market exchange rates (er) as follows:  
 
)ln()ln()ln()ln( errlprnlcrulc                        (4.13) 
 
It is perhaps worth spelling out that a positive change in dulc (unit labour costs) 
indicates gain of China competitiveness, and a positive change in dnlc (nominal labour 
costs) indicates a relative decrease in China nominal labour costs. A negative change in 
dlp (labour productivity) indicates a relative improvement in China labour productivity 
and a negative change in de (market exchange rates) shows depreciation in China 
currency relative to foreign currency in the cross-country comparisons.   
Similarly, for the cross-provincial comparisons, the formula becomes: 
 
        )ln()ln()ln( rlprnlcrulc                              (4.14) 
 
where a negative change in dulc (unit labour costs) indicates gain of province 
competitiveness, and a negative change in dnlc (nominal labour costs) indicates a 
relative decrease in province nominal labour costs. A positive change in dlp (labour 
productivity) indicates a relative improvement in province labour productivity.   
This country by country analysis decomposes the competitiveness gains or losses 
of the nineteen countries and twelve sectors in Table 4.8 and Table 4.9. During 1978-
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1995, China has cost competitiveness gains only relative to the Mediterranean countries 
(Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal), mainly relying on the negative changes of labour 
productivity in these countries and depreciation in China currency relative to foreign 
currencies. After 1995, China loses its cost competitiveness relative to all countries, 
because the negative changes of labour productivity in these countries have been offset 
by the appreciation of China currency. 
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Table 4.8 Decomposition of relative unit labour costs, 19 countries compared with 
China, 1978-1995 (Values have been timed 100) 
 
Country 78-95 15t16 17t19 20 21t22 23 24 26 27t28 29 30t33 34t35 36t37 
USA RULC -5 -6 -4 -2 -10 -4 -5 -5 -3 -11 -3 -4 
NLC -11 -11 -12 -11 -12 -11 -12 -12 -12 -11 -11 -12 
RLP 3 4 1 0 7 3 2 2 0 10 1 2 
EXCH -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 
UK RULC 0 0 1 1 -1 -2 0 0 -1 -3 -2 5 
NLC -7 -8 -9 -8 -9 -6 -7 -8 -9 -6 -7 -6 
RLP 1 1 -1 0 -1 4 2 1 0 5 4 -3 
EXCH -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 
France RULC -2 -1 -5 1 -29 -6 -1 7 -5 -2 -1 -2 
NLC -10 -8 -8 -8 -9 -8 -8 -8 -8 -9 -7 -8 
RLP 1 2 5 0 29 7 1 -6 6 2 3 3 
EXCH -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 
Germany RULC -2 -4 -3 -2 10 -4 -4 -3 -2 -4 -2 -1 
NLC -11 -10 -11 -10 -10 -10 -11 -11 -10 -10 -11 -10 
RLP 2 6 3 4 -9 6 5 4 3 5 3 2 
EXCH -12 -12 -12 -12 -12 -12 -12 -12 -12 -12 -12 -12 
Denmark RULC -1 -3 -1 0 7 -3 -1 -2 -1 -6 -2 -2 
NLC -10 -10 -9 -9 -9 -9 -10 -9 -10 -10 -10 -10 
RLP 0 3 1 0 -7 3 0 2 1 6 2 1 
EXCH -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 
Finland RULC -2 -2 -3 -3 -1 -3 -2 -4 -1 -6 -1 -2 
NLC -8 -8 -8 -8 -7 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 
RLP 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 5 2 7 2 3 
EXCH -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 
Sweden RULC -3 -4 -3 -3 -5 -3 -2 -5 -4 -6 -4 -6 
NLC -9 -10 -10 -9 -8 -9 -10 -9 -9 -9 -9 -11 
RLP 0 0 0 0 4 1 -1 2 2 3 2 2 
EXCH -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 
Spain RULC 2 3 4 -1 10 3 -1 1 0 -1 0 1 
NLC -5 -6 -6 -7 -5 -6 -5 -7 -6 -7 -7 -6 
RLP -1 -2 -4 1 -9 -2 2 -2 0 1 -1 -1 
EXCH -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 
Greece RULC 10 9 10 12 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 
NLC 2 -3 -3 4 2 2 -1 -1 -6 -6 -6 -6 
RLP -9 -14 -15 -10 -10 -10 -12 -11 -17 -17 -17 -17 
EXCH 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Italy RULC 1 1 1 1 2 -3 2 -1 2 -1 2 2 
NLC -5 -6 -5 -5 -6 -6 -6 -6 -5 -5 -5 -7 
RLP -1 -1 0 0 -2 3 -2 1 -2 2 -1 -3 
EXCH -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 
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Continue… 
 
Country 78-95 15t16 17t19 20 21t22 23 24 26 27t28 29 30t33 34t35 36t37 
Portugal RULC 9 7 8 9 0 9 6 8 11 7 5 8 
NLC -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 2 
RLP -8 -6 -7 -6 4 -6 -4 -7 -9 -5 -4 -4 
EXCH -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 
Australia RULC -4 -4 -3 -3 -4 -4 -3 -5 -4 -5 -4 -2 
NLC -10 -11 -9 -9 -9 -10 -7 -10 -10 -8 -9 -10 
RLP 1 0 0 1 3 0 3 2 1 4 2 -1 
EXCH -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 
Austria RULC -4 -3 -2 -5 -8 -6 -2 -6 -3 -4 -1 -4 
NLC -11 -11 -11 -11 -10 -11 -12 -11 -11 -11 -11 -11 
RLP 4 3 2 6 10 7 2 6 4 5 2 4 
EXCH -12 -12 -12 -12 -12 -12 -12 -12 -12 -12 -12 -12 
Belgium RULC -4 -5 -7 -5 -4 -8 -5 -5 -4 -4 -4 -2 
NLC -10 -9 -11 -10 -7 -9 -9 -9 -11 -10 -10 -9 
RLP 4 6 7 5 7 9 6 5 3 4 4 3 
EXCH -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 
Ireland RULC -1 -1 0 1 -2 -3 -2 -1 -1 -4 0 -2 
NLC -6 -10 -7 -6 -10 -4 -8 -8 -5 -2 -9 -9 
RLP 3 -1 1 1 0 8 3 1 4 11 0 2 
EXCH -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 
Luxembourg RULC -1 -12 -4 -1 0 -4 -4 -4 -1 -2 -4 -4 
NLC -11 -10 -11 -9 0 -11 -10 -10 -10 -11 -11 -9 
RLP 0 12 3 2 0 3 4 4 1 1 3 5 
EXCH -10 -10 -10 -10 0 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 
Netherlands RULC -6 -7 -6 -6 -5 -8 -5 -6 -6 -8 -6 -5 
NLC -12 -14 -12 -12 -14 -12 -13 -12 -12 -13 -11 -13 
RLP 5 5 5 5 2 7 3 5 5 6 7 3 
EXCH -11 -11 -11 -11 -11 -11 -11 -11 -11 -11 -11 -11 
Korea RULC 4 5 6 3 2 1 3 2 1 -2 -1 5 
NLC -3 -3 2 -2 -2 -3 -2 1 -2 0 -3 2 
RLP 0 -1 3 3 2 3 2 5 4 9 4 4 
EXCH -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 
Japan RULC -3 -3 -3 -3 0 -9 -4 -4 -7 -12 -5 -3 
NLC -13 -13 -12 -13 -11 -12 -12 -13 -12 -13 -13 -12 
RLP 3 5 5 4 3 12 6 5 9 14 7 6 
EXCH -14 -14 -14 -14 -14 -14 -14 -14 -14 -14 -14 -14 
 
Notes:  
1. The subsectors represent Food and Tobacco (15t16), Texiles (17t19), Wood (20), Paper and 
publishing (21t22), Petroleum (23), Chemicals (24), other non-metallic products (26), Metals 
(27t28), Machinery (29), Electrical equipment (30t33), Transport equipment (34t35) and 
Manufacturing nec (36t37). 
2. The bold value represent China’s advantage (dulc>0, dnlc>0, dlp<0 and de<0) 
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Table 4.9 Decomposition of relative unit labour costs, 19 countries compared with 
China, 1995-2007 (Values have been timed 100) 
 
Country 95-07 15t16 17t19 20 21t22 23 24 26 27t28 29 30t33 34t35 36t37 
USA RULC -15 -17 -15 -15 -13 -17 -15 -16 -17 -27 -19 -16 
NLC -20 -18 -19 -19 -16 -18 -20 -20 -19 -17 -20 -19 
RLP -6 -2 -5 -5 -4 -2 -5 -5 -3 9 -2 -3 
EXCH 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
UK RULC -12 -13 -11 -13 -10 -14 -13 -14 -14 -17 -15 -13 
NLC -19 -15 -18 -19 -17 -18 -18 -18 -18 -18 -20 -19 
RLP -5 -1 -6 -5 -6 -3 -3 -3 -3 0 -4 -5 
EXCH -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
France RULC -15 -18 -19 -17 -19 -17 -17 -16 -19 -20 -17 -16 
NLC -20 -19 -19 -20 -18 -20 -19 -20 -20 -20 -20 -19 
RLP -5 -1 -1 -3 0 -3 -3 -5 -1 0 -4 -4 
EXCH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Germany RULC -17 -20 -20 -20 -8 -21 -20 -19 -18 -22 -18 -18 
NLC -21 -20 -22 -23 -17 -20 -21 -22 -21 -20 -19 -22 
RLP -5 -1 -3 -4 -10 0 -2 -4 -4 1 -2 -5 
EXCH 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Denmark RULC -13 -14 -16 -16 -4 -17 -16 -14 -14 -18 -14 -15 
NLC -19 -18 -19 -20 -18 -18 -19 -19 -19 -19 -19 -19 
RLP -6 -5 -4 -4 -14 -3 -3 -6 -5 -1 -6 -5 
EXCH 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Finland RULC -20 -17 -17 -19 -18 -16 -17 -17 -16 -28 -16 -17 
NLC -20 -19 -20 -20 -20 -19 -20 -20 -19 -18 -21 -20 
RLP -1 -3 -4 -2 -2 -4 -4 -4 -4 9 -6 -4 
EXCH 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Sweden RULC -15 -15 -18 -16 -29 -18 -15 -15 -16 -32 -18 -18 
NLC -19 -19 -19 -19 -20 -18 -19 -19 -19 -18 -19 -19 
RLP -4 -5 -2 -4 9 -1 -4 -5 -3 14 -1 -1 
EXCH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Spain RULC -12 -9 -13 -15 -10 -13 -14 -13 -13 -15 -15 -14 
NLC -20 -16 -20 -20 -19 -20 -19 -20 -19 -20 -20 -20 
RLP -9 -7 -8 -6 -10 -8 -6 -8 -7 -6 -6 -6 
EXCH 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Greece RULC -10 -9 -9 -11 -22 -10 -15 -15 -14 -15 -14 -13 
NLC -17 -18 -17 -17 -19 -17 -17 -17 -17 -17 -18 -17 
RLP -8 -11 -10 -7 2 -8 -3 -3 -4 -3 -6 -5 
EXCH 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Italy RULC -13 -13 -14 -14 -2 -13 -14 -13 -12 -13 -14 -13 
NLC -21 -20 -20 -20 -20 -20 -20 -20 -20 -20 -20 -20 
RLP -7 -7 -6 -6 -17 -6 -6 -7 -8 -7 -6 -7 
EXCH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Continue… 
 
Country 95-07 15t16 17t19 20 21t22 23 24 26 27t28 29 30t33 34t35 36t37 
Portugal* RULC -13 -13 -15 -13 -47 -15 -14 -16 -15 -18 -19 -12 
NLC -19 -19 -17 -18 -17 -19 -18 -21 -19 -17 -16 -20 
RLP -7 -7 -4 -7 29 -6 -5 -7 -5 0 2 -9 
EXCH 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Australia RULC -13 -13 -11 -13 -9 -12 -18 -15 -14 -16 -17 -15 
NLC -18 -19 -19 -18 -15 -16 -18 -18 -17 -21 -21 -23 
RLP -5 -5 -8 -5 -6 -4 0 -3 -2 -5 -4 -7 
EXCH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Austria RULC -19 -22 -19 -21 -28 -21 -18 -18 -18 -18 -20 -20 
NLC -20 -20 -20 -20 -18 -19 -20 -20 -20 -20 -19 -20 
RLP -2 1 -2 0 10 2 -3 -3 -2 -2 0 0 
EXCH 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Belgium RULC -16 -19 -19 -18 -14 -17 -15 -17 -18 -19 -16 -18 
NLC -20 -20 -21 -21 -18 -20 -20 -20 -20 -20 -19 -20 
RLP -5 -2 -3 -3 -6 -4 -6 -4 -3 -2 -4 -3 
EXCH 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Ireland RULC -16 -15 -12 -22 -18 -16 -11 -13 -15 -18 -16 -12 
NLC -19 -18 -17 -18 -15 -18 -21 -19 -19 -18 -20 -16 
RLP -3 -3 -5 4 2 -2 -10 -6 -4 0 -4 -5 
EXCH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Luxembourg RULC -11 -15 -22 -14 0 -23 -16 -16 -19 -18 -22 -15 
NLC -21 -26 -20 -20 0 -22 -20 -20 -22 -19 -22 -20 
RLP -11 -11 2 -7 0 1 -5 -4 -4 -1 -1 -5 
EXCH 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Netherlands RULC -16 -18 -15 -16 -15 -19 -16 -16 -17 -17 -18 -16 
NLC -19 -19 -20 -19 -20 -19 -21 -19 -20 -19 -19 -20 
RLP -4 -2 -6 -4 -6 -1 -6 -5 -4 -3 -1 -5 
EXCH 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Korea RULC -15 -16 -16 -11 -12 -18 -15 -14 -15 -24 -16 -14 
NLC -16 -15 -16 -17 -13 -13 -14 -16 -13 -15 -15 -15 
RLP -4 -1 -3 -8 -4 2 -1 -5 0 7 -1 -3 
EXCH 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Japan* RULC -21 -19 -21 -23 -20 -23 -24 -21 -27 -30 -25 -23 
NLC -23 -21 -23 -25 -24 -23 -23 -23 -25 -22 -25 -23 
RLP -5 -5 -4 -5 -6 -3 -2 -4 0 6 -2 -2 
EXCH 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 
Notes:  
1. *The time periods for Portugal and Japan are 1995-2006. 
2. The subsectors represent Food and Tobacco (15t16), Texiles (17t19), Wood (20), Paper and 
publishing (21t22), Petroleum (23), Chemicals (24), other non-metallic products (26), Metals 
(27t28), Machinery (29), Electrical equipment (30t33), Transport equipment (34t35) and 
Manufacturing nec (36t37). 
3. The bold value represent China’s advantage (dulc>0, dnlc>0, dlp<0 and de<0) 
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Table 4.10 and 4.11 decompose the competitiveness gains or losses of the 28 
provinces and the nine one digit sectors. Overall, there are much more cost 
competitiveness gains through decreasing relative nominal labour costs and increasing 
labour productivity before 1995 than afterwards. During 1978-1995, cost 
competitiveness gains still exist after labour productivity improvement offset increase of 
nominal labour costs for provinces in the Coastal region (such as Beijing, Shanghai, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Fujian). In 1995-2009, Primary sector (AtoB), Construction (F) 
and Transportation (I) experience more cost competitiveness gains than other sectors. 
Among provinces, only one province – Guangxi in the West region appears cost 
competitiveness gains in all sectors due to the sharp relative decrease of nominal labour 
costs over the whole time period. 
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Table 4.10 Decomposition of relative unit labour costs, 28 provinces compared with 
national level, 1978-1995   (Values have been timed 100) 
 
Province 78-95 AtoB D F G I J K M N 
Beijing RULC -8 -9 -8 -6 -5 -21 -9 -10 -9 
NLC -1 -2 1 2 -1 -3 0 4 -3 
RLP 6 7 9 8 4 18 9 15 7 
Tianjin RULC -5 -10 -14 -4 -9 -31 -13 -12 -11 
NLC 2 -1 -1 1 2 -1 -5 -5 1 
RLP 7 10 13 5 10 30 9 7 12 
Hebei RULC -4 -12 -11 -7 -8 -12 -15 -10 -10 
NLC 1 0 0 4 -1 3 -7 1 0 
RLP 5 12 10 10 7 15 9 11 10 
Shanxi RULC -6 -12 -12 -11 -10 -12 -13 -12 -13 
NLC -3 -3 -1 -4 2 1 -4 -5 -8 
RLP 3 9 11 7 12 14 9 7 4 
Inner Mongolia RULC -5 -13 -9 -8 -10 -14 -12 -10 -11 
NLC 0 -3 -2 -1 -1 -2 -1 -2 1 
RLP 5 10 7 7 9 12 12 8 11 
Liaoning RULC -6 -10 -9 -8 -9 -11 -14 -9 -8 
NLC -1 -2 2 0 -3 5 7 4 4 
RLP 6 8 11 8 6 16 21 13 12 
Jilin RULC -4 -12 -15 -15 -9 -17 -12 -10 -11 
NLC 1 -3 -2 -3 -2 -4 -3 -3 -2 
RLP 5 9 13 12 7 13 9 8 8 
Heilongjiang RULC -6 -13 -11 -14 -9 -18 -14 -11 -11 
NLC -1 -3 -1 -3 -4 -6 -1 -4 0 
RLP 5 10 10 11 5 12 13 8 11 
shanghai RULC -6 -10 -13 -6 -14 -13 -10 -12 -11 
NLC -2 -1 5 1 -5 2 2 2 2 
RLP 4 9 18 7 9 15 12 13 14 
Jiangsu RULC -6 -11 -11 -7 -8 -11 -12 -10 -11 
NLC 0 3 0 3 3 0 0 -1 0 
RLP 6 14 11 10 11 11 12 10 11 
Zhejiang RULC -4 -13 -11 -7 -12 -13 -7 -10 -11 
NLC 0 4 3 7 4 3 3 1 0 
RLP 4 17 14 14 16 15 11 12 11 
Anhui RULC -5 -12 -10 -9 -15 -17 -10 -13 -13 
NLC -1 2 1 -4 -7 -2 3 -3 -4 
RLP 4 14 11 5 8 15 13 10 9 
Fujian RULC -5 -15 -9 -15 -14 -17 -16 -12 -11 
NLC 3 3 3 1 3 -3 3 2 4 
RLP 8 17 12 16 16 14 20 14 15 
Jiangxi RULC -4 -11 -12 -6 -11 -21 -13 -8 -6 
NLC -1 0 -7 0 -1 -6 -7 1 1 
RLP 4 11 5 6 10 16 7 8 7 
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Shandong RULC -5 -12 -11 -14 -9 -10 -10 -10 -11 
NLC 0 -1 0 4 1 5 4 2 0 
RLP 5 12 11 18 10 15 13 12 11 
Henan RULC -4 -10 -9 -8 -6 -17 -10 -10 -10 
NLC -1 3 -2 0 3 -5 1 -1 0 
RLP 3 12 7 8 8 12 12 8 10 
Hubei RULC -5 -14 -10 -8 -9 -17 -12 -12 -8 
NLC -1 -1 -4 0 0 -6 1 -1 6 
RLP 4 13 7 9 10 10 13 11 14 
Hunan RULC -5 -10 -11 -9 -8 -12 -11 -12 -11 
NLC -1 1 -2 -1 1 1 1 -2 -1 
RLP 5 11 9 9 9 13 12 10 10 
Guangdong* RULC -4 -14 -5 -13 -12 -16 -16 -9 -12 
NLC 3 2 7 -3 2 3 7 9 3 
RLP 7 16 12 10 14 19 22 18 15 
Guangxi RULC -4 -8 -10 -9 -6 1 -11 -10 -9 
NLC 3 5 4 3 4 14 2 -2 2 
RLP 7 14 13 13 11 13 12 8 11 
Sichuan* RULC -5 -13 -11 -9 -9 -20 -15 -13 -15 
NLC -3 -2 -1 -3 -3 -1 0 -2 -3 
RLP 2 11 10 6 5 19 15 12 12 
Guizhou RULC -5 -13 -10 -10 -3 -14 -14 -11 -11 
NLC 1 1 -3 -1 5 0 -1 2 2 
RLP 6 13 7 9 8 14 14 14 13 
Yunnan RULC -6 -14 -10 -17 -7 -10 -15 -11 -12 
NLC -1 1 -3 -5 1 5 -1 0 0 
RLP 5 15 8 12 8 15 14 11 12 
Shaanxi RULC -5 -12 -13 -6 -9 -25 -12 -12 -11 
NLC -2 -4 -5 0 2 -7 0 -1 0 
RLP 3 9 8 7 10 17 13 11 11 
Gansu RULC -6 -14 -11 -10 -11 -21 -17 -12 -10 
NLC -3 -7 -5 -3 -8 -9 -6 -4 -4 
RLP 3 7 6 7 3 12 11 8 7 
Qinghai RULC -6 -13 -14 -8 -14 -12 -13 -12 -11 
NLC -1 -3 -6 -3 -5 2 -8 -6 -12 
RLP 5 10 8 5 10 14 6 5 -1 
Ningxia RULC -8 -11 -11 -9 -8 -14 -11 -12 -10 
NLC 0 -2 -3 -4 -3 -1 -2 -3 -3 
RLP 7 9 8 5 5 13 9 9 8 
Xinjiang RULC -6 -13 -9 -8 -7 -16 -14 -11 -11 
NLC 2 0 3 4 6 -2 2 3 1 
RLP 8 12 12 12 13 14 16 13 12 
 
Notes:  
1. The sectors are Primary sector (AtoB), Manufacturing (D), Construction (F), Trade (G), 
Transportation (I), Finance (J), Real estate (K), Education (M) and Health (N) 
2. The bold values represent province’s advantage (dulc<0, dnlc<0 or dlp>0) 
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Table 4.11 Decomposition of relative unit labour costs, other 28 provinces 
compared with national level, 1995-2009 (Values have been timed 100) 
 
Province 95-09 AtoB D F G I J K M N 
Beijing RULC 7 5 5 1 4 -1 3 1 4 
NLC 4 2 5 -3 -3 -1 2 3 3 
RLP -3 -4 -1 -4 -7 0 -1 2 -2 
Tianjin RULC 6 5 6 0 6 4 5 0 0 
NLC 6 3 7 4 4 3 5 5 5 
RLP 0 -2 1 4 -1 -1 0 5 4 
Hebei RULC -1 0 2 2 -2 4 0 -2 -3 
NLC -1 1 2 -2 -1 0 0 -2 -2 
RLP 0 0 0 -4 2 -4 0 0 1 
Shanxi RULC -1 1 1 -1 0 1 1 -2 -3 
NLC 0 2 2 -1 0 0 2 1 1 
RLP 0 1 2 0 0 -1 1 2 4 
Inner 
Mongolia 
RULC 5 4 9 -1 2 4 2 1 0 
NLC 2 7 8 8 5 5 5 5 5 
RLP -3 3 0 10 3 1 3 4 5 
Liaoning RULC 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 
NLC -1 4 6 5 2 1 4 1 1 
RLP -2 1 4 3 0 -1 2 -1 -2 
Jilin RULC 0 1 1 -1 3 3 3 1 1 
NLC -4 4 5 5 1 1 2 1 1 
RLP -4 3 4 6 -2 -3 -1 0 -1 
Heilongjiang RULC 0 2 1 0 0 5 2 -1 2 
NLC -3 1 1 1 0 -1 -1 0 0 
RLP -2 -1 0 0 0 -5 -3 0 -2 
shanghai RULC 3 6 5 2 8 2 6 4 4 
NLC 11 2 5 2 0 -4 4 5 3 
RLP 8 -4 0 0 -8 -6 -2 1 -1 
Jiangsu RULC 2 3 2 2 4 2 4 3 3 
NLC 2 0 2 2 2 0 3 2 1 
RLP 0 -3 0 1 -2 -3 -1 -1 -2 
Zhejiang RULC 3 3 3 5 6 -4 2 1 2 
NLC 7 -5 -6 -1 0 -2 -1 -1 -2 
RLP 4 -7 -9 -5 -6 2 -3 -2 -4 
Anhui RULC 0 3 -1 0 1 2 0 -3 -5 
NLC -1 2 0 0 1 -1 0 -2 -1 
RLP -1 -1 1 -1 0 -3 0 1 4 
Fujian RULC 1 2 4 1 4 0 3 3 2 
NLC -1 -9 -3 -2 -2 -2 -3 -1 -1 
RLP -2 -11 -7 -4 -6 -2 -6 -4 -4 
Jiangxi RULC 0 1 2 -3 0 5 2 3 2 
NLC 1 2 -2 2 -1 0 -2 -1 -1 
RLP 1 1 -3 5 -1 -5 -4 -4 -3 
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Shandong RULC 2 3 4 2 4 6 4 2 1 
NLC 4 -1 -4 1 2 2 2 1 2 
RLP 2 -4 -8 -1 -2 -4 -3 0 0 
Henan RULC -1 0 1 -1 1 2 3 1 2 
NLC -3 0 -3 -4 -2 0 -2 -3 -2 
RLP -2 0 -3 -2 -2 -2 -5 -4 -4 
Hubei RULC -1 2 0 2 1 1 1 -1 1 
NLC 0 1 -1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
RLP 1 -1 -1 -2 -1 0 -2 1 -1 
Hunan RULC -2 0 0 -1 0 0 0 -3 -4 
NLC 6 0 -6 1 -1 -2 -3 -2 -3 
RLP 7 0 -6 3 -1 -1 -2 0 2 
Guangdong* RULC 2 2 10 -2 4 -1 3 6 4 
NLC 3 -4 2 0 -1 1 -2 0 -1 
RLP 1 -7 -8 2 -4 1 -5 -6 -5 
Guangxi RULC -3 -1 -2 0 -1 -4 -1 -1 -2 
NLC -4 -4 -4 -6 -5 -3 -5 -4 -5 
RLP -2 -3 -3 -5 -3 1 -4 -3 -4 
Sichuan* RULC -1 2 4 0 -1 0 1 0 1 
NLC -2 0 -4 1 0 -1 -2 -1 -1 
RLP -1 -2 -8 0 1 -1 -3 -1 -1 
Guizhou RULC 0 0 -2 -1 -8 -2 -2 -7 -9 
NLC 0 -1 -3 -5 -1 -1 -5 -2 -1 
RLP 1 -1 -1 -4 8 2 -2 5 8 
Yunnan RULC -1 2 -2 1 4 0 3 5 1 
NLC -2 -1 -1 -2 -1 -1 -2 -1 -2 
RLP -1 -3 1 -3 -4 0 -5 -6 -2 
Shaanxi RULC 1 0 0 -4 1 2 3 0 0 
NLC -2 2 3 -2 -1 1 -2 1 1 
RLP -2 2 3 2 -2 -1 -5 0 1 
Gansu RULC -2 2 -2 4 -1 5 3 -2 -2 
NLC -2 2 1 0 0 1 0 -1 1 
RLP 0 -1 3 -4 1 -5 -2 1 3 
Qinghai RULC -1 0 2 1 0 3 3 2 1 
NLC -1 4 5 0 -1 2 -4 0 -1 
RLP 0 4 4 -1 -1 -1 -7 -2 -1 
Ningxia RULC 1 1 -1 1 -5 1 -1 -5 -6 
NLC 1 2 0 1 1 2 1 2 1 
RLP -1 1 1 0 6 0 2 7 7 
Xinjiang RULC -1 -3 1 2 1 0 2 -1 -2 
NLC -2 1 0 -2 -1 -1 -3 -2 -3 
RLP -1 4 -1 -4 -3 -1 -5 -1 -1 
 
Notes:  
1. The sectors are Primary sector (AtoB), Manufacturing (D), Construction (F), Trade (G), 
Transportation (I), Finance (J), Real estate (K), Education (M) and Health (N) 
2. The bold values represent province’s advantage (dulc<0, dnlc<0 or dlp>0) 
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4.6 Convergence in RULC, RLP and RNLC 
To have a better understanding of the degree of convergence that has taken place across 
countries and provinces, we further look at the dispersion of the relative levels of ULC, 
LP and NLC across countries and provinces. Figure 4.1 is the coefficients of variation 
of RULC for cross-country comparisons by 12 manufacturing subsectors. The Textiles 
(17t19), Paper and Publishing (21t22), other non-metallic (26), Chemicals (24), Metals 
(27t28), Machinery (29), Electrical equipment (30t33), Transport equipment (34t35) and 
Manufacturing nec (36t37) sectors have convergence trend over time. The RULC 
disparity of Petroleum (23) is stable from 1978 to 1987, then converges sharply during 
1987-1993, and then keeps stable afterwards. The Food and Tobacco (15t16) sector has 
“U” style of RULC with convergence in 1978-1995 and then divergence in 1995-2007. 
The Woods (20) sector also has “U” style of RULC with vibration between 1988 and 
1996. 
Figure 4.1: Coefficients of variations of RULC for international comparisons 
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Table 4.12 illustrates the annual growth rates of coefficients of variation of RULC, 
RLP and RNLC for cross-country comparisons by 12 manufacturing subsectors. RLP 
converges much more quickly than RULC and RNLC, suggesting a fast technology 
spillover effect across countries. Labour market institutional factors such as collective 
bargaining of trade union, minimum wages, coordination of wage setting and 
employment protection legislation may withhold the convergence of nominal wages 
(and the unit labour costs) across country. The convergence of RULC, RLP and RNLC 
appear in all sectors during 1978-1995, but only in Textile (17t19), other non-metallic 
products (26), Machinery (29) and Manufacturing nec (36t37) during the period 1995-
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2007.   
 
Table 4.12 Annual Growth rates of Coefficients of variations for cross-country 
comparisons 
 
  15t16 17t19 20 21t22 26 23 24 27t28 29 30t33 34t35 36t37 
  Relative unit labour costs 
78-95 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.09 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 
95-07 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.04 -0.02 
  Relative labour productivity 
78-95 -0.05 -0.04 -0.11 -0.05 -0.07 0.01 -0.05 -0.09 -0.08 -0.14 -0.12 -0.12 
95-07 0.03 -0.05 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.04 0.00 
  Relative nominal labour costs 
78-95 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
95-07 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 
 
Note: The subsectors represent Food and Tobacco (15t16), Texiles (17t19), Wood (20), Paper and 
publishing (21t22), Petroleum (23), Chemicals (24), other non-metallic products (26), Metals (27t28), 
Machinery (29), Electrical equipment (30t33), Transport equipment (34t35) and Manufacturing nec 
(36t37). 
 
Figure 4.2 presents the coefficients of variations of RULC for provincial 
comparisons from 1978 to 2009, which have more variation than international 
comparisons. The Trade (G) and Real Estate (K) sectors have convergence trend over 
time, especially from 1978 to 1995. The Manufacturing (D), Transportation (I) and 
Health (N) sectors have “W” trend with sharp divergence and convergence from 1990 to 
1997. The disparity of Finance (J) sector is stable before 1998, then has sharp 
divergence until 2000, then convergence quickly afterwards. The disparities of Primary 
(AtoB), Construction (F) and Education (M) sectors are stable before 1993 but diverge 
afterwards.  
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Figure 4.2 Coefficients of variations of RULC for cross-provincial comparisons 
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Table 4.13 shows the annual growth rates of coefficients of variations of RULC, 
RLP and RNLC for the cross-provincial comparisons by 9 sectors over 1978-1995 and 
1995-2009. The RULC convergence appear in all sectors with the highest growth rate (-
0.06) in Education (M) before 1995, but only in Finance (J) after 1995.  The 
convergence of RLP and RULC occur in Primary (AtoB) sector, Manufacturing (D), 
Real estate (K), Education (M) and Health (N) sectors in one or both time periods. The 
RNLC diverges in Trade (G) and Transportation (I) in the whole time periods. 
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Table 4.13 Annual growth rates of coefficients of variation for provincial 
comparisons 
 
 
AtoB D F G I J K M N 
  Relative unit labour costs 
78-95 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 
95-09 0.07 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.11 0.07 
  Relative labour productivity 
78-95 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 
95-09 0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.01 
  Relative nominal labour costs 
78-95 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.07 
95-09 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.03 
 
Note: The sectors are Primary sector (AtoB), Manufacturing (D), Construction (F), Trade (G), 
Transportation (I), Finance (J), Real estate (K), Education (M) and Health (N) 
 
4.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we examine Chinese international and internal provincial disparities and 
convergence from the labour cost perspective. Analysis on the drivers of unit labour 
costs and decomposition of cost competitiveness help us understand how Chinese 
economy gains comparative advantages over other countries and how provinces within 
China compete with each other. 
First, regarding to the relative unit labour costs (RULC), China has the largest cost 
advantage with the USA and the three large EU countries, and can competes with 
Mediterranean countries in the high-tech subsectors and with neighbouring countries in 
the low-tech subsectors. Within China, provinces should develop the specific industries 
according to their comparative advantages. The provinces in the Northeast and Coastal 
have strong advantages in the manufacturing sector. However, gaining more 
comparative competitiveness in the Primary sector, Construction and Real estate sectors 
are best strategies for the provinces in the Interior and West. Developing transportation 
sector is also a good direction for the provinces in the Interior possibly due to their 
central geographic location. 
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Second, the two drivers of RULC are relative nominal labour costs (RNLC) and 
relative labour productivity (RLP). The RNLC gap between China and other 19 
countries decreases about 80 percent from 1978-1995 to 1995-2007, which explains the 
sharp decrease of RULC in China. For cross-provincial comparisons, we find that the 
decrease of RULC is mainly because the growth rates of RLP are higher than the growth 
rate of RNLC in most cases.  
Third, the decomposition analysis of cost competitiveness across the country and 
province shows many interesting points. During 1978-1995, China has cost 
competitiveness gains only relative to the Mediterranean countries, mainly relying on 
the negative change in labour productivity of these countries and depreciation in China 
currency relative to foreign currency. After 1995, China loses its cost competitiveness 
relative to other countries because the negative changes in labour productivity in these 
countries have been offset by the appreciation in China currency. Similarly, there are 
much more cost competitiveness gains, relative decrease of nominal labour costs and 
labour productivity improvement before 1995 than afterwards for Chinese provinces. 
Finally, we find convergence of RULC is more prominent before 1995 than 
afterwards for both cross-country and provincial comparisons. The fast convergence of 
the RLP in cross-country comparisons could be from the continuous decline of relative 
labour productivity in many European countries. However, for cross-provincial 
comparisons within China, the fast convergence of RULC is consistent with the fast 
converging relative labour productivity among provinces with static wages. It suggests 
the importance of institutional factors such as rigid wage setting in Chinese labour 
markets.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: A SELECTION ANALYSIS ON 
EDUCATION RETURNS 
34
  
 
5.1 Introduction 
There is a well-established literature on the economic returns to education, since Schultz 
(1961a) and Mincer (1974a). According to human capital theory, following Becker 
(1962), education is an investment that produces knowledge acquisition and increases 
productivity, which in turn leads to higher income. Human capital theory bears a strong 
resemblance to vintage capital theory. The individual’s capital stock (his or her level of 
education) can be treated as a factor of production in its own right and may gradually 
depreciate with time (Byron and Manaloto, 1990). Thus, the distribution of labour 
incomes can be regarded as a function of education and experience, as in the benchmark 
Mincerian model which involves regression of the natural logarithm of earnings against 
educational attainment and working experience.  
A large amount of empirical research, based on the Mincerian model, has been 
carried out for many countries and time periods and confirms that better-educated 
individuals earn higher wages, experience less unemployment, and work in more 
prestigious occupations than their less-educated counterparts (Card, 1999; O'Mahony 
and Stevens, 2009). Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) finds that the education returns 
for one additional year are 9.7 percent for world average, 9.9 percent for Asian average 
as well as the 10.7-10.9 percent range for low and middle incomes. However, literature 
on economic returns to education in China is still sparse and shows much lower rates of 
returns compared with those from other countries, especially developing ones. An early 
                                                             
34 The minor revised version of this chapter will be published in the Post-Communist Economics (Kang 
and Peng, forthcoming). 
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study on this topic for China was made by Byron and Manaloto (1990). Using a sample 
of eight hundred adult workers from the city of Nanjing in 1986, they estimate a low 
rate of returns between 1.2 percent and 3.7 percent for one additional year of schooling. 
Meng and Kidd (1997) also find a low rate of returns to education of 2.7 percent in 
1987. Liu (1998) uses the China Household Income Project (CHIP) 1988 data and finds 
a slightly larger but still low rate of returns to education of 3.6 percent . Therefore, 
Fleisher et al. (2005) conclude that China is an outlier, in that its rapid economic growth 
is associated with returns to education remaining below the world average for 
comparable countries.  
Low returns to education do not necessarily imply that education has no value in 
China. It may be because the value of education has not been properly reflected as 
private economic returns in labour markets. Fleisher and Wang (2004) find that the 
wages of educated workers are well below their marginal product in China, and the 
social returns to education will exceed the estimated private returns. Hence, the most 
widely accepted explanation of lower Chinese education returns may be the explanation 
of labour markets transition. Before 1978, wages of all workers were determined and 
controlled through a rigid system in China, designed to reduce labour costs during the 
rapid industrialization. Low wages were made possible by state-subsidized food prices 
and state provision of non-wage benefits to workers and their families. Throughout the 
economic reforms in China into the early 1990s, the wage differentials by levels of skill 
and schooling still remained narrow. After the “socialist market economy” was 
authorized in the early 1990s, the rigid wage system was gradually replaced by the 
flexible wage system.35  Thus, the wage reform in China freed up the compressed wage 
                                                             
35 The flexible wage system allows a variable component in the usual fixed wages. The fixed wage 
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differentials and thereafter had similar implications for the economic returns to 
education. 
The explanation of labour markets transition is supported by the literature dealing 
with evidence of increasing returns to education over time, following the progress of 
economic reforms. Recent research suggests that reform and marketization are finally 
contributing to an increase in the relative wages of educated workers (Fleisher and 
Wang, 2005). Zhang et al. (2005) find a dramatic increase in education returns, from 
only 4.0 percent  in 1988 to 10.2 percent in 2001 for one additional year of schooling. 
Most of the rise occurs after 1992 and supports the explanation of labour markets 
transition. 
This chapter provides alternative points of view on returns to education in China, 
using recent available China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) datasets from 1989 
to 2009. We have three objectives. First, education has an important effect on wages but 
it is not clear whether this is because education raises productivity or because education 
is simply a signal of innate ability (Chevalier et al., 2004). We need to test whether the 
returns to education in China reflect accumulation of human capital or are just signals of 
innate ability. Following Qiu and Hudson (2010), we put the interaction of education 
and experience into regressions for all employees and for four age groups. We calculate 
the marginal effects of schooling at different percentiles of experience (Dreher and 
Gassebner, 2007; Friedrich, 1982; Potrafke, 2009) and then graph their trends with 
ranges of standard errors. We find that Chinese data appear to strongly support the 
human capital explanation. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
includes the basic wages, seniority wage, insurance (medical, unemployment and pensions) and a housing 
fund. The variable wage includes bonuses, based on both individual productivity and enterprise 
profitability. The system of allocated housing was largely abolished around 1998 and replaced with a 
housing fund. 
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Second, most studies on education returns in China only apply the traditional OLS 
Mincerian model, which ignores the probable selection biases of employment. If the job 
assignments in the labour markets are not random, OLS estimation of education returns 
might be biased. The direction of biases is dependent on how jobs are assigned and how 
people make self-selections in the labour markets (Heckman, 1974; Heckman and 
Honoré, 1990; Roy, 1951). Appleton et al. (2005) observe a continued influence of 
political forces of loyalty, power, and patronage on the rewards for labour in the 
Chinese labour markets. Considering the selection bias of employment, we compare the 
estimates of education returns in a Heckman selection model with results from 
traditional OLS.  
Last, but not least, to consider the composition bias mentioned in the chapter 3, 
we separate our sample into four age groups: people born before 1950, during 1950-
1961, during 1962-1980 and in 1981 or after (see the birth rate graph 3.2). The special 
age group born 1950-1961 mainly received their education during the “Cultural 
Revolution” period (1966-1976), when the leftist ideological goals of an egalitarian 
educational agenda reached a peak and the normal education process was interrupted 
and replaced by continuous political movements (Qian and Smyth, 2008). They find this 
group has considerably lower returns to education than younger people who received 
standardised education and entered the labour market during the urban economic reform 
era.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In section 5.2 we outline the 
empirical specifications for our three objectives. In section 5.3 we describe our data and 
present descriptive statistics. Estimates of the returns to schooling are presented in 
section 5.4. Section 5.5 forms our conclusions. 
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5.2 Empirical specifications 
Most previous literature relies on the theoretical foundations for returns to education, 
laid down by Schultz (1961a), Becker (1962) and Mincer (1974a). We also estimate a 
semi-logarithmic specification for the wages based on the Mincerian equation, given as: 
 
)1.5(Prln 1654
2
3210   iiiiiii GenderUrbanExpExpSw  
 
where the dependent variable 
iwln is the log form of real hourly wage rate of employee i. 
Wages consist of basic wages, subsidies and bonuses. We use the urban/rural consumer 
price indices, classified by year and province from the China Statistics Yearbooks, to 
deflate employees’ labour incomes. In the independent variables Si is years of schooling; 
Expi is an employee’s potential labour markets experience, measured as age minus years 
of schooling minus six (Katz and Murph, 1992); Urbani is a dummy variable for the 
urban areas; Genderi is a dummy variable capturing the wage differential between men 
and women; and Pri is a set of province dummy variables. 
 
5.2.1 Signal and human capital effects  
There is debate whether the impact of education on earnings isolates the effects that are 
caused by education from the consequences of innate ability. Economists have relied on 
natural experiments, twins data, regression discontinuity, and field experiments to 
control for innate ability and estimate the causal impact of education (human capital) on 
earnings (see a review in Card (1999)). The CHNS cannot provide data for a direct 
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control on innate ability as do these classic models. However, we can develop Qiu and 
Hudson’s (2010) model to test whether education is the signal of innate ability, or the 
accumulation of human capital. It is assumed that schooling (
iS ) that an individual 
acquires is a function of innate ability (
iA ):  
 
)2.5()( ii AmS   
 
Hence, more able individuals can grasp knowledge more rapidly and transform 
schooling into human capital more efficiently, that is, 0/  ii AS . We can argue that 
the basic theory underlying the earnings’ equation is that wages (
iw ) are a function of 
human capital (
iH ):   
 
)3.5()( ii Hfw   
 
In efficient labour markets, jobs with higher wages will be assigned to individuals 
with higher productivity. Hence, individuals with higher human capital would have 
higher wages, that is, 0/  iHf . Human capital of an individual itself is a function of 
innate ability ( iA ), education-augmented human capital ( iS ) and experience-augmented 
human capital (from on-the-job training or “learning by doing” processes,
iExp ) as 
follows: 
 
)4.5()()( iiii ExpgShAH   
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Human capital augmented by experience is also possibly influenced by innate 
ability. More able individuals can grasp knowledge from on-the-job training or 
“learning by doing” processes more rapidly and transform it into human capital more 
efficiently, that is 0
),(



i
ii
A
AExpg
. However, an inverted U curve of experience in 
earnings equations with quadratic experience is widely observed in the literature (for 
China, see Appleton et al. (2005) and Qiu and Hudson (2010)). The individual’s capital 
stock from experience can be treated as a factor of production in its own right and 
gradually depreciates with time. Hence, we can firstly assume (for simplicity) that the 
experience-augmented human capital is derived only from experience, and we also 
assume linearity and that it is possible to separate the three types of human capital, in 
equation (5.4). We cannot observe innate ability directly, hence we estimate wages as a 
function of education and experience as: 
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The total derivative of the wage function with respect to experience is as follows: 
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We calculate the partial derivative of wage function with respect to schooling, and 
allow the correlation between schooling and experience-augmented human capital. The 
equation (5.6) has the form:  
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For simplicity, we drop the individual subscript i. The first item is the quadratic 
experience items in equation (5.1) to proxy the isolated experience effect on the wage. 
The second item is the combination of signal and human capital effects of schooling on 
the wage. The final item is the interaction of schooling and experience. If the only 
impact of schooling is to proxy innate ability, schooling cannot enhance human capital, 
that is, 0
)(



S
Sh
. Then, the above equation becomes: 
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The coefficients of schooling are only capturing the effects of variations of innate 
ability among individuals on wages. The impact of education on wages should be 
constant over time, as the coefficients of experience and education interaction are zero. 
Riley (1979) and Farber and Gibbons (1996) also argue that a basic condition for a 
signalling equilibrium is that employers’ predictions based on education signals are 
correct on average. If not, then education and experience could enhance productivity, 
supporting the human capital theory.  
Do the returns to schooling decline with rising experience since the individual left 
formal education? Normally, with rising experience, education will depreciate. Hence, 
the interaction between schooling and experience-augmented human capital should 
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show a negative correlation (substitution relationship)
 
0
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 and make the 
coefficients of interaction items also negative because 0


H
f
 and 0
)(



S
Sh
. But, in a 
reforming society such as China, education chances may be very selective for innate 
ability (for example, very strict college entrance examinations) or political virtue 
(Broaded, 1990). Individual human capital, enhanced by education and experience, 
could be complementary if we consider the possibility that the innate ability or political 
virtue also enhances human capital from experience. Education-augmented human 
capital could be positively correlated with experience-augmented human capital. The 
marginal effects of schooling may increase with experience in this simultaneous system. 
We use pooled data to test the trend of education returns with rising experience over 
time. Therefore, an interaction item is very important in our wage equation. After we 
add the interaction variable of schooling and experience, and allow year dummies Y for 
macro time dynamics, the empirical specification for our pooled data is as follows: 
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                                                                            (5.9) 
 
 
5.2.2 Heckman selection bias 
One important issue to consider is the fact that wages are only observed for individuals 
actually working. Some individuals become inactive because they do not find a job, or 
their reservation wages are higher than offer wages. There would be a potential 
selection bias when estimating earnings equations. The Heckman selection model 
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provides a solution through an additional selection equation (Heckman, 1976). People 
with more education might have higher participation rates, because they are more 
attractive to employers and their opportunity cost of unemployment are higher. 
Education increases expected wages over time, through higher wages when working 
(the effect captured through the Mincerian equation above) and through a higher 
probability of being employed (this effect will be captured through the Heckman 
selection model below).  
As derived from equation (5.9), the hourly wage rate is a function of schooling, 
experience, urban, gender, province and year dummies, whereas the likelihood of 
employment is a function of marital status and (implicitly) the wage (via the inclusion 
of all above variables which determine the wage). The identifying variable for 
employment selection is the marital status of a respondent, that is, a dummy variable 
(0= single; 1=once married) which is widely used in literature (see an example for Italy, 
in Brown and Sessions (1999)). Therefore, we assume that wage is observed if  
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The inverse Mills ratio (lambda) defined as in (Heckman, 1979) is designed to correct 
for selectivity bias in the samples. A significant coefficient on the lambda term indicates 
non-random selection into employment in the relevant sample.  
 
5.3 Data description 
The data used in this chapter are eight waves (1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 
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2006 and 2009) of the CHNS dataset, which has been collected by the Carolina 
Population Centre and the National Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety. The CHNS 
data cover two decades of Chinese economic reform since 1989, and contain accurate 
information on wages, education, and other demographic information which provides a 
basis for an estimate of the returns to education. Eight provinces are covered by data in 
the period of 1989-1997 and nine provinces thereafter. 36  We exclude individuals 
working as farmers, fishermen and hunters in the primary sector (mainly agriculture). 
Employees with a salary (wage earners) between 16 and 65 years old are our basic 
sample. 37  The full sample composed of employees, unemployed persons and self-
employees is also analyzed for the Heckman correction. 
Table 5.1 represents the data description for the employee and full samples. For 
the employee sample, the real hourly wage rate (based on 1995 RMB) is below 2 Yuan 
and grows comparatively slowly before 1993. However, the hourly wage rate 
dramatically doubles in the 4 years from 1993 to 1997, and then doubles again in the 9 
years from 1997 to 2006. In the last 3 years of our sample period, 2006-2009, the hourly 
wage rate still grows by about 30 percent. The rapidly rising wage rate, especially after 
1993, is also observed by other authors, such as Yang et al. (2010). 
The average schooling increases with rising wages by about 40 percent over the 
last two decades (from 7.49 years in 1989 to 10.54 years in 2009). The working 
experience decreases in the 1990s and increases in the 2000s, but still seems quite stable, 
                                                             
36
 There are 8 provinces (Liaoning, Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi and Guizhou) for 
years 1989-1993, and 8 provinces in 1997 (replacing Liaoning with Heilongjiang), and 9 provinces for 
years 2000-2009 (with both Liaoning and Heilongjiang, and other provinces as well). 
 
37
 The current retirement age in China is usually 60 for men and 50-55 for women. But civil servants or 
professionals can postpone their retirement. Hence, we put the upper limit as 65 for our sample. 
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ranging between 20.15 years in 2000 to 24.33 years in 2009. About 60 percent of 
employees are males and less than half the employees are in an urban area. About 80 
percent of the employees are married once, in our employee sample. The largest baby 
boom group, born in 1962-1980, occupies 37 percent of total employment in 1989, 
increasing to around 55 percent after 1993. Hence, this group can benefit much more 
than others from the dramatic rising wages after 1993. Actually, we find the special 
wage premium (or “rent”) in returns to schooling of this group in the later analysis. The 
oldest group (born before 1950) keeps on decreasing due to retirement. The youngest 
group (born in 1981 or after) has no observation before 1997, and is still small in 1997, 
so we involve this group only after 1997. The share of the group born just after the 
foundation of China is stable at around 30 percent in the past two decades. Compared 
with the employee sample, the main difference in the full sample is that the average 
years of schooling is lower (8.48 years in 1989 to 9.06 years in 2009). That is consistent 
with the findings  that higher educated individuals have higher probability to be 
employed (O'Mahony and Stevens, 2009).  
Table 5.2 shows descriptive statistics for the four groups in the pooled dataset of 
all eight waves. For employees, the younger groups have higher real hourly wage rates 
and years of schooling, but shorter potential labour markets experience. For example, 
the youngest group (born in 1981 or after) has the highest hourly wage rate at 6.35 Yuan 
(double the oldest), and years of schooling (at 10.89 years, this is 4.35 years longer than 
the oldest), and lowest experience at 5.11 years (35.6 years less than the oldest). In 
addition, the younger group has a higher female participation rate, higher participation 
rates in rural regions and lower marriage rates. 
Compared with employees, the full sample in the bottom panel has fewer years of 
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schooling than employees for all four groups, as we find in Table 5.1. Each group still 
has distinguishable features as employees. These distinctive characteristics among 
groups reflect volatile changes of Chinese society in recent decades, which imply 
heterogeneous human capital accumulation of different groups from their education and 
experience. If we only consider aggregated results, our estimate may be biased by the 
composition shifts of groups. 
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Table 5.1: Data description for cross-sectional data 
 
Employee sample (Ordinary Least Square model) 
Variable All 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
Real hourly wage rate (Yuan) 3.93 1.22 1.46 1.73 3.49 5.13 6.07 6.93 9.05 
Years of schooling (Years) 9.17 7.49 8.29 8.59 9.36 9.85 10.46 10.64 10.54 
Experience (Years) 22.63 23.21 23.40 22.99 20.50 20.15 22.53 23.54 24.33 
Male (%) 0.57 0.52 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 
Urban (%) 0.48 0.49 0.51 0.48 0.48 0.44 0.50 0.47 0.47 
Married (%) 0.79 0.75 0.80 0.77 0.74 0.74 0.87 0.88 0.88 
Born before 1950 (%) 0.20 0.35 0.34 0.30 0.15 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.03 
Born 1950-1961 (%) 0.29 0.28 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.25 
Born 1962-1980 (%) 0.47 0.37 0.35 0.41 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.55 0.57 
Born in 1981 or after (%) 0.04 
   
0.00 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.16 
Full sample (Heckman selection model) 
Variable All 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
Years of schooling (Years) 8.48 7.16 7.90 8.12 8.37 8.95 8.79 9.04 9.06 
Experience (Years) 24.77 23.45 22.28 22.42 22.36 22.14 26.82 27.87 28.80 
Male (%) 0.51 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.52 0.52 0.49 0.49 0.48 
Urban (%) 0.43 0.45 0.46 0.43 0.43 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.43 
Married (%) 0.78 0.74 0.73 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.88 0.89 0.90 
Born before 1950 (%) 0.23 0.35 0.32 0.29 0.24 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.11 
Born 1950-1961 (%) 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.29 0.30 0.31 
Born 1962-1980 (%) 0.43 0.38 0.41 0.45 0.50 0.45 0.41 0.41 0.43 
Born in 1981 or after (%) 0.07 
   
0.03 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.16 
 
Data source: CHNS 1989-2009 
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Table 5.2: Data description for pooled data (four age groups) 
          
Employee sample (Ordinary Least Square model) 
Variable 
Born  Born  Born  Born  
before 1950 1950-1961 1962-1980 in 1981 or after 
Real hourly wage rate (Yuan) 2.99 3.88 4.11 6.35 
Years of schooling (Years) 6.53 9.41 10.06 10.89 
Experience (Years) 40.71 26.31 13.57 5.11 
Male (%) 0.63 0.6 0.53 0.5 
Urban (%) 0.53 0.53 0.44 0.4 
Married (%) 0.99 0.98 0.63 0.23 
Full sample (Heckman selection model) 
Variable 
Born  Born  Born  Born  
before 1950 1950-1961 1962-1980 in 1981 or after 
Years of schooling (Years) 5.88 8.43 9.6 10.36 
Experience (Years) 44.09 30.21 14.39 3.83 
Male (%) 0.5 0.51 0.51 0.52 
Urban (%) 0.48 0.47 0.39 0.39 
Married (%) 0.98 0.98 0.64 0.19 
 
Data source: CHNS 1989-2009 
 
 
5.4 Empirical results 
Table 5.3 presents results of repeated cross-section OLS, as in equation (5.1). We find, 
in common with others that education returns for one additional year generally increase 
from 2.6 percent in 1989 to 7.9 percent in 2009. Results by groups are very similar to 
the aggregated results in 1989, and this is consistent with the highly regulated wage 
setting in the 1980s. With the ownership reform in the 1980s, the role of state-owned 
enterprises has been weakened in the Chinese economy and has triggered the 
transformation from a planned labour allocation system into a well-functioning labour 
markets (Appleton et al., 2005). China authorized the “socialist market economy” to 
accelerate reforms, including to the labour markets, the effect of which led to a major 
reduction in rates of returns for the aggregated sample or groups in the early 1990s. 
Camposa and Jolliffe’s (2003) study of Hungary, as well as that of Flabbi et al. (2008) 
in examining eight transition economies (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, 
Poland, Russia, Slovak Republic and Slovenia) argue that the skills acquired cannot be 
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easily transferred to a changed economic situation. Thus one would expect to see a 
temporary decline to returns during any period of transition.  
Between the trough of 1.4 percent in 1993 and peak of 9.4 percent in 2004, there 
is a continuous rising trend of education returns for one additional year, which is also 
noted in the most recent literature (for example, Liu et al. (2010)). After 1997, the four 
groups experience different, but still increasing paths of education returns.  Groups born 
before 1950 (8 percent for one additional year) and 1962-1980 (10 percent for one 
additional year) have a peak in 2004 as for the employee sample, while the other two 
groups experience peaks in 2006 (both around 10 percent for one additional year). The 
decline of education returns after 2004 is caused mainly by the structural break of 
education returns of the group born before 1950. Their dramatic fall of education returns 
(from the peak value to insignificance) may reflect the human capital loss of 
compulsory retirement (especially for women), and the rapidly depreciated human 
capital from education by the new skill-biased technology (Liu et al., 2010). This loss 
can only be partly offset by the rising employment proportions of the younger groups 
with still significant and high education returns. 
Table 5.4 shows the estimates from OLS regressions using the pooled dataset for 
all eight waves. In order to test whether schooling only reflects the signal effects of 
innate ability the interaction of schooling and experience has been regarded as an 
explanatory variable, as in equation (5.9). For all employees, the coefficient of 
schooling is 6 percent for one additional year. The highest coefficients are for groups 
born before 1950 and in 1981 or after (around 10 percent), but they are below 5 percent  
for the other two middle-aged groups, suggesting lower rates of returns to schooling 
acquired during the Mao era. The difference between Table 5.4 and Table 5.3 is derived 
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from the interaction item of schooling and experience. The coefficients of schooling in 
Table 5.4 are actually the education returns when the labour market experience is equal 
to zero (Friedrich, 1982). Thus, the above results only show that the new entrants of the 
oldest and youngest groups have higher education returns than new entrants in the other 
two groups. We need to investigate the interaction item for the marginal effects of 
schooling with experience. 
The interaction variable of schooling and experience (divided by 100) is only 
significantly negative for the full employee sample and the group born before 1950, 
which casts doubt on the human capital explanation of education. In order to show the 
dynamics of changing schooling returns by groups, we follow Dreher and Gassebner 
(2007) and Potrafke (2009) to evaluate the marginal effects of schooling at various 
points of the distribution of experience; namely at the 5
th
, 25
th
, median, 75
th
 and 95
th
 
percentiles of the interacted variable.38 Using this method we can distinguish between 
the impact of schooling on wage rates when the levels of experience are low and high. 
All marginal effects are presented in the bottom panel of Table 5.4. 
                                                             
38
 We use the 5
th
 percentile and 95
th
 percentile to replace the minimum and maximum experience years, 
which are extreme values and hence not representative. 
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Table 5.3: Ordinary Least Square regressions, by year 
 
Employee sample All years 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
Years of schooling 0.043*** 0.026*** 0.015*** 0.014** 0.028*** 0.051*** 0.094*** 0.090*** 0.079*** 
 
0.003 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.007 
R-squared 0.597 0.138 0.12 0.102 0.1 0.09 0.222 0.238 0.197 
N 17,212 2,712 2,759 2,307 2,080 1,879 1,695 1,787 1,993 
Born before 1950 All years 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
Years of schooling 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.009 0.014 0.02 0.070*** 0.080** 0.026 -0.106 
 
0.004 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.019 0.016 0.033 0.043 0.068 
R-squared 0.482 0.211 0.097 0.117 0.055 0.236 0.25 0.441 0.304 
N 2,962 877 736 551 339 210 116 80 53 
Born 1950-1961 All years 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
Years of schooling 0.048*** 0.026*** 0.020* 0.017 0.047*** 0.065*** 0.086*** 0.107*** 0.095*** 
 
0.005 0.009 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.016 0.017 0.015 0.018 
R-squared 0.614 0.084 0.087 0.077 0.134 0.101 0.19 0.253 0.192 
N 5,706 978 1,006 849 704 590 531 544 504 
Born 1962-1980 All years 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
Years of schooling 0.051*** 0.026*** 0.014 0.014 0.022** 0.034*** 0.100*** 0.093*** 0.087*** 
 
0.004 0.009 0.009 0.012 0.009 0.01 0.012 0.01 0.008 
R-squared 0.605 0.063 0.05 0.063 0.09 0.047 0.222 0.209 0.226 
N 7,891 857 1,017 907 1,034 1,000 936 997 1,143 
Born in 1981 or after Years in 2000s 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
Years of schooling 0.080*** 
    
0.022 0.025 0.102*** 0.087*** 
 
0.013 
    
0.154 0.038 0.023 0.016 
R-squared 0.306 
    
0.04 0.354 0.243 0.204 
N 650         79 112 166 293 
 
Note: The standard errors are in italics and adjusted by clusters. *** Significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%.  Province dummies are included for all 
regressions. Year dummies are included in the ‘all years’ regression. Constants and controlled variables are not reported. 
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Table 5.4: Ordinary Least Square regressions, by age group 
 
  Employee 
sample 
Born  
before 1950 
Born 
1950-1961 
Born 
1962-1980 
Born  
in 1981 or 
after 
Years of schooling 0.060*** 0.091*** 0.047*** 0.041*** 0.093*** 
 0.005 0.019 0.013 0.008 0.026 
School*experience/100 -0.067*** -0.178*** 0.004 0.063 -0.265 
 0.015 0.053 0.048 0.043 0.413 
Experience 0.030*** 0.136*** 0.054*** 0.020** 0.032 
 0.003 0.023 0.014 0.008 0.076 
Experience square -0.000*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001 
 0 0 0 0 0.003 
R-squared 0.598 0.484 0.614 0.605 0.308 
N 17212 2962 5706 7891 653 
Marginal effects of schooling (OLS) 
 Percentile 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 
 Experience 3.41 11.57 21.39 31.83 47.98 
Employee 
sample 
Marginal effects 0.058*** 0.052*** 0.046*** 0.038*** 0.028*** 
standard error 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 
Born 
before 1950 
Marginal effects 0.085*** 0.071*** 0.053*** 0.035*** 0.006 
standard error 0.018 0.014 0.009 0.004 0.007 
Born 
1950-1961 
Marginal effects 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 
standard error 0.012 0.008 0.005 0.006 0.012 
Born 
1962-1980 
Marginal effects 0.043*** 0.048*** 0.054*** 0.061*** 0.071*** 
standard error 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.008 0.015 
Born 
in 1981 or after 
Marginal effects 0.084*** 0.062*** 0.036   
standard error 0.015 0.028 0.067   
 
Note: The standard errors are in italics and adjusted by clusters. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 
5%, * significant at 10%.  Constants and controlled variables are not reported. 
 
At the fifth percentile of potential labour markets experience (3.41 years), the groups 
born before 1950 and in 1981 or after have the marginal effects of about 8.5 percent , 
higher than the other two middle-aged groups (each around 4.5 percent ), and similar to 
the coefficients of schooling as experience equals 0. With increase in experience, the 
groups born before 1950 and in 1981 or after have declining marginal effects of 
schooling. However, the group born 1962-1980 has significant and increasing marginal 
effects, which are also significant and stable over experience for the group born 1950-
1961.  
Figure 5.1 illustrates the trends of marginal effects of schooling with increasing 
experience, with the lower and upper limits of one standard deviation for all the 
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employees and the four groups. Equation (5.7) shows that the coefficients of schooling 
only reflect the signal of innate ability, because the coefficients of interaction are 
insignificantly different from zero. Hence, the signal model fits the group born 1950-
1961 in Table 5.4 and Figure 5.2 very well. If the interactions have negative coefficients, 
the longer an individual has been out of school, the lower are his/her education returns 
for one additional year of schooling, which fits the groups born before 1950 and in 1981 
or after in Table 5.4 and Figure 5.2. Possible explanations for this difference include a 
vintage effect, the rising quality of education, and greater mobility among younger 
workers because they have made fewer employer-specific investments. People with 
longer experience also are likely to be more constrained by wage compression and other 
restrictions of past employment arrangements. Coefficients of schooling in this case 
may include both signal and human capital effects of schooling, which would be a 
traditional endogeneity problem. 39  
Moreover, if the innate ability or education enhanced human capital can also 
enhance human capital from on-the-job training and “learning by doing” processes, 
education enhanced human capital is positively correlated (hence complementary) with 
experience enhanced human capital in equation (5.7). The longer an individual has been 
out of school, the higher are his/her returns to education. Therefore, the group born 
1962-1980 (if they are employed) can benefit from the “rent” from interaction between 
education and experience. In this case, coefficients of schooling also include both signal 
and human capital effects of schooling and show a rising trend in Figure 5.1. 
                                                             
39
 We acknowledge the possible endogeneity of schooling in the sense of unobserved innate ability in the 
OLS regressions and the bias it can cause. We have corrected the endogeneity biases in the section 3.6 of 
the chapter 3. 
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Figure 5.1: Ordinary Least Square Model (OLS) - marginal effects and low/upper 
limits 
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Next, we will use the Heckman selection model to correct selection biases. We 
apply the Heckman selection model to provide consistent, asymptotically efficient 
estimates for schooling. Table 5.5 presents the results of the Heckman selection model 
using equation (5.9) and (5.10). The selectivity effect (lambda) is significant for the full 
sample and the four groups. LR/Wald tests of independent equations (rho = 0) are easily 
rejected for all ML specifications. These tests clearly justify the Heckman selection 
model with data. By correcting the selection bias, the education returns for the full 
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sample decrease from 6 percent to 5.2 percent for one addition year, and decrease from 
9.1 percent to 7.4 percent for the group born before 1950.  Returns do not change very 
much for the group born 1950-1961, while the two younger groups have higher rates 
(from 4.1 percent to 11.8 percent for the group 1962-1980; and from 9.3 percent to 22.1 
percent for the group born in 1981 or after) than in the OLS specification. Although 
these results are only point estimates, as experience is equal to 0, we still find that they 
are closer to the results in other transition countries (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004; 
Flabbi et al., 2008). 
The Heckman correction also has a significant effect on coefficients of interaction 
of schooling and experience. Figure 5.2 illustrates all negative correlations (substitution 
relationship) between marginal effects of schooling and experience. Compared with the 
OLS estimates, the interactive variable of schooling and experience becomes 
significantly negative for the largest baby-boom group (1962-1980) and the one-child-
policy group (in 1981 or after). Selection biases seem very serious for the group 1962-
1980. The positive coefficients of interaction variable in OLS regressions just fit the 
“rents”, as above-equilibrium wages in this group and could give rise to a “hitting the 
jackpot” effect when a job is won (Peng and Siebert, 2008). After we correct the 
selection biases, the significantly positive trend of the group 1962-1980 in Figure 5.1 is 
replaced by a significantly negative trend in Figure 5.2. 
The only insignificant coefficient remains that to be found in the group born 1950-
1961, the schooling years of which may only reflect the innate ability as we find in the 
OLS regressions. This is not very surprising, because the group born 1950-1961 mainly 
received their education during the “Cultural Revolution” period (1966-1976), when 
education chances were only allocated for selected students based on political virtue. 
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Those from families of workers, peasants or soldiers were deemed the most “virtuous” 
and were among the first admitted. This has generated the label of worker-peasant-
soldier student (gong-nong-bing xueyuan) for those students entering college during the 
early 1970s. Identification as a Cultural Revolution-era university student continues to 
carry a negative loading and, in general, depressed opportunities for advancement 
(Broaded, 1990; Fleisher and Wang, 2005).  
For the only-child-policy group, even though the starting education for one 
additional year are as high as about 20 percent , the most rapidly depreciation of 
education offsets the high coefficients of schooling as a new entrant. However, since we 
have only a few hundred observations in the youngest group, any formal interpretation 
should be concerned with caveats and needs further research. Therefore, the human 
capital explanation of education is supported by our study, except for the group 
educated during the “Cultural Revolution”.   
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Table 5.5: Heckman Selection Model 
 
  Full  
sample 
Born  
before 
1950 
Born 
1950-1961 
Born 
1962-1980 
Born  
in 1981 or after 
Ln (real hourly wage rate) 
Years of schooling 0.052*** 0.074*** 0.049*** 0.118*** 0.221*** 
 
0.005 0.019 0.013 0.01 0.037 
School*experience/100 -0.059*** -0.135*** -0.028 -0.105** -1.009**  
 
0.015 0.052 0.046 0.052 0.499 
Experience 0.027*** 0.117*** 0.062*** 0.116*** 0.369*** 
 
0.003 0.023 0.014 0.01 0.103 
Experience square -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.014*** 
 
0 0 0 0 0.004 
Select model 
Married 0.080** 0.248* 0.234** -0.054 -0.220*** 
 
0.034 0.145 0.113 0.033 0.064 
Years of schooling 0.210*** 0.246*** 0.282*** 0.182*** 0.217*** 
 
0.008 0.038 0.028 0.012 0.029 
School*experience/100 -0.470*** -0.651*** -0.574*** -0.355*** -1.040*** 
 
0.022 0.09 0.083 0.06 0.398 
Experience 0.172*** 0.062 0.193*** 0.213*** 0.535*** 
 
0.005 0.041 0.025 0.011 0.075 
Experience square -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.022*** 
 
0 0 0 0 0.003 
 Mills (lambda) -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.04*** 0.67*** 0.80*** 
standard error 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.09 
t value -5.04 -3.81 -3.27 20.68 8.87 
Wald test of indep. 
Eqns. (rho=0) 
25.62*** 13.51*** 10.79*** 342.22*** 70.59*** 
0 0.0002 0.001 0 0 
N 40,933 9,494 11,668 17,218 2,553 
Marginal effects of schooling (Heckman selection model) 
   Percentile 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 
  Experience 3.41 11.57 21.39 31.83 47.98 
Full  
sample 
Marginal effects 0.050*** 0.045*** 0.039*** 0.033*** 0.024*** 
standard error 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 
Born  
before 1950 
Marginal effects 0.069*** 0.058*** 0.045*** 0.031*** 0.009 
standard error 0.017 0.013 0.008 0.004 0.007 
Born 
1950-1961 
Marginal effects 0.048*** 0.046*** 0.043*** 0.040*** 0.036*** 
standard error 0.012 0.008 0.005 0.006 0.011 
Born 
1962-1980 
Marginal effects 0.114*** 0.106*** 0.096*** 0.085*** 0.068*** 
standard error 0.009 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.017 
Born 
in 1981 or after 
Marginal effects 0.187*** 0.104*** 0.005   
standard error 0.023 0.030 0.075   
 
Note: The standard errors are in italics and adjusted by clusters. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 
5%, * significant at 10%.  Year dummies and province dummies are included for all regressions. 
Constants and controlled variables are not reported. 
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Figure 5.2: Heckman Selection Model - marginal effects and low/upper limits 
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5.5 Conclusions 
Schooling itself can be identified as an augmenting factor of human capital, or merely 
as signals reflecting innate ability. Moreover, traditional aggregated Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) estimates are biased by selection problem and mix-ups of group 
heterogeneity. Hence, in this chapter, we use the eight waves of the CHNS dataset to 
estimate the rates of private returns to schooling in China over the last two decades. We 
categorize data into four age groups according to the structural breaks of the birth rates 
and estimate the marginal effects of schooling with increasing experience, using OLS 
and the Heckman selection model.  
The OLS estimates of education returns for all employees are 2.6 percent for one 
addition year in 1989, then declining to around 1.5 percent in 1991 and 1993, possibly 
due to the political campaigns and delayed reaction for labour market reforms. And then, 
education returns increase to 9.4 percent for one addition year in 2004 before finally 
dropping to 7.9 percent for one addition year in 2009 with the dramatic loss of human 
capital of the retired group (born before 1950). Groups have similar education returns in 
the early years of the 1990s, but they experience heterogeneous dynamics later. This 
suggests a substantial influence of institutional reforms in the labour markets. Our age 
group analyses support the labour market transition explanation of the evolution of 
returns to schooling over time. 
The interactive variable of schooling and experience is used in the Heckman 
model to test whether years of schooling only reflect the signal effects of innate ability. 
We find that the education returns for one additional year decline with labour markets 
experience, which supports the human capital hypothesis for all groups except the group 
born 1950-1961, the schooling years of which may only reflect the innate ability or 
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political virtue as we find in the OLS regressions. This conclusion is not very surprising 
because the group born 1950-1961 mainly received their education during the “Cultural 
Revolution” period (1966-1976) when education chances were only allocated for 
selected students based on political virtue. This group also has the lowest education 
returns after we correct selection biases, just as found by Fleisher and Wang (2005). 
Selection biases are very serious for the group born in the period 1962-1980. The 
positive coefficients of interaction variable in OLS regressions just fit the “rents” 
argument in this group with a “hitting the jackpot” effect when a job is won. After we 
correct the selection biases, the significantly positive marginal effects of the group 
1962-1980 in OLS are replaced by significantly negative marginal effects, as expected 
by the human capital hypothesis. For the only-child-policy group, even though the 
starting returns to schooling are as high as about 20 percent, the most rapid depreciation 
of education offsets the high coefficients of schooling as a new entrant. However, since 
the youngest group has many fewer observations than other groups in our sample, any 
formal interpretation should be concerned with caveats and demands further research.  
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS 
 
The reform and open-door policy launched in 1978 is the starting point of China’s 
success story. The reforms in the past three decades include many dramatic changes in 
political and economic institutions, but the most important issue may be the economic 
transition from a highly central-planned economy to a market-oriented one. The market-
oriented economic reform began in the agricultural sectors at the end of the 1970s, 
spreading to manufacturing sectors by the speeding-up of marketization in the goods 
market and an increase of profitability within the state sector. As more and more foreign 
and private enterprises are set up, market competition causes the financial collapse of 
many State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) which initiates dramatic changes in the labour 
market in the mid-1990s.   
Under the planned economic regime, Chinese workers have lifetime employment 
whereby their jobs are assigned by the state. SOEs are not allowed to fire workers, and 
wage levels are centrally determined and rigid (Kang and Peng, 2012). The growth of 
joint venture firms and demand for openness increase demand for workers in cities, met 
by the large scale inflow of rural migrants to urban centre. Ownership reforms shift 
workers from SOEs to private sector employment. Workers can have the right to move 
and search for a job around the country. This labour mobility enhances the growth 
‘miracle’, and is also associated with a widening of income inequality.  This is partly 
due to reform-induced economic gains that are distributed more to workers on a high 
income than to those on a low income, and also comes from economic restrictions, such 
as enlarged disparities of  low and high skills with labour market liberalization  (Meng, 
2004).  
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The open-door policy is the other side of the coin. Openness to the outside world 
is not only reflected in increasing exports and income for the whole country, but also in 
an adaptation process of new technology and entrepreneurship from other countries.  
Joining the global value chain, especially after becoming a formal member of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2000 brings big success for China and causes its 
economic convergence towards western developed countries. However, openness also 
exacerbates the economic disparities among regions and provinces within China.  
Enterprises and workers in the Coastal region can benefit more from the export-
orientation policies. This region has advantages in the import and export of goods to 
other countries and can attract more Foreign Domestic Investment (FDI). Through these 
channels, technical spill-over and increasing productivity disparities also help this 
region to push their institutional reforms further (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Acemoglu, 
2003). Capital and skill-intensive technologies from developed countries dramatically 
change the institutions of ownership, education and labour market in the Coastal region. 
The other three regions, the Northeast, Interior and West have been left behind, not only 
in an economic but also in an institutional sense, which exacerbates the regional 
disparities within China.        
  
This thesis uses the “Human Capital Theory” to discuss four issues in China: 
production processes and productivity change, regional productivity disparities and 
convergence, cost competitiveness comparisons and private returns to education. 
Chapter 2 reviews the growth accounting model and measurement methods of physical 
capital services, labour inputs, and labour composition index (LCI) and Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) from 1978 to 2009.  We verify that China’s growth miracle in the 
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past 30 years, that has mostly taken place in the advanced Coastal region, has mainly 
been driven by the accumulation of physical capital. The growth rate of physical capital 
in the Coastal region was at about double the speed of the other three regions before 
2000. During the period of 2000-2009, the growth rates of physical capital in the 
regions previously left-behind have caught up with that of the Coastal. However, the 
contribution of physical capital has been declining, from 83 percent in the 1980s to 
66.80 percent in the 2000s. In contrast, the contribution of TFP increased from 18 
percent to 32 percent, and the contribution of LCI rose from 0.2 percent to 1.4 percent 
over the same period. 
The annual growth rate of labour productivity in the Coastal region is the highest 
among all regions in China, while labour input and TFP growth contribute more in the 
Interior and West regions. This can reasonably explain the regional disparities. Since 
physical capital can make a similar contribution to economic growth in all regions, with 
more investment of physical capital in the less developed three regions, further research 
would find more evidence of convergence of economic growth. The labour composition 
index suggests that education also contributes to economic growth. The Interior has the 
highest LCI, perhaps because it is centrally located between Beijign and Shanghai (two 
educational and economic centers in China). Although its contribution is not as 
dominant as physical capital in the current stage of development, LCI is becoming more 
and more important in the growth accounting model.  Education will be the next 
potential engine of economic growth among regions, leaving much space for less 
developed regions to catch up. 
China’s spectacular economic growth coincides with unequal economic 
performance of provinces and regions. Chapter 3 examines the effects of the physical 
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and human capital formation on labour productivity, TFP and wages, incorporating the 
market reform factors such as ownership types, One-Child Policy, openness and fiscal 
expenditures on human capital. We find that, in a simple production function, the 
adjusted labour inputs are slightly more important than capital services. And the returns 
to adjusted labour in the West, which has the poorest education resources, are the 
highest among the four regions. This suggests a strategy to attract more skilled workers, 
while the returns to capital input are still the highest in the traditional industrial 
Northeast region.  
In more accurate specifications for labour productivity, TFP and wages, the 
Chinese economic miracle is mainly propelled by the deepening of capital rather than 
labour composition. Perhaps because of this, the effect of human capital factor has been 
reflected in market reform variables such as ownership, population growth, openness, 
and fiscal expenditures on human capital. Privatization and openness are more 
important than labour composition for TFP growth. Competing with foreign companies 
advances provincial labour productivity and TFP growth, but harms the local average 
wages. The average wage is harmed by the fiscal expenditures on human capital, 
verifying Zhang and Zou (1998)’s argument that central government spending (such as 
in highways, railways, power stations, telecommunications and energy) benefits 
economic growth, while a high degree of provincial government spending is associated 
with lower provincial economic growth. 
The structural break between the pre-1994 and post-1994 periods illustrates 
significant differences in economic growth patterns, especially for the TFP and wage 
growth, indicating that the market economy affects determinants of productivity. After 
1994, the capital inputs contribute more with the open-door policy but, since the late 
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1990s, the returns to labour composition decrease with the expansion of education. The 
four regions also show different patterns in their economic growth path. The capital 
services and labour composition mostly help the labour productivity and wage growth 
in the West. The greater share of persons employed in the public sector and the private 
firms, the higher the labour productivity and TFP growth in the Northeast and Coastal 
regions. The collective-owned enterprises are the most important ownership type in the 
West region for all the three productivity proxies. For the Interior region, the public 
sector and private firms only have a significant effect for wages. Openness facilitates 
the technology spill-over for all four regions, but harms labour productivity in the 
Northeast and wages in the Coastal region. 
Moreover, provinces within each region present strong evidence of beta-
convergence for all three productivity proxies. The highest convergence speed is found 
in the provinces in the Northeast and Coastal regions for labour productivity and TFP 
growth, suggesting fast technology spill-over. The provinces in the Coastal region, as 
the most advanced region in China, have the highest convergence speed for average 
wages, while the provinces within the Northeast region has no convergence trends for 
average wages by both OLS and Generalized Least Square (GLS) models.  
Finally, we overcome the endogeneity problem of education by the Generalized 
Instrumental Variables (GIV) method using the CHNS dataset (1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 
2000, 2004, 2006 and 2009), considering the composition bias of gender and age groups.  
We argue the validity of instruments applied in the past literatures, and try three 
instruments (number of brothers, number of sisters and tap water). These IVs pass the 
required tests (F tests and Chi-square tests). Results of the first step of GIV regressions 
show that, children born before 1961 appear mainly to compete with their same sex 
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siblings, while children born in the largest baby boom period 1962-1980 compete with 
both brothers and sisters, and girls suffer from siblings than boys. For the youngest 
group born in 1981 and after, girls appear to compete strongly with their sisters. Having 
tap water always favours the years of schooling for the three age groups and both 
genders (more for girls, as expected). By eliminating the endogeneity problem, males’ 
returns to schooling are higher than females’ for the two older age groups, in contrast 
with the higher returns for females in the OLS estimation. The returns from the GIV 
estimators are higher than the OLS estimators, supporting the domination of downwards 
bias due to the endogeneity problem.  
 
Chapter 4 examines Chinese international and provincial disparities and 
convergence of sectors from the perspective of labour cost, the drivers of unit labour 
cost, decomposition of cost competitiveness and the convergence trends among 
countries/provinces by industry. This chapter helps us to understand how the Chinese 
economy gains comparative advantages against other countries and how provinces 
within China compete against each other. 
First, with regard to the relative unit labour cost (RULC), China has the largest 
cost advantage against the USA and the three large (the UK, France and Germany) 
among the 19 countries. The comparative advantage of China’s industry appears in 
high-tech manufacturing subsectors against Mediterranean countries, and low-tech 
manufacturing subsectors against neighbouring countries (such as Korea). Within China, 
provinces are able to develop a development strategy according to their cost 
competitiveness. Provinces in the Northeast and Coastal regions have strong advantages 
in the manufacturing subsector, coming from the huge physical capital accumulation 
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which we discussed in chapter 2 and 3. The undeveloped West and Interior provinces 
could encourage Agriculture, Construction and Real estate sectors, as they have 
relatively low price of land. The Interior provinces also can make full use of their 
geographic location for the transportation sector.   
Comparing the time periods before 1995 and afterwards, the relative unit labour 
costs (RULC) from both international and provincial comparisons decline, but due to 
different reasons. For the international comparison, that is because the relative nominal 
labour cost (RNLC) decreases about 80 percent, while for the provincial comparison, 
that is because the growth rate of relative labour productivity (RLP) is higher than the 
growth rate of RNLC.  
Third, the decomposition of cost competitiveness across the country and 
provinces demonstrates many interesting points. During 1978-1995, China has cost 
competitiveness gains relative only to some Mediterranean countries (Spain, Greece, 
Italy and Portugal), relying on the negative change in labour productivity of these 
countries (verified by their situations in the current financial crisis) and depreciation in 
China’s currency relative to foreign currencies. After 1995, these countries still have 
negative changes in labour productivity, but China loses its cost competitiveness by the 
appreciation in China’s currency. Similarly, for comparison between provinces, there are 
many more cost competitiveness gains across sectors before 1995 than afterwards. 
Finally, we find convergence of RULCs appears more before 1995 than 
afterwards for both country and provincial comparisons. And, when we compare the 
convergence trends of RULC, RLP and RNLC, we find that the quickest speed of 
convergence occurs in RLP for the international comparison, but in RULC for the cross-
provincial comparison. RLP converge much more quickly than RULC and RNLC, 
166 
 
suggesting a fast technology spill-over effect across the world. Labour market 
institutional factors such as collective bargaining of trade unions, minimum wages, 
coordination of wage setting and employment protection legislation may all withhold 
the convergence of wages and the unit labour costs across the country.  
 
In chapter 5, we investigate the private returns to schooling in China over the last 
two decades. The OLS estimates of returns to schooling for all employees are 2.6 
percent in 1989, declining to around 1.5 percent in 1991 and 1993 possibly due to 
political campaigns and delayed reactions to labour market reforms. From then, returns 
to schooling increase to 9.4 percent in 2004 and finally drop to 7.9 percent in 2009 with 
the dramatic loss of human capital of the retired age group (people born before 1950). 
This general rising of returns education over time with the increase of demand and 
supply for human capital are consistent with Katz and Murphy (1992) and Murphy and 
Welch (1992; 1993). They find changes in the supply and demand for human capital, 
leading to the coexistence of higher estimated rates of returns to education and 
significant increases in wage inequality.  
Our age group analyses support the labour market transition explanation, of the 
evolution of returns to schooling over time. Cohorts have similar returns to schooling in 
the early years of the 1990s, but experience heterogeneous dynamics later, suggesting a 
large influence of institutional reforms in the labour market.  For example, the wage 
reforms may free up the compressed wage differentials. 
The interactive variable of schooling*experience is used in the Heckman model to 
test whether years of schooling only reflect the signal effects of innate ability. We find 
that the returns to schooling decline with labour markets experience, which supports the 
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human capital hypothesis for all cohorts except the cohort born 1950-1961. The 
schooling years of these people may only reflect the innate ability or political virtue, as 
we find in the OLS regressions. This is not very surprising, because the cohort born 
1950-1961 mainly received their education during the “Cultural Revolution” period 
(1966-1976) when education opportunities were only allocated for selected students, 
based on their political virtue. This cohort also has the lowest returns to schooling after 
we correct selection biases, just as found by Fleisher and Wang (2005). 
Selection biases are very serious for the age group (people born during 1962-
1980). The positive coefficients of the interaction variable in the OLS regressions just 
fit the “rents” argument in this group, with a “hitting the jackpot” effect when a job is 
won. After we correct the selection biases, the significantly positive marginal effects of 
the age group 1962-1980 in OLS are replaced by significantly negative marginal effects, 
as expected by the human capital hypothesis. For the One-Child policy age group 
(people born in 1981 or after), even though the starting returns to schooling are as high 
as about 20 percent, here the most rapid depreciation of education offsets the high 
coefficients of schooling as a new entrant. However, since the youngest group has far 
fewer observations than other groups in our sample, any formal interpretation should be 
concerned with caveats and demands further research.  
 
For further research, we would extend Chinese provincial comparison of cost 
competitiveness to the manufacturing subsectors, over long-run time period. It would 
need better data for detailed manufacturing sectors for gross value added, price deflators 
of gross value added, number of staff and workers and labour compensation. In addition 
we would acquire detailed annual working hours for macro data, to evaluate labour 
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productivity and nominal labour cost more precisely. 
In summary, this thesis emphasizes the effect of human capital on productivity 
and wages. After thirty years’ development, relying heavily on physical capital 
accumulation, Chinese regions appear to show disparities and convergence on labour 
productivity, TFP and wages. Reforms and open-door policies bring prosperity as well 
as inequality in China. Contribution of physical capital to economic growth has been 
declining. Finding the new growth engine and keeping the economic growth more 
sustainable are great challenges for China. We find that human capital formation should 
be the next growth engine for Chinese sustainable growth because of its potential and 
great space to improve (Ding and Knight, 2011). 
However, institutional impediments to human capital formation are still very 
serious in China. Inefficient and monopoly SOEs occupy more than half the economic 
resources and make the emerging market and private enterprises very weak. Lacking an 
efficient financial market of education has made higher education in China an unfair 
inverse-selection process (Wang et al., 2010). Moreover, the command and market 
coordination in the labour market leaves the lagging private sector behind (Kang and 
Peng, 2012). Therefore, this thesis concludes that Chinese sustainable growth in the 
next stage is dependent on human capital formation. And institutional reforms on 
ownership, education and labour market, as well as continuous openness to the 
globalization, would be the vital factors for human capital formation in China, as Hayek 
said: Our generation has forgotten that the system of private property is the most 
important guaranty of freedom. It is only because the control of the means of production 
is divided among many people acting independently that we as individuals can decide 
what to do with ourselves (Hayek, 1944). 
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APPENDICES 
 
Figure A2.1: Geographic graph of four regions in this thesis 
(1) Northeast region: Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning; 
(2) Coastal region: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Shandong, and Guangdong-Hainan; 
 (3) Interior region: Shanxi, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei and Hunan; 
(4) West region: Guangxi, Sichuan-Chongqing, Guizhou, Yunnan, Inner Mongolia, 
Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang. 
Note: We do not study Tibet due to data limitation.
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Figure A3.1: Birth rate (per thousand, 1949-2009) 
 
Data source: National Bureau of Statistics (1999) ; China Statistics Yearbook 2010 
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Table A2.1: Measured wage rate – average approach (by province) 
                                  
 
Urban Area Rural Area 
 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
 
Primary school and below  
LN 0.66 0.85 0.93 
 
4.09 5.01 4.14 4.63 0.79 1.14 1.43 
 
5.85 4.76 6.31 17.4 
HLJ   
  
2.81 2.89 3.47 12.5 7.05   
  
2.63 6.78 5.19 5.31 13.01 
JS 0.68 1.16 1.55 3.01 5.24 6.02 6.12 8.08 0.54 1.04 1.29 4.21 4.61 3.52 3.94 7.61 
SD 0.55 0.65 1.12 2.5 5.57 4.2 3.18 9 0.68 0.82 1.26 3.11 4.1 6.46 3.88 9.59 
HEN 0.57 1.19 0.81 2.48 2.84 3.28 3.57 7.45 0.65 0.97 0.73 2.55 2.62 2.52 3.59 7.63 
HB 0.61 0.74 1.15 3.01 3.13 3.22 6.18 13.12 0.42 0.79 0.82 2.76 6.57 6.88 7.88 21.52 
HUN 0.79 1.05 2.71 3.06 5.24 8.88 6.99 9.24 0.87 0.93 2.58 5.51 4.44 5.85 6.23 6.41 
GX 0.6 0.79 1.22 2.53 5.39 2 3.69 5.25 0.77 0.87 1.14 2.58 4.2 3.6 3.77 5.61 
GZ 0.52 0.61 2.23 3.75 3.12 3.85 4.86 7.57 0.65 0.91 1.09 3.27 4.03 4.57 6.33 5.37 
 
Lower middle school 
LN 0.5 0.65 1.07 
 
3.63 4.51 6.21 7.34 0.56 0.93 1.39 
 
4.3 10.34 8.5 9.67 
HLJ   
  
3.37 5.92 6.34 6.51 9.62   
  
3.35 3.71 4.47 4.78 7.13 
JS 0.63 1 1.6 3.87 4.48 7.23 7.67 11.23 0.61 0.73 1.18 3.31 4.31 5.63 4.98 8.44 
SD 0.67 0.7 1.36 2.61 7.39 4.68 5.34 10.6 0.79 0.79 1.16 2.8 4.23 5.6 6.74 11.13 
HEN 0.68 0.76 1.06 2.46 4.67 4.14 4.85 8.52 1.66 0.6 1.09 2.73 4.59 3.41 6.21 11.69 
HB 0.6 0.78 1.26 3.08 3.73 7.97 13.42 11.12 0.49 0.62 1.13 2.63 4.16 4.22 3.9 7.99 
HUN 0.83 0.94 1.55 3.88 3.94 6.87 13.33 7.71 0.95 1.09 3.44 3.08 3.81 5.97 10.07 27.86 
GX 0.62 0.59 1.59 2.84 3.72 4.77 3.76 7.89 0.51 0.88 1.35 3.08 5 4.95 5.24 7.31 
GZ 0.49 0.58 1.01 2.54 7.63 4.08 5.5 7.74 0.61 0.52 1.57 3.43 4.08 10.03 8.42 11.78 
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Continue... 
  
                
 
Urban Area Rural Area 
 
1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
 
Upper school 
LN 0.6 0.67 0.86 
 
4.56 5.77 9.21 7.53 0.47 1.87 1.17 
 
3.33 5.45 7.95 10.22 
HLJ   
  
2.99 5.78 9.58 9.19 14.09   
  
1.86 4.33 7.17 8.21 10.5 
JS 0.6 0.93 1.7 3.9 5.45 9.55 10.83 15.83 0.55 0.69 1.04 3.54 5.97 7.46 9.98 14.28 
SD 0.6 0.71 1.48 3.18 7.1 5.65 5.57 11.98 0.72 0.81 1.44 3.62 4.5 7.11 6.47 7.14 
HEN 0.58 0.69 0.84 2.89 4.56 7.03 8.34 9.71 0.4 0.66 0.78 2.69 6.16 4.3 5.51 7.8 
HB 1.05 0.8 1.24 3.47 5.2 5.19 7.87 14.12 0.52 0.59 0.89 3.44 5.1 5.76 8.07 15.03 
HUN 0.77 0.89 1.31 5.17 8.87 8.88 11.32 13.91 0.91 0.96 0.93 4.27 4.84 8.46 7.89 13.25 
GX 0.54 0.57 1.18 2.75 3.97 6.24 7.43 12.94 0.49 0.69 1.08 2.95 4.62 5.87 6.28 7.97 
GZ 0.52 0.68 1.26 2.58 4.13 8.93 10.83 13.68 0.48 0.64 0.77 2.92 5.35 8.34 7.02 23.6 
 
College and above 
LN 0.63 0.75 1.09 
 
5.84 10.31 11.79 16.17 0.59 0.82 1.02 
 
3.85 6.16 9.51 12.29 
HLJ   
  
3.04 7.33 9.97 14.83 18.79   
  
1.88 4.79 6.41 13.64 13.92 
JS 0.6 1.05 1.49 4.64 9.68 12.16 18.26 22.02 0.48 0.67 1.12 3.32 6.15 21.2 12.81 14.57 
SD 0.74 0.6 1.25 3.25 3.91 5.28 5.92 11.68   0.56 0.71 1.83 3.86 6.07 9.32 11.3 
HEN 0.61 0.83 3.13 4.96 7.23 9.27 16.07 14.27 0.77 1.17 
 
2.98 5.96 4.26 9.11 8.84 
HB 0.82 0.94 2.1 5.47 8.53 7.63 8 17.38 0.51 0.65 1.43 4.32 6.02 7.27 8.51 11.48 
HUN 0.8 0.84 1.32 5.69 10.09 14.63 18.85 19.99 0.7 0.87 0.98 2.33 47.32 8.7 7.95 23.75 
GX 0.51 0.69 1.68 4.12 6.87 6.44 11.67 14.18 0.48 0.79 0.6 3.7 4.82 5.3 9.04 11.29 
GZ 0.64 0.7 1.2 2.6 4.56 16.6 10.16 17.31 0.58 0.59 0.61 3.19 4.38 6.77 11.1 25.99 
 
Note: Province abbreviations (LN: Liaoning; HLJ: Heilongjiang; JS: Jiangsu; SD: Shandong; HEN: Henan; HB: Hubei; HUN: Hunan; GX: Guangxi; GZ: Guizhou) 
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Table A2.2: Ordinary Least Square model (by province) 
 
Primary school and below  1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
  Urban Area 
Liaoning 0.184 0.051 -0.056 
 
0.081 0.025 -0.83 -0.267 
Heilongjiang 
   
-0.233 -0.324 -0.344 -0.004 0.083 
Jiangsu 0.259 0.165 0.396** -0.095 0.152 -0.042 -0.112 0.275* 
Shandong 0.008 -0.131 0.13 -0.275* 0.232 -0.19 -0.543*** 0.238 
Henan 0.036 0.226 -0.188 -0.280* -0.289 -0.447 -0.557*** 0.121 
Hubei 0.181 0.023 0.035 -0.084 -0.32 -0.598* -0.195 0.627** 
Hunan 0.365** 0.238* 0.653*** -0.101 0.26 0.591*** 0.149 0.443** 
Guangxi 0.053 -0.033 0.147 -0.213 -0.113 -0.834*** -0.402 -0.11 
Guizhou -0.055 -0.167* 0.293 -0.185 -0.219 -0.285 -0.277 0.171 
  Rural Area 
Liaoning 0.261 0.246 0.063 
 
0.216 -0.258 -0.181 0.532*** 
Heilongjiang 
   
-0.217 -0.082 0.014 -0.274 0.420** 
Jiangsu 0.03 0.027 0.143 0.088 0.118 -0.426** -0.467*** 0.145 
Shandong 0.095 -0.004 0.118 -0.219 -0.027 -0.209 -0.471*** 0.118 
Henan 0.147 -0.087 -0.266* -0.404** -0.593** -0.843*** -0.648*** 0.098 
Hubei -0.205 -0.148 -0.226 -0.224 0.116 -0.176 0.034 0.738** 
Hunan 0.225* 0.078 0.141 0.271 0.023 -0.021 -0.409 0.05 
Guangxi 0.185 0.059 0.118 -0.251** 0.047 -0.308* -0.539*** -0.064 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
186 
 
Continue... 
                  
Lower middle school 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
  Urban Area 
Liaoning 0.06 -0.072 0.004 
 
-0.059 -0.178 -0.213 0.101 
Heilongjiang   
  
-0.07 0.329* 0.111 -0.084 0.447*** 
Jiangsu 0.268* 0.287 0.480*** 0.031 0.133 0.308* 0.069 0.467*** 
Shandong 0.292** -0.055 0.138 -0.324** 0.146 -0.203 -0.317* 0.370**  
Henan 0.260* 0.092 0.006 -0.249 0.028 -0.381 -0.269* 0.287*   
Hubei 0.213 0.148 0.226 -0.044 -0.07 0.061 0.069 0.426*** 
Hunan 0.329* 0.194 0.374** 0.095 0.044 0.319** 0.557*** 0.176 
Guangxi 0.142 -0.155* 0.208 -0.183 -0.104 -0.004 -0.637*** 0.113 
Guizhou -0.038 -0.15 0.02 -0.285 0.205 -0.229 -0.206 0.21 
  Rural Area 
Liaoning 0.022 0.108 0.097 
 
-0.092 -0.022 -0.158 0.243 
Heilongjiang   
  
-0.345** -0.089 -0.095 -0.380* 0.106 
Jiangsu 0.149 -0.059 0.165 -0.079 0.095 -0.012 -0.264* 0.308**  
Shandong 0.184 0.101 0.178 -0.358** -0.004 -0.089 -0.114 0.227*   
Henan 0.283 -0.169 0.069 -0.390** -0.069 -0.249* -0.104 0.312**  
Hubei -0.036 -0.095 -0.017 -0.312** 0.058 -0.221 -0.433*** 0.174 
Hunan 0.343** 0.076 -0.06 -0.028 0.07 0.241* 0.157 0.747**  
Guangxi 0.072 0.143 0.209 -0.116 0.13 -0.014 -0.319* 0.125 
Guizhou 0.106 -0.291** 0.287* 0.008 0.068 0.354* -0.026 0.537*** 
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Continue... 
  
        Upper school 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
  Urban Area 
Liaoning 0.207 0.004 -0.073 
 
0.17 0.143 0.048 0.242*   
Heilongjiang   
  
-0.103 0.409** 0.594*** 0.364** 0.815*** 
Jiangsu 0.226* 0.280*** 0.593*** 0.175 0.358* 0.681*** 0.435** 0.891*** 
Shandong 0.183 0.015 0.298** -0.06 0.282 0.036 -0.175 0.471**  
Henan 0.181 0.004 -0.152 -0.099 0.187 0.24 0.21 0.452*** 
Hubei 0.348* 0.197** 0.256 0.001 0.243 0.01 0.058 0.692*** 
Hunan 0.365** 0.242** 0.268* 0.199 0.536*** 0.619*** 0.507*** 0.825*** 
Guangxi 0.029 -0.166* 0.223 -0.116 0.045 0.293 0.115 0.412*   
Guizhou 0.07 -0.011 0.249* -0.224 0.151 0.483*** 0.282 0.797*** 
  Rural Area 
Liaoning 0.03 0.077 -0.121 
 
-0.11 0.032 0.085 0.420**  
Heilongjiang   
  
-0.510*** 0.197 0.364** 0.127 0.626*** 
Jiangsu 0.109 -0.07 0.07 0.011 0.321 0.306 0.25 0.558*** 
Shandong 0.329* 0.054 0.239 -0.053 0.178 0.127 -0.053 0.138 
Henan -0.186 -0.158 -0.189 -0.228* -0.012 -0.105 -0.176 0.199 
Hubei -0.006 -0.137 -0.063 -0.112 0.135 0.163 0.138 0.796*** 
Hunan 0.152 0.11 -0.058 0.099 0.218 0.346** 0.11 0.709*** 
Guangxi -0.006 -0.08 0.064 -0.117 0.175 0.133 -0.069 0.275**  
Guizhou -0.016 -0.034 -0.149 -0.063 0.281 0.384* 0.12 1.012*** 
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Continue... 
  
        College and above 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
  Urban Area 
Liaoning 0.239** 0.04 0.095 
 
0.369* 0.785*** 0.636*** 1.005*** 
Heilongjiang   
  
-0.233 0.608*** 0.699*** 0.650*** 1.195*** 
Jiangsu 0.197 0.311*** 0.294 0.374** 0.775*** 0.934*** 1.005*** 1.367*** 
Shandong 0.516*** -0.149 0.251* 0.066 0.084 0.164 0.018 0.701*** 
Henan 0.220* 0.123 0.353** 0.362** 0.690*** 0.637** 0.666*** 0.818*** 
Hubei 0.482** 0.216** 0.574*** 0.042 0.494** 0.471*** 0.266* 1.121*** 
Hunan 0.488*** 0.153 0.265 0.539*** 0.784** 1.005*** 0.907*** 1.242*** 
Guangxi 0.131 0.065 0.432*** 0.326*** 0.611 0.441*** 0.847*** 0.966*** 
Guizhou 0.292** -0.014 0.234* -0.135 0.189 0.657* 0.538*** 0.965*** 
  Rural Area 
Liaoning 0.246 0.119 0.037 
 
0.04 0.195 0.420** 0.751*** 
Heilongjiang   
  
-0.474*** 0.272 0.339** 0.508*** 0.873*** 
Jiangsu 0.089 -0.038 0.201 0.093 0.438* 1.316*** 0.693*** 0.970*** 
Shandong 0 0.073 -0.359*** -0.493*** 0.1 0.274 0.171 0.669*** 
Henan 0.467*** 0.845*** 
 
0.005 0.574 0.1 0.487* 0.479**  
Hubei -0.053 -0.078 0.27 0.290** 0.499* 0.424*** 0.298** 0.647*** 
Hunan 0.287** 0.135 -0.039 -0.265 1.783 0.598*** 0.242 1.058*** 
Guangxi 0.014 0.21 -0.523** 0.195* 0.332 0.194 0.390** 0.763*** 
Guizhou -0.06 -0.081 -0.430*** -0.015 -0.038 0.389** 0.466** 0.927*** 
 
Note: The coefficients are incremental effects on the baseline group “primary school and below * Guizhou province * rural area”. 
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Table A2.3: Labour composition index (by province) 
          Average LN HLJ JS SD HEN HB HUN GX GZ 
1989 95.21 103.70 100.88 101.86 109.76 103.16 100.76 97.15 100.00 
1990 94.74 104.01 100.79 101.85 111.11 103.34 100.88 96.63 99.70 
1991 94.36 104.31 100.28 101.87 110.87 103.17 101.01 96.41 99.14 
1992 94.13 104.59 99.79 101.84 110.40 103.11 101.09 96.48 98.67 
1993 94.10 104.87 99.55 101.82 110.92 103.42 101.11 96.79 98.52 
1994 94.14 105.13 99.42 101.80 111.78 103.82 101.01 97.18 98.47 
1995 94.14 105.37 99.28 101.76 112.41 104.13 100.74 97.55 98.39 
1996 94.11 105.60 99.13 101.72 112.84 104.36 100.34 97.89 98.28 
1997 94.33 105.12 99.05 101.55 113.26 105.55 98.91 97.81 98.27 
1998 94.24 105.30 99.33 101.53 113.56 105.10 98.77 98.27 98.31 
1999 94.19 105.74 99.41 101.57 113.17 104.84 100.44 98.27 98.48 
2000 94.06 105.85 99.50 101.71 116.40 104.66 103.36 98.90 98.68 
2001 93.94 106.13 99.88 101.91 119.94 104.15 106.95 99.63 99.06 
2002 94.01 105.97 98.35 101.94 121.52 106.52 108.10 99.31 100.42 
2003 94.98 105.82 100.99 101.71 119.38 104.92 110.21 100.20 100.82 
2004 95.69 106.02 100.37 101.50 121.91 104.75 110.02 102.34 102.33 
2005 94.64 108.28 104.69 100.71 119.36 104.99 109.29 99.46 96.96 
2006 94.52 107.02 104.67 101.08 119.27 105.51 108.76 100.66 97.48 
2007 94.59 105.65 103.09 102.54 119.73 104.80 110.64 100.35 98.88 
2008 95.54 104.68 103.39 102.74 120.81 104.37 111.15 100.21 101.50 
2009 95.40 104.60 104.29 103.27 121.20 102.89 114.15 100.80 99.94 
OLS LN HLJ JS SD HEN HB HUN GX GZ 
1989 101.30 104.79 103.09 103.68 102.72 103.58 101.68 99.89 100.00 
1990 101.04 104.88 103.15 103.76 102.97 103.87 101.78 99.77 100.02 
1991 100.82 104.95 103.16 103.96 103.04 104.08 101.80 99.80 99.84 
1992 100.69 105.02 103.14 104.11 103.21 104.32 101.70 99.94 99.68 
1993 100.71 105.08 103.19 104.21 103.77 104.70 101.41 100.11 99.73 
1994 100.77 105.14 103.24 104.27 104.42 105.08 101.06 100.31 99.85 
1995 100.79 105.20 103.26 104.28 104.91 105.35 100.75 100.52 99.91 
1996 100.77 105.24 103.26 104.24 105.23 105.52 100.47 100.73 99.92 
1997 101.37 105.00 103.07 104.11 105.73 106.39 99.66 100.70 99.94 
1998 100.99 105.08 103.60 103.90 106.19 106.05 99.60 101.08 99.96 
1999 101.06 105.25 103.85 103.77 105.72 105.84 100.81 100.98 100.17 
2000 100.90 105.84 104.08 104.32 109.28 106.84 102.62 102.13 100.27 
2001 100.72 106.63 104.59 105.06 113.17 107.99 104.85 103.35 100.47 
2002 100.46 106.66 102.99 105.46 114.94 105.33 105.42 103.00 101.20 
2003 103.19 106.76 105.81 104.96 112.03 107.07 106.91 104.26 101.90 
2004 101.57 106.93 105.13 104.97 115.42 108.40 107.50 106.53 102.15 
2005 101.76 108.92 109.81 103.20 112.52 107.54 106.56 103.49 99.33 
2006 101.73 107.28 109.91 103.58 112.30 108.88 105.86 104.45 98.68 
2007 101.78 107.34 108.03 104.42 112.69 107.92 107.66 103.40 99.51 
2008 103.70 106.49 108.28 104.86 113.73 107.70 108.44 103.00 100.94 
2009 104.10 106.77 109.34 105.23 114.18 107.16 109.83 103.79 100.03 
Note: Province abbreviations (LN: Liaoning; HLJ: Heilongjiang; JS: Jiangsu; SD: Shandong; HEN: 
Henan; HB: Hubei; HUN: Hunan; GX: Guangxi; GZ: Guizhou) 
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Table A2.4: Labour composition index (by region) 
                  
 
Average approach OLS regression 
Year Northeast Coastal Interior West Northeast Coastal Interior West 
1989 96.31 99.31 101.61 100.00 98.83 100.79 102.33 100.00 
1990 95.81 99.28 101.96 99.62 98.57 100.88 102.52 99.96 
1991 95.44 99.01 101.90 99.27 98.34 100.95 102.60 99.89 
1992 95.22 98.73 101.81 99.09 98.20 100.98 102.67 99.87 
1993 95.18 98.60 101.95 99.16 98.20 101.02 102.80 99.98 
1994 95.24 98.52 102.12 99.31 98.27 101.06 102.93 100.14 
1995 95.36 98.44 102.16 99.47 98.33 101.06 103.02 100.30 
1996 95.52 98.36 102.11 99.62 98.38 101.04 103.04 100.47 
1997 94.85 98.32 101.86 99.68 98.10 100.98 103.12 100.54 
1998 95.16 98.33 101.76 99.82 98.20 101.07 103.11 100.64 
1999 95.32 98.31 101.79 99.95 98.26 101.09 103.21 100.79 
2000 95.26 98.83 102.98 100.41 98.38 101.76 104.68 101.41 
2001 95.24 99.68 104.39 101.02 98.54 102.81 106.48 102.15 
2002 95.31 99.72 104.00 101.22 98.64 102.90 105.56 102.22 
2003 96.40 100.14 103.82 102.40 100.51 103.31 105.86 103.48 
2004 96.52 99.82 104.49 103.87 99.41 103.16 107.64 104.58 
2005 96.11 99.18 103.67 100.08 100.20 102.38 105.98 101.38 
2006 95.67 99.46 103.71 100.74 99.54 102.66 106.04 101.47 
2007 95.67 99.47 103.97 101.37 99.80 102.45 106.28 101.65 
2008 96.06 100.15 104.31 102.20 100.51 103.05 106.82 102.14 
2009 95.90 100.56 104.77 102.08 100.84 103.53 107.24 102.06 
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Table A3.1: The location of the 211 famous universities 
Coastal region 
Province Whole Beijing Tianjin Hebei Shanghai Jiangsu Zhejiang Fujian Shandong Guangdong*   
Number 63 26 4 1 10 11 1 2 3 5   
Percentage 56% 23% 3% 1% 9% 10% 1% 2% 3% 4%   
Northeast region 
Province Whole Liaoning Jilin Heilongjiang               
Number 12 4 3 5               
Percentage 10% 3% 3% 4%               
Middle region 
Province Whole Shanxi Anhui Jiangxi Henan Hubei Hunan         
Number 16 1 3 1 1 7 3         
Percentage 15% 1% 3% 1% 1% 6% 3%         
West region 
Province Whole Inner Mongolia Guangxi Sichuan* Guizhou Yunnan Shaanxi Gansu Qinghai Ningxia Xinjiang 
Number 24 1 1 7 1 1 8 1 1 1 2 
Percentage 22% 1% 1% 6% 1% 1% 7% 1% 1% 1% 2% 
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Table A3.2: Data description 
        
 
Born  
before 1961 
Born  
1962-1980 
Born  
in 1981 or after 
Male 
Real hourly wage rate (Yuan) 3.77 4.62 6.8 
Years of schooling (Years) 8.96 10.12 10.59 
Number of brothers 2.07 1.58 0.43 
Number of sisters 1.89 1.65 0.81 
Having tap water (%) 0.83 0.81 0.82 
Experience (Years) 30.86 13.73 5.45 
Urban (%) 0.49 0.41 0.38 
Female 
Real hourly wage rate (Yuan) 3.17 3.53 5.92 
Years of schooling (Years) 8.35 9.98 11.18 
Number of brothers 2.01 1.58 0.82 
Number of sisters 2.06 1.67 0.64 
Having tap water (%) 0.89 0.84 0.79 
Experience (Years) 27.32 13.36 4.77 
Urban (%) 0.58 0.47 0.43 
 
Data source: CHNS 1989-2009  
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Table A3.3: OLS regressions  
 
Dependent:  
ln (hourly wage) 
All 
Born  
before 1961 
Born  
1962-1980 
Born  
in 1981 or after 
Male 
Schooling 0.015*** 0.021*** 
  
 
0.004 0.004 
  
Schooling*year1991 -0.010* -0.010* 0.001 
 
 
0.006 0.006 0.012 
 
Schooling*year1993 -0.004 -0.005 0.008 
 
 
0.007 0.008 0.013 
 
Schooling*year1997 0.01 0.011 0.018 
 
 
0.009 0.01 0.011 
 
Schooling*year2000 0.032*** 0.041*** 0.032*** 
 
 
0.009 0.012 0.012 
 
Schooling*year2004 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.085*** 0.082** 
 
0.009 0.012 0.01 0.033 
Schooling*year2006 0.074*** 0.077*** 0.087*** 0.080*** 
 
0.008 0.011 0.011 0.028 
Schooling*year2009 0.061*** 0.073*** 0.071*** 0.069*** 
 
0.008 0.016 0.01 0.025 
R-squared 0.607 0.594 0.615 0.301 
N 9961 5383 4255 323 
Female 
Schooling 0.025*** 0.036*** 
  
 
0.006 0.007 
  
Schooling*year1991 0 -0.006 0.022**                 
 
0.008 0.009 0.011                 
Schooling*year1993 -0.009 -0.013 0.004                 
 
0.009 0.011 0.016                 
Schooling*year1997 0.006 -0.004 0.031**                 
 
0.011 0.015 0.013                 
Schooling*year2000 0.035*** 0.049*** 0.035***                 
 
0.011 0.014 0.012                 
Schooling*year2004 0.086*** 0.071*** 0.107*** 0.103**  
 
0.011 0.02 0.012 0.04 
Schooling*year2006 0.073*** 0.046*** 0.099*** 0.095*** 
 
0.01 0.014 0.012 0.023 
Schooling*year2009 0.082*** 0.031 0.114*** 0.088*** 
 
0.01 0.021 0.011 0.019 
R-squared 0.608 0.57 0.609 0.346 
N 6708 2742 3636 330 
 
Note: The standard error adjusted by clusters. The significant levels are * for 10%; ** for 5% and *** for 
1%. Experience, experience square, urban dummy, provincial dummies and year dummies are not 
reported. 
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Coefficients table for years of schooling:  
 
  
All 
Born  
before 1961 
Born  
1962-1980 
Born  
in 1981 or after 
Male 
1989 0.015 0.021 
  1991 0.005 0.011 0 
 1993 0.015 0.021 0 
 1997 0.015 0.021 0 
 2000 0.047 0.062 0.032 
 2004 0.082 0.089 0.085 0.082 
2006 0.089 0.098 0.087 0.162 
2009 0.076 0.094 0.071 0.151 
Female 
1989 0.025 0.036 
  1991 0.025 0.036 0.022 
 1993 0.025 0.036 0.022                
1997 0.025 0.036 0.053                 
2000 0.06 0.085 0.057                 
2004 0.111 0.107 0.129 0.103 
2006 0.098 0.082 0.121 0.198 
2009 0.107 0.036 0.136 0.191 
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Table A3.4: First step of GIV regressions  
          
 Dependent:  
Years of schooling All 
Born  
before 1961 
Born  
1962-1980 
Born  
in 1981or after 
Male 
Number of brothers -0.163*** -0.199*** -0.131*** -0.325 
 
0.026 0.036 0.032 0.278 
Number of sisters -0.060** 0.025 -0.175*** 0.054 
 
0.026 0.034 0.041 0.203 
Having tap water 1.492*** 1.512*** 1.417*** 1.056*** 
 
0.108 0.147 0.113 0.292 
R-squared 0.321 0.389 0.157 0.443 
N 11415 5955 5020 440 
F-test 78.46 44.81 62.67 5.19 
Female 
Number of brothers -0.167*** -0.066 -0.214*** -0.011 
 
0.043 0.062 0.058 0.262 
Number of sisters -0.174*** -0.123*** -0.202*** -0.379*   
 
0.031 0.047 0.041 0.214 
Having tap water 1.742*** 1.867*** 1.641*** 1.534*** 
 
0.135 0.23 0.137 0.288 
R-squared 0.396 0.501 0.201 0.475 
N 7926 3176 4309 441 
F-test 68.32 23.32 60.18 13.44 
 
Notes:  
1. The standard error adjusted by clusters. The significant levels are * for 10%; ** for 5% and *** 
for 1%. Experience, experience square, urban dummy, provincial dummies and year dummies 
are not reported. 
2. The chi-2 statistics are 308.14 between males and females, 274.4 among the male groups and 
240.39 among the female groups. 
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Table A3.5: Second step of GIV regressions  
 
          
Dependent:  
ln (hourly wage)  
All 
Born  
before 1961 
Born  
1962-1980 
Born  
in 1981 or after 
Male 
Schooling 0.031*** 0.061*** 
  
 
0.011 0.016 
  
Schooling*year1991 -0.013 -0.014 -0.012 
 
 
0.011 0.011 0.04 
 
Schooling*year1993 0.014 0.009 0.035 
 
 
0.014 0.015 0.052 
 
Schooling*year1997 0.003 -0.006 -0.017 
 
 
0.015 0.016 0.034 
 
Schooling*year2000 0.039*** 0.041** 0.025 
 
 
0.014 0.017 0.035 
 
Schooling*year2004 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.161*** 0.118* 
 
0.015 0.021 0.029 0.064 
Schooling*year2006 0.098*** 0.088*** 0.188*** 0.125*** 
 
0.013 0.018 0.031 0.048 
Schooling*year2009 0.079*** 0.074*** 0.103*** 0.146*** 
 
0.015 0.022 0.031 0.055 
R-squared 0.596 0.582 0.607 0.282 
N 9607 5212 4082 313 
Female 
Schooling 0.048*** 0.068*** 
  
 
0.015 0.021 
  
Schooling*year1991 -0.014 -0.015 0.05 
 
 
0.015 0.017 0.036 
 
Schooling*year1993 -0.023 -0.021 -0.01 
 
 
0.016 0.017 0.036 
 
Schooling*year1997 -0.022 -0.025 0.002 
 
 
0.018 0.02 0.033 
 
Schooling*year2000 0.024 0.034 0.041 
 
 
0.017 0.021 0.028 
 
Schooling*year2004 0.052*** 0.034 0.135*** 0.175*** 
 
0.018 0.026 0.025 0.05 
Schooling*year2006 0.031* 0.003 0.116*** 0.158*** 
 
0.018 0.024 0.03 0.044 
Schooling*year2009 0.075*** 0.053* 0.137*** 0.167*** 
 
0.019 0.028 0.029 0.043 
R-squared 0.586 0.567 0.584 0.337 
N 6569 2704 3545 320 
 
Note: The standard error adjusted by clusters. The significant levels are * for 10%; ** for 5% and *** for 
1%. Experience, experience square, urban dummy, provincial dummies and year dummies are not 
reported. 
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Coefficients table for years of schooling:  
 
          
  All 
Born  
before 1961 
Born  
1962-1980 
Born  
in 1981 or after 
Male 
1989 0.031 0.061 
  
1991 0.031 0.061 0 
 
1993 0.031 0.061 0 
 
1997 0.031 0.061 0 
 
2000 0.07 0.102 0 
 
2004 0.103 0.134 0.161 0.118 
2006 0.129 0.149 0.188 0.243 
2009 0.11 0.135 0.103 0.264 
Female 
1989 0.048 0.068 
  
1991 0.048 0.068 0 
 
1993 0.048 0.068 0                 
1997 0.048 0.068 0                 
2000 0.048 0.068 0                 
2004 0.1 0.068 0.135 0.175 
2006 0.079 0.068 0.116 0.333 
2009 0.123 0.121 0.137 0.342 
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Table A4.1: Recode China’s Input-Output tables to EU KLEMS code 
 
China, Input-Output table in 1987, 1990, 1992 and 1995 - 33 industries 
Description EU KLEMS code 
Agriculture AtB 
Coal mining and dressing C 
Petroleum and natural gas extraction C 
Metals mining and dressing C 
Non-metal minerals mining and dressing C 
Food manufacturing 15 
Textile industry 17 
Sewing and leather industry 18t19 
Timber processing and furniture 20 
Papermaking and cultural, educational goods 21t22 
Production and supply of electric power, steam and hot water E 
Petroleum processing 23 
Coking, gas and products E 
Chemical industry 24 
Construction material and other non-metal mineral products 26 
Smelting and pressing of metals 28 
Metal products 27 
Machinery 29 
Transport equipment 34 
Electric equipment and machinery 31 
Electric and telecommunications equipment 32 
Instruments, meters and office equipment 33 
Machinery repairing 31 
Other industries 36 
Construction F 
Transport and Post services I 
Commerce G 
Catering services H 
Passenger transport I 
Public and resident services N 
Education, culture and research M 
Finance and insurance J 
Government agencies L 
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Continue... 
 
China, Input-Output table in 1997 - 40 industries 
Description EU KLEMS code 
Agriculture AtB 
Coal mining and dressing C 
Petroleum and natural gas extraction C 
Metals mining and dressing C 
Non-metal minerals mining and dressing C 
Food and tobacco manufacturing 15t16 
Textile industry 17 
Garments, leather, down and related products 18t19 
Timber processing and furniture 20 
Papermaking and cultural, educational goods 21t22 
Petroleum processing and coking 23 
Chemical industry 24 
Non-metal mineral products 26 
Smelting and pressing of metals 28 
Metal products 27 
Machinery 29 
Transport equipment 34 
Electric equipment and machinery 31 
Electric and telecommunications equipment 32 
Instruments, meters and office equipment 33 
Machinery repairing 31 
Other industries 36 
Recycling and disposal 37 
Utilities E 
Production and supply of gas E 
Production and supply of tap water E 
Construction F 
Transport and Storage I 
Post and telecommunication services I 
Commerce G 
Catering services H 
Passengers transport I 
Finance and insurance J 
Real estate K 
Social services K 
Health care, sports and social welfare N 
Education, culture and arts, radio, film, and television M 
Scientific research  K 
Polytechnic services K 
Government agencies and others L 
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Continue... 
 
China, Input-Output table in 2002 and 2007 - 42 industries 
Description 
EU KLEMS 
code 
Agriculture AtB 
Coal mining and dressing C 
Petroleum and natural gas extraction C 
Metals mining and dressing C 
Non-metal minerals mining and dressing C 
Food and tobacco manufacturing 15t16 
Textile industry 17 
Garments, leather, down and related products 18t19 
Timber processing and furniture 20 
Papermaking and cultural, educational goods 21t22 
Petroleum processing and coking 23 
Chemical industry 24 
Non-metal mineral products 26 
Smelting and pressing of metals 28 
Metal products 27 
Manufacturing of general and specific purpose machinery 29 
Transport equipment 34 
Electric equipment and machinery 31 
Manufacturing of communication equipment, computers and 
other electronic equipment 32 
Manufacturing of measuring instruments and machinery for 
cultural activity and office work 33 
Other manufacturing 36 
Recycling and disposal 37 
Utilities E 
Production and supply of gas E 
Production and supply of tap water E 
Construction F 
Transport and Storage I 
Post and telecommunication services I 
Information transfer, computer services and software K 
Wholesale and retail trade G 
Accommodation and catering H 
Finance and insurance J 
Real estate K 
Leasing and commercial services K 
Tourism I 
Scientific research  K 
Technical services K 
Other social welfare K 
Education M 
Health care, social insurance and welfare N 
Culture, sports and entertainment N 
Public administration and social organization L 
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Appendix A4.2 Manufacturing subsector ratios derived from the seven Chinese Input-Output tables 
 
Industry 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
15t16 12.3% 12.3% 12.3% 12.3% 12.3% 12.3% 12.3% 12.3% 12.3% 12.3% 12.6% 13.0% 13.3% 12.3% 11.7% 
17 10.8% 10.8% 10.8% 10.8% 10.8% 10.8% 10.8% 10.8% 10.8% 10.8% 10.7% 10.6% 10.6% 9.5% 8.8% 
18t19 3.4% 3.4% 3.4% 3.4% 3.4% 3.4% 3.4% 3.4% 3.4% 3.4% 3.5% 3.6% 3.7% 3.6% 3.6% 
20 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.6% 1.6% 1.5% 1.4% 
21t22 5.7% 5.7% 5.7% 5.7% 5.7% 5.7% 5.7% 5.7% 5.7% 5.7% 5.7% 5.7% 5.8% 5.5% 5.3% 
23 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 3.9% 3.8% 3.6% 3.0% 2.6% 
24 14.9% 14.9% 14.9% 14.9% 14.9% 14.9% 14.9% 14.9% 14.9% 14.9% 15.2% 15.5% 15.7% 15.4% 15.1% 
26 8.3% 8.3% 8.3% 8.3% 8.3% 8.3% 8.3% 8.3% 8.3% 8.3% 8.6% 8.9% 9.2% 9.6% 9.8% 
27 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.1% 4.2% 4.2% 4.0% 3.8% 
28 8.9% 8.9% 8.9% 8.9% 8.9% 8.9% 8.9% 8.9% 8.9% 8.9% 8.6% 8.4% 8.1% 9.3% 10.1% 
29 12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 11.7% 11.0% 10.4% 11.3% 12.0% 
31 5.9% 5.9% 5.9% 5.9% 5.9% 5.9% 5.9% 5.9% 5.9% 5.9% 5.3% 4.7% 4.3% 4.3% 4.4% 
32 2.8% 2.8% 2.8% 2.8% 2.8% 2.8% 2.8% 2.8% 2.8% 2.8% 2.8% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 
33 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.8% 0.8% 
34 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 4.0% 4.6% 
36t37 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 1.1% 1.3% 1.6% 1.9% 2.1% 
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Continue…. 
 
Industry 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
15t16 13.1% 14.8% 16.6% 14.6% 13.1% 12.8% 12.6% 12.3% 12.0% 11.8% 11.5% 11.3% 11.0% 10.8% 10.5% 
17 8.1% 7.5% 6.9% 8.1% 9.0% 8.2% 7.6% 6.9% 6.4% 5.8% 5.7% 5.5% 5.4% 5.2% 5.1% 
18t19 4.1% 4.8% 5.5% 6.1% 6.5% 6.0% 5.5% 5.1% 4.6% 4.3% 4.2% 4.2% 4.2% 4.2% 4.2% 
20 1.5% 1.7% 2.0% 2.1% 2.1% 2.3% 2.4% 2.5% 2.7% 2.8% 2.8% 2.8% 2.8% 2.7% 2.7% 
21t22 5.2% 5.0% 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 5.0% 5.3% 5.6% 5.9% 6.2% 5.6% 5.0% 4.5% 4.1% 3.7% 
23 2.7% 2.8% 2.8% 2.6% 2.3% 2.4% 2.5% 2.6% 2.7% 2.7% 2.9% 3.1% 3.4% 3.6% 3.9% 
24 14.8% 14.4% 14.0% 14.0% 14.0% 14.3% 14.5% 14.7% 15.0% 15.2% 14.7% 14.3% 13.9% 13.4% 13.0% 
26 9.6% 9.5% 9.3% 9.4% 9.6% 8.4% 7.4% 6.5% 5.7% 5.0% 5.3% 5.5% 5.8% 6.2% 6.5% 
27 3.8% 3.8% 3.7% 3.9% 4.0% 3.9% 3.9% 3.8% 3.8% 3.7% 3.7% 3.8% 3.8% 3.8% 3.8% 
28 10.0% 9.8% 9.7% 7.3% 5.4% 6.1% 6.9% 7.7% 8.7% 9.8% 10.3% 10.8% 11.3% 11.8% 12.3% 
29 11.1% 10.2% 9.4% 9.5% 9.5% 9.5% 9.5% 9.5% 9.5% 9.5% 9.5% 9.5% 9.5% 9.5% 9.4% 
31 4.4% 4.4% 4.4% 4.9% 5.3% 5.1% 5.0% 4.8% 4.6% 4.5% 4.6% 4.6% 4.7% 4.7% 4.8% 
32 3.4% 4.0% 4.7% 4.4% 4.3% 4.7% 5.2% 5.8% 6.4% 7.1% 7.1% 7.1% 7.1% 7.1% 7.0% 
33 0.7% 0.6% 0.5% 0.7% 0.9% 0.9% 1.0% 1.0% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 
34 4.5% 4.5% 4.4% 4.6% 4.8% 5.1% 5.4% 5.8% 6.2% 6.6% 6.6% 6.6% 6.6% 6.6% 6.6% 
36t37 1.2% 0.7% 0.4% 2.7% 4.4% 4.2% 4.1% 4.0% 3.8% 3.7% 4.0% 4.3% 4.6% 4.9% 5.3% 
 
 
